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THE CONNECTION" 



BETWEEN 



THOUGHT AND MEMORY 



A CONTRIBUTION TO PEDAGOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
ON THE BASIS OF F. WIDORPFELD'S MONO- 
GRAPH " DENKEN UND GEDACHTNIS " 



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

G. STANLEY HALL, LL.D. 

President of Clark University 



BY 

HERMAN T. LUKENS, Ph.D. 

DOCENT IN CLARK UNIVERSITY 



BOSTON, U.S.A. 

D. C. HEATH & CO., PUBLISHERS 

1895 



K 



LV 









Copyright, 1895, 
By Herman T. Lukens. 



TYPOGBAPHY BY C. J. PETEK8 & SON, BOSTON. 



Pbesswobk by S. J. Pabkiiill & Co. 



PREFACE. 



A short time ago a teacher complained to the author 
that she could not get any real help in her school-work 
from reading psychologies and books on education. It is 
hoped that the following book will give help to such teach- 
ers, not only by the central idea that stands out so promi- 
nently, but by its copious illustrations and descriptions of 
mental phenomena, as well as by the practical applications 
in the last chapters. The teacher needs descriptive psychol- 
ogy far more than metaphysical psychology. 

Even a few simple exercises, such as those recommended 
on page 5 for grammar school pupils, would greatly help 
teachers toward appreciating the character of the mental 
processes with which they have to deal. Observation work 
thus begun will be found so interesting and attractive that 
it will easily lead to further introspection and study of the 
laws of association (cf. pp. 41, 42). But still more help 
will be gained if teachers will watch how their own pupils 
think and reason. Make notes of the observations, and 
compare them with such records as those reported in the 
Pedagogical Seminary, vol. ii. pp. 358-396. 

There is nothing in all of this that any bright teacher 
cannot readily understand. But the mistake is too fre- 
quently made of supposing that whatever the teacher 
learns she must forthwith tell her pupils. Nothing could 



IV PREFACE. 

be more fatal to good teaching than to attempt to make 
the child think logically, or learn lessons by the Herbartian 
formal steps. But every teacher should know how chil- 
dren do think, and what the necessary steps in acquiring 
knowledge really are, so as to be able to get out of the 
way and not hinder the pupil's progress, as well as to be 
able when necessary to give just the help that is needed. 

The monograph treatment is eminently adapted to a 
work of this kind. Two of the most helpful and sugges- 
tive books for teachers are already published in this form : 
Radestock's Habit and Its Importance in Education, and 
Lange's Apperception. It is earnestly hoped that others 
will follow. Until the chief points in school-work are 
thus treated, we cannot expect any firm basis for a general 
work, nor would the teachers get much assistance from 
such general reading. For self-instruction, the teacher 
needs clearness, fulness, and practical applications. These 
are the qualities aimed at in a monograph. 

The German monograph on which the following work 
is based grew out of round-table conferences in a teachers' 
reading circle formed for the purpose of study in educa- 
tional psychology. In writing a book for American teach- 
ers I have tried to keep true to the best ideals in the 
German, while at the same time being perfectly free to 
add to, omit, or modify, any statement or ideas whatever. 
When I visited Rector Dorpfeld in 1890, to talk over these 
and other matters with him, he not only gave me full per- 
mission to translate his work, but urged me to make any 
changes and additions I saw fit. Thus it has come to pass 



PREFACE. V 

that this work, while quoting very largely from Dorpfeld' s, 
and being based on it so far as its essential central idea is 
concerned, is yet in no strict sense a translation. When- 
ever better ideas have been found elsewhere, they have 
been unhesitatingly substituted. The explanation of the 
common origin of the two laws of memory, for instance, is 
radically opposed to the view expressed by Dorpfeld and 
all other Herbartians. But I do not believe in the Herbar- 
tian view on this point, and hence have re-written that part 
entirely. The same is true of many other less important 
parts. All of the bibliographical references, and likewise 
many of the illustrations, are additions. 

On the other hand, everything that was essentially Ger- 
man and local in its allusion has been omitted. For the 
many controversial points with other German educators, and 
long explanations applicable to religious instruction in 
Germany only, the reader is referred to the German work. 
It is now in its fifth edition, in the present issue of the 
Collected Works of F. W. Dorpfeld, 11 vols. Gutersloh ; C. 
Bertelsmann, 1894-1895. Dorpfeld died in October, 1893. 

In conclusion, I wish to thank President G. Stanley Hall 

and Dr. Wm. H. Burnham for their encouragement and 

help in the work of revision and of publication. I am also 

greatly indebted to the following friends : President Charles 

De Garmo, Dr. C. C. Van Liew, Dr. Charles A. McMurry, 

and Dr. Frank M. McMurry, for valuable suggestions 

while the book was passing through the press. 

H. T. L. 
Clark University, June, 1895. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Preface iii-v 

Introduction, by President G. Stanley Hall ix 

CHAPTER I. 

Preliminary 1-7 

Statement of the Problem, 1. — Orientation and Explanation of 
Terms, 3. — The Study of Psychology in the Elementary School, 
5. — Clearness of Ideas, 7. 

CHAPTER II. 
The Processes of Thought and Memory 8-38 

A. Of Thought, 8-24. 

Comparison, 8. — Conception, 9. — Spontaneous Concepts, 11. — 
Judgment, 12. — Reasoning, 14. — Graphic Syllogism, 17. — For- 
mation of Sense Percepts, 19. — Elements of Thought, 21.— 
Simple Ideas, 23. — Bibliographical Note, 24. 

B. Of Memory, 24-38. 

Definitions, 25. — Examples, 26. — Memory in Conception, 28. — 
In Judgment, 30. — Spontaneous Judgments, 31. — Memory in 
Reasoning, 33. — In Perception, 34.— Apperception, 35. — Sum- 
mary, 36. — Bibliographical Note, 38. 

CHAPTER III. 

The Laws of Thought and Memory 39-88 

A. Of Memory, 39-53. 
Derivation of Laws of Association, 39. — Aristotle, 39. — Des- 
cartes, 43. — Herbart and the Recent Writers, 45. — Relative Im- 
portance of the Two Laws, 49. — Bibliographical Note, 52. 
vii 



Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

B. Of Thought, 53-88. 
Difference between the Laws of Psychology and those of Logic, 

53. — Genetic Order of Comparison, Judgment, and Conception, 

54. — The Single Thought-Process, 57. — Superordinate and Sub- 
ordinate Concepts, 58. — Examples, 59. — Children's Use of Lan- 
guage, G5. — Language not a True Mirror of the Mental Processes, 
68. — The Law of Conception, 72. — Causes of Spontaneous Judg- 
ments, 73. — Examples, 74. — Disappointed Expectation, 77. — 
Three Forms of Judgments, 80. — Comparison of Laws of Thought 
and Memory, 82. — Imagination, 84. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Application to Pedagogy 89-127 

Limitations, 89. — Steps in Acquiring Knowledge, 90. — Memory 
in Apperception, 93. — Ways and Means of Committing to Mem- 
ory, 95. — Forms of Memorizing, 97. — Relative Value of Rational 
and Mechanical Association in Intensity, Extent, and Direction, 
98. — Spontaneous Memorizing, 102. — Immanent Memorizing, 
107. — Two Forms of Repetition, 109. — Treatment of Reviews, 
112. — Advantages and Disadvantages of Mechanical Repetition, 
114. — Its Service sometimes Indispensable, 119. — Recapitula- 
tion, 121. — Mnemonics, 123. — Ebbinghaus's Experiments on the 
Memory, 125. — Bibliography of the Herbartian School, 127. 

CHAPTER V. 

Illustrations taken from the Subjects of the 

Curriculum 128-158 

First Example — History, 128-141. 

Second Example — Natural Science, 141-145. 

Third Example — Selections to be learned by heart, 145-148. 

Fourth Example — Arithmetic, 148-158. 

CHAPTER VI. 

Summary and Conclusion 159-165 

Reference List of Books 166-169 



INTRODUCTION. 



Dr. Herman T. Lukens, to whom we owe the presenta- 
tion in so attractive English form of this most noted work 
of one of the best German teachers of pedagogy, and who 
as I write has just been advanced in Clark University from 
the position of Honorary Fellow to Docent, is one of the 
most accomplished and promising men in that choice group 
of young Americans who have studied Education in a post- 
graduate and professional way in Europe and at home, and 
have deliberately chosen the work of teaching pedagogy as 
their calling. Unlike too many members of this group, 
Dr. Lukens, although thoroughly trained in Herbartian 
pedagogy and in sympathy with it, does not regard it as 
the consummate formulation of educational theory, nor 
attempt to apply its rubrics blindly and without change to 
the very different material and environment of American 
pedagogy, but has felt it necessary to supplement Herbart, 
both by modern child-study, and by some practical acquaint- 
ance with experimental psychology. It is this that makes 
Dr. Lukens competent to present us with a condensed 
digest, instead of a literal translation, and to enrich these 
pages with copious and valuable notes that render this 
volume more valuable than the original. This, and many 
other signs of the times pointing in the same direction, sug- 
gests how speedily our country is outgrowing its excessive 

ix 



X INTRODUCTION. 

reverence for the German speculators of half a century ago. 
That there are still some to whom it seems the acme of 
philosophic or pedagogic attainment to interpret the tomes 
of these great and useful, but now obsolescent, writers is a 
note of provincialism from which, if all indications do not 
fail, we are soon to be emancipated. 

Save health alone, there is no more important and prac- 
tical topic for teachers to study than that to which this 
little book is devoted. Its subject-matter is presented in a 
clear and elemental manner sure to have speedy fruit in 
the schoolroom, and it is worthy the attention of all prac- 
tical teachers, to whom I have no hesitation in recommend- 
ing it. I cannot forebear laying still more stress than does 
Eector Dorpf eld on the distinction, not only between imma- 
nent and intentional memorizing, but between immanent 
and intentional thinking. The latter is, of course, chiefly 
dealt with in books, but the former is incalculably more 
important ; and to know something of the mysterious nature 
of memory and of thought is one of the chief objects of the 
new study of children. 

G. STANLEY HALL. 
Clark University, 

Worcester, Mass., Sept. 17, 1895. 



THE 

connection between thought 
and memoey. 



CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY. 

There are undoubtedly many more books written about 
the memory than about any other faculty of the human 
mind. Great power of retention is fascinating to most 
people and easily appreciated. The " memory doctors " 
are accordingly numerous, and reap a rich harvest, not- 
withstanding repeated exposures. Thinking is, however, 
somewhat more difficult than remembering, and therefore 
less attractive for most of us. But every educator, at 
least, is interested in both divisions of our subject, and 
must come to some conclusion in his own mind as to the 
relation that these two activities should bear to each other. 
For centuries past many questions relating to thought and 
memory have been discussed with great warmth and ear- 
nestness. Which of these two faculties is the more im- 
portant for culture ? Should the memory be cultivated 
more at one period of life, and the development of the 
thinking powers be left for another period ? Is the great 
importance given to memory a hindrance to productive 
thinking ? Or, vice versa, does the too early cultivation of 
the thinking powers weaken the memory ? There is no 

1 



2 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

topic of instruction, and no problem of moral education 
into which these considerations do not enter at all periods 
of the child's development. 

Although our theme embraces, to be sure, two subjects, 
yet the point of view for their consideration is merely 
the relation in which they stand to each other. Accord- 
ingly, there is no need of presenting either all that is known 
about thought, nor all that is known about memory, but of 
each subject only so much as is requisite in order to explain 
the relation between these two mental activities — first of all 
psychologically, and then applied to practice in the school. 
In the second place, it must not be lost sight of that it is 
mainly the practical field of application that gives the sub- 
ject its broad extent. Let us take an analogous example in 
physics. The laws of gravitation govern the material world 
of the whole universe. Nevertheless, the conception of the 
force of gravitation, together with the most important gen- 
eral laws relating thereto, can without difficulty be made 
intelligible by the help of well-chosen illustrative examples, 
together with something of the practical application of these 
general laws. It would be quite another thing, however, 
to trace out their application in all directions and ramifi- 
cations, — in the field of astronomy, geology, meteorology, 
etc. ; further, of architecture, mechanics, navigation, and 
the many other applied arts. What is possible in physics 
will probably also be possible in psychology. 

Let us note once more our problem distinctly. In the 
psychological portion of our work we have to consider the 
thinking process as well as the memory, in so far as is 
necessary to explain their mutual relation ; the practical 
application needs to be followed only as far as is requisite 
on the one hand to make the above results still somewhat 



STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. 3 

clearer, and on the other hand to help the reader to think 
for himself. 

The mental processes or activities are, as is well known, 
divided into three main classes, — activities of cognition 
(intelligence), emotion (feelings), and volition (desires and 
will). 

The consideration of our theme will have to do, for the 
most part, with the activities of cognition ; first, because 
thought and memory of themselves belong to this class, 
although they stand in very close relation to both of the 
others ; secondly, because the feelings and desires, being 
more vague and indefinite in their very nature, present 
much greater difficulties to closer observation and intro- 
spection. 

Knowledge begins with perceptions through the five 
senses, — sight, hearing, smell, taste, and feeling (touch, 
muscular sense, etc.). 1 This is, however, not to be un- 
derstood as if the sense impressions forthwith produced 
actual perceptions. They result first of all only in sensa- 
tions. A perception does not form until a sensation has 
been frequently repeated, and only after certain other 
psychic processes have taken place. 

The reader should notice from this that the formation of 



1 Whoever wants to, can, even here at the outset, plunge headlong into 
philosophical and theological speculations, with all their old and all their 
new controversies. Sensualism here, idealism there, and so forth. Let 
the reader remember, therefore, once for all, that we are going to concern 
ourselves with facts of experience in psychology — not in how far meta- 
physical doctrines can be spun from them, but simply in so far as they are 
able to give clearness and support in our pedagogical practice. In this 
sense we may accept the old dictum: Nihil est in intellectu, quod antea 
non fuerit in sensu, understanding it to mean, There is nothing in the 
intellect that does not presuppose sense-perceptions. 



4 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

clear perceptions is far from being so simple as it at first 
view seems and is generally considered. If a teacher is 
not thoroughly familiar with the subject of the origin of 
perceptions, he may assume as certain that in instruction 
he will make many mistakes, even in the very first stages 
of the lesson, in particular by expecting more of the pupil's 
power of perception than he is capable of. A step farther. 
If such a knowledge of psychology is required in order to 
give even an object-lesson properly, where things can be 
presented immediately to the senses, how much more neces- 
sary is it when the object must be represented in language, 
in which case the imagination must assist. 

Besides the senses, the mind has still another source 
of knowledge. The senses make report only of the phe- 
nomena of the outer world ; i.e., of the things, properties, 
processes (and their relations) in the world of matter. 
They say nothing, on the other hand, of the phenomena in 
the mind. These latter processes, belonging to the world 
of spirit, make themselves known immediately through 
consciousness. Thus the mind gains ideas not only of the 
things and processes outside, but also of the phenomena of 
its own inner life, especially of ideation itself, of feeling, 
exercise of will, and the relations existing between these. 
How else would the science of psychology be possible? 
And all the other sciences of mind — logic, ethics, law, 
theology, pedagogy, psychiatry, aesthetics, philology, etc. — 
draw essentially from this second source. 

There is a special reason why pedagogy should turn its 
attention to this second source of knowledge. Those sub- 
jects of the curriculum that have most directly to do with 
character-forming, as literature on its humanistic side 
and history, belong in so far to the field of psychology. 



THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 5 

This is shown by the vast array of names and expressions 
there met with, that refer to mental qualities, states, and 
processes. The usual method of presentation aims to 
bring these concretely before the pupils' minds by the his- 
toric events, and by associating these latter with events 
in the experience of the pupils. But the teacher must be 
concerned to see to it that meanwhile this second source 
of knowledge in the pupil's mind is actually at work ; i.e., 
that the words call up corresponding processes and states 
in the mind. The teacher can do considerable to help in 
this in two ways, the first of which is applicable through- 
out the whole course, from the lower grades up ; the second 
is only possible in the upper grades. 

The former work will be accomplished if the teacher 
directs the pupils' attention to psychic processes and states 
as they occur in the lesson, and does his best to make 
them definite and distinct. Three objects will be gained 
by this : first, this kind of instruction will be in the highest 
degree in the interest of character-building ; secondly, the 
pupil learns to be observant of his inner life ; and thirdly, 
he is collecting in this way a desirable store of psycho- 
logical material and expressions for use later. 

The second part of the work consists of a number of 
separate lessons in psychology, using the material collected 
as above. In these lessons nothing more is needed than 
an arrangement and review of this material by topics; 
e.g., expressions of knowing (to deliberate, to consider, to 
find out ; silly, wise, ingenious ; judg- 
ment, question, statement, etc.) ; expressions of feeling (to 

mourn ; sad, desperate ; joy, sorrow, 

etc.), and expressions of willing (to resolve : stub- 
born ; purpose, etc.). Rightly managed, this may 



6 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

with profit be begun with children of ten or eleven 
years. 

The perceptions of sense from without, together with 
those of consciousness from within the mind, form the fun- 
damental stock in trade of the intellect. Out of this raw 
material the soul creates new forms of knowledge, — con- 
cepts and imaginary ideas, judgments and conclusions. We 
may compare the intellectual activities of the soul to the 
commercial and industrial activities of the people. We 
distinguish here, (1) original production, which by agricul- 
ture, mining, etc., furnishes raw material ; and on the other 
hand, (2) manufactures, which make the raw goods into 
something better ; and lastly, (3) commerce and transpor- 
tation, which effect the exchange of goods of both kinds 
between different regions. In this comparison we would 
call the sense perceptions (together with the inner per- 
ceptions) the intellectual raw production, and the other 
activities beyond these, mental manufacture and commerce. 
Now we are going to include all of these higher activities 
of knowledge, with the exception of imagination, 1 under 
the name of "thinking." Ordinary usage gives to the word 
a wider sense ; e.g., in the expressions, Who would have 
thought it (expected or imagined it) ? Think of yourself 
in my place! What do you think of my new hat? 

The word "concept" is also used in several different 
senses. In the following pages it is always to be under- 
stood as equivalent to "general notion." Conception is 
employed as the name of the process by which concepts 
are formed. 

1 In a wider sense, imagination is included in thinking, since it, too, 
creates new ideas ; but these are never abstract, if the imagination alone 
is concerned. 



USE OF TERMS. 7 

"In all thought the greatest beauty is the greatest clearness." 
These are very nearly the words with which Rector Dorpfeld began 
a conversation with ine in the summer of 181)0, when I visited him 
to consult about the subject of this work. Every one will do well 
to bear this advice ever in mind, and never be satisfied with a 
thought until it is followed out to its logical conclusions, and is as 
clear as it is possible to make it. Confusion of ideas is fatal to all 
sound work. In an article by Fullerton, Oyi Sameness and Identity, 
in the Publications of the University of Pennsylvania, No. 1, there 
are enumerated and illustrated no less than seven different meanings 
of the word "same," which, one would think, should certainly keep 
the "same" meaning better than any other word in the language. 
Yet, as the author points out, this very term has led to a host of 
misunderstandings and false reasonings in systems of philosophy. 
Most of the prolonged and fruitiess discussions in which we engage 
are based on a difference of use in our words, and the consequent 
misunderstandings they occasion. This is especially true of the 
mental sciences. 

The use of the word "concept" adopted in this book agrees 
with that of the great majority of writers on psychology, both in 
this country and in England. Indeed, I know of but two conspicu- 
ous exceptions. These are De Garmo, in his translation of Lind- 
ner's Psychology ; and secondly, perhaps following this use of 
concept as equivalent to idea in its generic sense, M. K. Smith in 
her translation of Herbart's Psychology. I call attention to this 
difference in use, to prevent confusion. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE PROCESSES OF THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

A. Of Thought. 

As already explained, we understand by "thinking" 
(in the narrower sense) all of those intellectual activities 
which, out of the raw material of the senses and inner 
perceptions, produce new material ; viz., higher (abstract) 
ideas. These activities are usually divided into : compar- 
ing, distinguishing, forming concepts, judging, reasoning, 
etc. This division is not wrong ; but if we examine these 
I)rocesses closely, we shall find that they all agree in hav- 
ing essentially to do with ideas, and differ only in the man- 
ner of presentation. 

Let us examine these processes singly. For simplifica- 
tion we will take the comparison of two objects, say two 
plants, that are not present to the senses. In order to 
compare them, they must be so well known that their 
mental images can be distinctly recalled to consciousness. 
Thereupon those properties are sought out in which they 
both agree. When these are found and noted, — i.e., pre- 
sented to the mind singly, — the process of comparison has 
in so far reached its end. It is, so far as we are now con- 
cerned, the same as if the objects themselves were pres- 
ent to the senses. In the latter case the qualities of 
the objects would be presented in the mind more vividly; 
but otherwise the x^rocess is the same. 

"We will take next the forming of conceptions ; and first 



FORMATION OF CONCEPTS. 9 

the so-called class-concepts (species, kind, family, order, 
class, etc.). The word "mountain," for instance, is asso- 
ciated in the child's mind at first with the perception of a 
single elevation, which he has seen and which he was told 
was a mountain. Later he becomes acquainted with sev- 
eral more such elevations, — small and large, wooded and 
bare, steep and gently sloping, rocky and sandy, etc. ; all 
are called mountain. Now, since those qualities wherein 
these elevations differed came into consciousness only in a 
few cases, perhaps only once, while those common to all 
occurred in every perception, and therefore by this fre- 
quent repetition became clearer and more firmly impressed, 
therefore as a result we find very naturally that those 
qualities occurring seldom have withdrawn, as too weak, 
from consciousness, while those common to all have come 
forw r ard in consciousness, and become distinct. Finally, 
these latter alone remain, and are the content of the con- 
cept. But a concept may be formed on the basis of even a 
single observation, whenever any one or more qualities in 
a new object stand out with such prominence as to fasten 
the attention on them, and thus separate them from the 
other qualities. The first time a child sees a giraffe, he 
undoubtedly forms a concept that serves him even if he 
never sees another. But such concepts are almost sure to 
be faulty. The mental process is purely spontaneous and 
involuntary. Language, although not the cause of the 
process, has favored it very much. In the instance cited 
above, the fact that two or more different things bore the 
same name (mountain) aroused the attention, and so led 
to a clearer apprehension. Secondly, the result of invol- 
untary comparison was step by step fixed in language, and 
so gotten ready for use. Of course the child has not been 



10 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

conscious of any of these psychic processes, not even no- 
ticing that the meaning of the word " mountain " has been 
gradually changing, losing one after another the specific 
qualities, and strengthening into clear consciousness those 
common to all. Nor has he noticed that the word has 
narrowed its meaning (content), while it has broadened 
its application (extent). 

Above is shown the involuntary, spontaneous rise of 
general notions or concepts. To be sure, this mode of pro- 
cedure alone will never bring the concept to full com- 
pleteness. For even if really so many examples presented 
themselves for observation that all the differing qualities 
could be eliminated, and only the similar ones retained, — 
which would be expecting a good deal, — still these latter 
are seldom all distinctly noticed. It is very seldom indeed 
that we can enumerate them separately. But besides this 
a second deficiency is possible. Among those qualities 
rightly recognized as common to all, may be found some 
insignificant ones ; i.e., such as do not change the nature 
of the concept, whether they are included or excluded. 
A logically complete concept must, however, omit such 
insignificant characteristics, and retain only such as are 
essential. In order, therefore, to bring to a conclusion 
this process of conception, and give rise to entirely clear 
and correct concepts, something additional is necessary. 
This is a conscious and voluntary investigation, so as to 
get rid, on the one hand, of all the accidental character- 
istics ; and, on the other hand, to bring into clear con- 
sciousness all those that remain and are essential to the 
concept. Thus in concepts of classes, or in particular 
concepts of individual characters; for example, if it is 
asked what belongs to the essential characteristics of 



SPONTANEOUS CONCEPTS. 11 

some historical personage (Socrates-, Napoleon, etc.), or 
of English nationality, this conscious and voluntary part 
of the work assumes a greater prominence. 

From the above, it seems clear that only in the field of 
science can we expect to find proper, logically complete 
concepts. The chief intellectual intercourse, even among 
people of culture, has to rely on the spontaneously formed 
general notions, which are never perfectly definite, and fre- 
quently contain something wrong. This accounts for many 
misunderstandings and vain disputations. It is further 
plain that all words, except proper names, denote not prop- 
erly perceptions, — unless it be when the child hears the 
word for the first time, — but general notions (concepts). 

Next to the formation of concepts, comes the apprehen- 
sion of the relations between things or processes, of which 
the causal and mathematical relations are the most impor- 
tant. Here, too, we make use of the word " conceive " ; 
and we shall find thinking, in this case also is only a par- 
ticular way of presenting ideas in consciousness. "We will 
take an example of the causal relation. What is the 
origin of our conception that cold is the cause of water 
changing into ice ? In the beginning it is quite sponta- 
neous. It is noticed that with a greater degree of cold, 
ice appears ; and again, that when the cold disappears the 
ice vanishes. This is, however, still by no means sufficient 
to give rise to the conception of a causal connection. For 
there are no innate ideas waiting, as it were, for outer 
stimulus in order to make their way into consciousness. 
The sequence of those two phenomena (cold and ice) is 
observed not only once, but again and again. This regular 
and invariable sequence of these phenomena produces the 
new idea finally that the one thing must follow the other, 



12 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

that the one phenomenon calls forth the other, causes it. 
Hereupon the relation between the two facts, which before 
seemed only temporal, becomes apprehended as causal in 
its origin ; out of post (after) has become propter (on ac- 
count of, by means of). The further details of this causal 
relation can, of course, be learned only by an investigation 
into the physical nature of cold and of water. That the 
conception of mathematical relations, as they occur in 
arithmetic, for instance, in the fundamental operations, in 
proportion, etc., rests likewise on simple elementary per- 
ceptions, is shown sufficiently in the schoolroom. 

We come now to the formation of judgments. In the 
simple proposition, " Snow is white," two ideas are in con- 
sciousness, — subject and predicate. We have here a 
so-called analytical judgment, since the subject-concept 
" snow " properly includes in it the characteristic " white " ; 
the latter, in order to direct attention to it, is separated in 
thought from that complex. It is the same with the 
proposition, " Mint is a labiate." The latter concept con- 
tains characteristics which are already in the subject- 
concept so far as this is completely apprehended ; but for 
the time being it is singled out for emphasis, that it may 
be once for all distinctly noticed. 

Let us take now an incompleted judgment, such as occurs 
in the question form; e.g., How much is 3X4? Here 
the predicate idea that belongs with the subject is still to 
be sought. The ability of the pupil to answer depends 
on whether the percepts of the numbers, of which the 
predicate is composed, are so clear and so mobile in his 
mind, that the idea sought, which he has already learned 
from adding, can now arise in consciousness. If this takes 
place, subject and predicate stand side by side in con- 



JUDGMENTS. 13 

sciousness : the judgment is complete. That which would 
cause the pupil trouble is moreover something that comes 
properly before the act of judging ; for the latter is noth- 
ing else than au act of mental representation, wherein two 
concepts (in the sense of subject and predicate) stand 
together complete in consciousness. Of course the judg- 
ment may be more complex than in the above examples, — 
if either the subject or the predicate, or both, have a 
more complicated form. For example : — 

" In the Acadian land, on the shores of the Basin of Minas, 
Distant, secluded, still, the little village of Grand-Pre' 
Lay in the fruitful valley." 

Here are associated with the subject (the village of 
Grand-Pre) certain characteristics (distant, secluded, still, 
little) ; and likewise the predicate (lay) is further, in local 
and other respects, more exactly described (in the Acadian 
land, on the shores of the Basin, in the fruitful valley). 
In this way arises one complex of ideas there grouped 
about the subject, and another one here forming the predi- 
cate. This does not, however, in any way change the fact 
that in both cases we have to do merely with the presenta- 
tion of ideas in consciousness. Although the two groups 
of ideas are at first held asunder as subject and predicate, 
in order that they may be more sharply examined and 
plainly apprehended, yet they combine again in con- 
sciousness to a compact mass of ideas which must be 
apprehended as a whole. The peculiarity of judgments, 
therefore, lies in this : that the two ideas or complexes 
of ideas separating at first as subject and predicate thus 
become more sharp and distinct, and therefore combine 
afterwards all the more readily. Judgments are, accord- 
ingly, a chief means of making ideas plainer, and of im- 



14 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

pressing them more firmly on the mind. The reader will 
now see at once the importance of the art of questioning, 
as well as its special purpose. 

It should be remarked further, that when we speak of a 
" thought" we generally mean a judgment; but the ex- 
pression may, in the wider sense, also stand for a single 
idea. 

We have yet to analyze the process of reasoning. Take 
the simplest possible example : — 

Major premise : New England belongs to the United 
States. 

Minor premise : Massachusetts belongs to New England. 

Conclusion : Therefore Massachusetts belongs likewise 
to the* United States. 

As is readily seen, to reason is to judge. What is the 
difference, then, between the syllogism and other judg- 
ments ? 

Logic says : reasoning means deriving a new judgment 
from two or more given ones. Let us look at the matter 
more exactly from the psychological side, and ask what 
takes place in our minds when we reason. 

Whereas in the simple judgment only two concepts, sub- 
ject and predicate, are held in consciousness, and repre- 
sented in their relation to each other, in reasoning three 
concepts are present, and therefore also three relations. 
In the above example the three concepts are : New 
England, Massachusetts, and the United States. It is this 
complexity that makes reasoning more difficult than the 
other processes of thinking; or, in other words, the effort 
to hold in consciousness at the same time so many ideas, 
together with their relations, in perfect clearness. 

In the above example the question is, What political 



KEASONING. 15 

relation exists between Massachusetts and the United 
States ? This is supposed to be unknown, or at least not 
yet fully determined. As a help to the mind, we insert 
between the two concepts, " Massachusetts " and " United 
States," which are for consciousness too wide apart, an 
intermediary concept, "New England, 1 ' whose relation to 
Massachusetts on the one side, and to the United States on 
the other, is already known. 

The reader will have no trouble in recognizing that this 
help to thinking — the insertion of a middle concept be- 
tween concepts lying too far apart — is entirely similar to 
the help that one makes use of when one is crossing a 
creek or ditch that is too wide to jump over. If one 
succeeds in throwing a stone into the middle of the creek 
to step on, thus requiring instead of a big jump only two 
little ones, the trouble is avoided, the impossible is made 
possible. Here ive have the secret of reasoning, as will be 
shown more exactly later. The above comparison may 
further serve to call attention to another fact. It is cus- 
tomary to begin a syllogism with the so-called major 
premise ; but, as in crossing a creek as above, the second 
step cannot be taken before the first, so one ought in 
reasoning to begin, not with a major premise, but with a 
minor premise ; for the movement of thought proceeds 
most easily from the minor premise to the major premise, 
as is shown by the very name and purpose of the middle 
term. 

Let us call to mind now the mental state after the 
insertion of the middle term, — what is known and what 
is still sought. Known are two relations: that of the 
first term (Massachusetts) to the middle term (New Eng- 
land), and that of the middle term to the third (United 



16 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

States) ; the relation of the first to the third is sought. 
This latter relation must be contained impliedly in the 
two known ones ; for else it could not be inferred from 
them. But since it had not previously been recognized, 
the light necessary to see it must have been wanting ; and 
if it is to be really noticed now, this illumination must 
come to it from some source. But whence can this light 
come, since the process is a purely internal one, and there- 
fore cannot receive help from the senses ? Evidently from 
the already known ideas, the premises. The successful 
result depends first of all on their clearness, and secondly 
on whether they are retained in consciousness until their 
light has spread over the third relation. If this does not 
take place at the first attempt, it must be owing to the 
fact that the full illumination is wanting ; i.e., that the 
preliminary conditions — clearness and repose of the ideas 
in the premises — are not yet fulfilled. In such case 
those two ideas must be repeated and kept in consciousness 
until, on the one hand, all indistinctness has disappeared 
from them, and, on the other hand, no more disturbance 
is caused by other ideas. 

We see from the above that even reasoning, which at 
first appears so mysterious, is nothing more than a kind 
of mental presentation of ideas, which is distinguished 
from other mental presentations only in that it depends 
on the clearness of two other groups of ideas, and on these 
remaining clear in consciousness. That this is so, and 
indeed that reasoning differs from" the sense perception of 
such relations only in that the former is a purely internal 
process, while in the latter case the objects are present 
to the senses — of this one can immediately convince one's 
self by representing symbolically to the senses the three 



GRAPHIC SYLLOGISM. 17 

terms of a syllogism, together with their relations. This 
symbolical representation is usually made by three circles 
whose size and position represent the three terms with 
their relations. In this way, as the text-books of logic 
show, all the figures of the syllogism may be represented 
graphically. The circle may stand as the symbol both of 
the content as well as of the extent of the concepts. The 
meaning of the figures will be most easily understood, how- 
ever, if the circles stand only for 
the extent of the concepts. The 
example given above belongs to 
the first and simplest figure of 
the syllogism, and is represented 
graphically, as in the margin. 

The three terms are here rep- 
resented in their extent by the 
visual image of the circles. The 
three relations of size, together 

with that of inclusion or exclusion, can be apprehended 
completely, as if they were so many sense perceptions. 
There is, accordingly, here no possibility of any difficulty 
in apprehending the third relation. This is, furthermore, 
the reason why the first example was chosen from geog- 
raphy, since the relation of size in the three terms is here 
of itself concrete. If the teacher wants to make trial of 
the above drawing with his pupils, he may try it first with 
different words, so as to direct the attention to the size 
only. For example, the first circle (Mass.) is smaller than 
the second (X. E.) ; the second is smaller than the third 
(U. S.) ; therefore, etc. If he wishes to make the process 
still plainer and more concrete, he may place three pupils 
of different height in a row before the class. A is shorter 




18 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

than B, and B is shorter than C. If now lie asks whether 
A is also shorter than C, every one will be ready with the 
answer, " Yes ; certainly." From the above the reader will 
be convinced that reasoning when it takes place internally, 
and without outward help, is still precisely the same process 
as when the three objects are present to the senses. Further: 
that the success of the unaided internal reasoning depends 
entirely on whether the two premises can be clearly pre- 
sented and retained for a time undisturbed in conscious- 
ness. The same is true of all the other forms of the 
syllogism. Why these latter are usually more difficult does 
not concern us here. 

We have now examined in their main features the most 
important processes (comparison, conception, judgment, and 
reasoning) of the human understanding, and have found 
that each consists of a mental presentation of ideas in 
consciousness, or of a combination of new ideas. 



Before we take up the memory, I want to make a remark 
about sense perceptions. Although this may not seem to 
belong to our theme, still it will later be seen that the 
above discussion, particularly one point in regard to the 
formation of concepts, is thereby desirably supplemented. 
The mental picture of a complex object — e.g., of a mountain, 
plant, etc. — is usually thought of as a mental product that 
has come all at once into existence in this complexity, 
just as a photograph is made by one flash of the camera. 
Of course it looks as if we adults could certainly obtain 
a mental picture of such an object by a momentary glance 
of the eye. This, however, is an illusion, but more es- 
pecially in the case of a child who is just beginning to use 
his senses. For perception even the simplest object is in 



FORMATION OF SENSE PERCEPTS. 19 

reality compound. It consists of form, size, color, material, 
weight, hardness, etc. ; and the form is, in addition, com- 
posed of elements even in the case of the simplest body, 
namely, a sphere. In a simple tone we may distinguish 
four elements, — pitch, color, intensity, and duration. Now, 
the only way in which any one can secure a distinct per- 
ception of any complex object is by quickly or slowly, or 
even at different times, examining and noticing every char- 
acteristic separately. Furthermore, be it remembered, 
every characteristic must be repeatedly observed before 
the first (obscure) impression can grow into a (clear) per- 
ception. Such a perception is, accordingly, to be thought 
of not as a picture made with a flash light, as it were, but 
as a mental product consisting of a number of simple or 
single ideas ; viz., as many as there were characteristics 
noted. In short, it is a complex of ideas. In this sense 
the saying, " Our knowledge is piece-work," may be applied 
here. This complex appears to consciousness, of course, as 
a whole or unit, because the object is a unit. 

As a rule, concepts also, as we have seen above, are com- 
plexes of ideas, but of an entirely different kind. In sense 
perception the characteristics combine in the idea because 
they are united in the object ; on the other hand, in concep- 
tion we have only definitely selected characteristics ; namely, 
such as have been chosen by comparison of several ideas, 
thus separating, first of all, common characteristics, and 
afterward from these, by a more exact examination, the 
essential ones. This knowledge that both sense percepts 
as well as concepts are complexes of ideas, should direct 
our attention to several other important questions. 

1. Why is a concrete percept fresher, more vivid, and 
more effective than the corresponding concept, although 



20 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

the latter is less compound than the former ? It seems 
now very generally admitted that thought is always accom- 
panied by motor manifestations. These are, of course, 
more pronounced in the case of sense perceptions, and de- 
crease in intensity more and more as the ideas become 
more abstract. In abstract ideas of the scientific sort, this 
motor element is reduced, it would seem, to the mere word, 
so far as it appears in the innervation of the muscles of 
speech. This being the case, it would seem clear that the 
freshness and power of concrete ideas depends, for the 
most part, on this re-enforcement received from the motor 
element. Some go so far as to say that all volition, even 
the calling up of the visual or auditory images in the mind, 
is effected by the innervation of muscles, and that the only 
possible expression of will power is through muscles. So 
far as this is true it throws important light on the subject 
of physical culture, and gives a new reason for muscle 
training. 1 

2. Since the single ideas which go to make a concept are 
also contained in the different complexes of ideas out of 
which they were chosen, as well as in the other complexes 
of ideas that belong under this concept, and since, further, 
each of these single ideas united with others occurs in still 
very many other complexes which do not belong to this 
concept, how is one to think of the existence in the mind 

i Ribot, along with many others, accepts as " a fundamental law that 
the reflex is the sole type of all neural action, of all relation," and hence 
that "every state of consciousness always has a tendency to express it- 
self, to manifest itself, by a movement, an act." See Ribot's Diseases 
of the Will, Pqtcholoyy of Attention, and Diseases of the Memory, three 
little books of 120-200 pages each, full of very suggestive ideas for every 
teacher. Miinsterberg has based his theory of association of ideas on the 
motor element in all thought. 



THE ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 21 

of the single ideas, of the complexes of ideas, and of the 
concepts ? In other words, and more exactly, does such a 
single idea (e.g., round, four-cornered, long, short, broad, 
narrow, bitter, sweet, learned, smart, foolish, just, etc.) 
exist many hundred times in the mind, — once perhaps as a 
single idea, then so and so many hundred times in different 
lower and higher concepts ; then, again, so and so many thou- 
sand times in sense perceptions, — or must one think of it in 
an entirely different way ? And how do the concepts and 
sense perceptions themselves exist in the mind ? This is 
not the place to attempt a final solution of these questions 
by argument ; but a comparison with another field of phe- 
nomena that lies open to every one's observation can per- 
haps put us on the track of a correct understanding. This 
field of phenomena is human society. There are here, first 
of all, individuals ; further, families, groups of friends and 
relations, civil and religious communities, cities, towns, 
states, nations, federal unions, guilds, railroad companies, 
singing-societies, missionary societies, and all the other 
many small and large associations for different purposes. 
All of these exist ; but hoiv do they exist ? Is the exis- 
tence of an individual of the same sort as that of a society ? 
Does each human being exist first as an individual, and 
then once more as a member of a family, and once more, 
again, as a member of society, and further, as many times as 
there are different associations to which he belongs ? To 
be sure, we say the family, the community, the state, etc., 
exist, and of course they do exist ; but what is it in each 
of these cases that exists bodily? Evidently that which 
exists as an actual being is only the individual. The 
names, family, circle of friends, singing-societies, etc., <le- 
note not actual beings, but only relations of bodily beings 



22 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

or individuals to one another. They are concepts of rela- 
tion. That which exists in human societies is nothing 
more than these relations, and they exist only as qualities 
of individuals. Thus, for instance, friendship has its ex- 
istence in the mutual affection of those concerned, — the 
nation, in the language which its members speak, — the 
social organizations in the consciousness of common in- 
terests, and perhaps also in sympathetic feelings, etc. 
These relations are also sometimes very well expressed 
in outward forms to the senses : thus nationality in the 
audible and visible forms of language, the other associa- 
tions by written statutes, by symbols of recognition, etc. ; 
but all of these are only signs of the relations or real quali- 
ties of individuals. Moreover, the associations can also 
carry on all sorts of work, great and small, — present operas 
on the stage, build railroads, fight battles, spread culture, 
etc. ; but the real power that accomplishes this work is not 
in the " singing-society," "railroad company," "state," 
" school," etc., but in the separate children of men which 
have applied their hands to the undertaking. There is, of 
course, no " spirit of the times," " class spirit," etc., in ac- 
tual existence outside of rhetoric and poetry. 

What you the Spirit of the Ages call, 
Is nothing hut the spirit of you all. 

Faust, part i. scene i. 

If accordingly one wants to know what really exists in 
the concepts, community, state, etc., one must turn to the 
separate human beings. Thus, a person may be by pro- 
fession engaged as a teacher; the same person, however, is 
perhaps, at the same time, husband, father, son, brother, 
etc ; in another relation the same person helps represent 
a religious and a civil community; furthermore, a state, 



SIMPLE IDEAS. 23 

a schoolmasters' association, a charity organization, etc. 
Notwithstanding all of these divisions of a person's life, 
the person does not become divided, but remains as he is, 
— an individual, indivisible; and just as little is he multi- 
plied in number, remaining what he is, — a single person. 

It is precisely the same with the intellectual products 
of the mind, the separate ideas and their different com- 
binations, — percepts, concepts, imaginary ideas, trains of 
thought, complexes, and systems of ideas. Corresponding 
to the individuals in society are here the simple ideas ; i.e., 
the partial ideas or characteristics. Such an elementary 
idea helps at one moment, united with others, to form a 
sense preception ; at another moment, a concept or an ima- 
ginary idea ; and so from moment to moment still other com- 
plexes of ideas. Nevertheless, it exists in the mind only 
once, — just as a person exists only as a single being. All 
complexes of ideas, on the other hand, exist in the mind 
not as separate things outside of and in addition to the 
simple ideas — or else each of the latter Avould have to be 
present as many times as it has entered into combinations. 
Notwithstanding this, since these complexes appear in 
consciousness as complete wholes, they seem to be separate 
things. All that is to be regarded as essentially existing 
in these phenomena — aside from the constituent elements 
or simple ideas — are solely the laws of association by 
means of which these separate ideas are called into con- 
sciousness at the same time. This point, — namely, that 
only the simple ideas are the proper mental existences; 
that, on the contrary, all complexes of ideas are only tran- 
sient combinations, — must be distinctly understood and 
kept firmly in mind, if one is ever to escape from the fog 
and din of psychological discussion. But this also opens 



24 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

up a view into the wonderland of the soul, so that one 
does not know which to admire the more, — the illimitable 
diversity of phenomena, or the extraordinary simplicity of 
the controlling laws. 

If the reader is at all inclined to follow out the relation of logic to 
psychology, and particularly of the different figures of the syllogism 
in sense-perception and abstraction, he will find a very profitable 
discussion from the Hegelian standpoint in Harris's Introduction to 
the Study of Philosophy, Section V., where Dr. Harris "develops 
some new insight into the nature of sense-perception," which he 
"has recently discovered after many years' study on the subject" 
(p. 96). 

On the processes of thought, see Dewey's Psychology, chap, viii., 
" Thinking" ; a clear and concise account. Sully, in chap. ix. and x. 
of the Outlines of Psychology, is particularly good, since his descrip- 
tion is from the psychological standpoint, instead of from the point 
of view of logic, as is the case with nearly all the other text-books. 
Preyer's Mental Development of the Child contains, p. 80-83, a sym- 
pathetic account of the development of a child's thinking powers. 
The formation of higher ideas is described in chap. viii. ; the influ- 
ence of language on the development of thought, p. 159-163, and still 
more fully in Development of the Intellect, chap. xvi. p. 3-33. 

The teacher will find many clear ideas and interesting points 
brought out in James's Psychology, L, chap. xii. and xiii. on concep- 
tion, discrimination, and comparison. Read also chap. ix. on "The 
Stream of Thought." 

Baldwin {Mental Development in the Child and the Pace, 1895) 
lays great stress on the motor side of thought, going so far as to 
define conception as a "motor habit" of reaction. Hence he 
denies all content to abstract terms, and claims that they are simply 
" attitudes, expectations, motor tendencies." Royce seems to agree 
with all of this. 

B. Of Memory. 

The expression " to commit to memory " is usually em- 
ployed in a narrow sense, being restricted to a particular 
manner of committing ; viz., by repetition. It is sometimes 



THE CONTENT OF MEMORY. 25 

used in a still narrower sense to refer only to ideas clothed 
in words. While this is all right so far as the meaning of 
the word is concerned, if sanctioned by usage, we should, 
however, bear in mind that the word " memory " has also 
a much larger meaning, and that there are other ways of 
committing to memory besides repetition. It is nowhere 
more harmful than in the held of psychology to take the 
traditional and popular meaning of an expression as a 
scientific guide, without due consideration. For the popu- 
lar meaning dates usually from a time when psychology 
" had not where to lay its head," to say nothing of scien- 
tific recognition. The meaning referred to above assigns 
to memory but half its field, and restricts its action in that 
field. This is not true of the following definition taken 
from the Century Dictionary: "Memory is the mental 
capacity of retaining unconscious traces of conscious im- 
pressions or states, and of recalling these traces to con- 
sciousness with the attendant perception that they (or 
their objects) have a certain relation to the past." The 
word is also used for the power of such retention alone ; 
while the power or act of recalling is termed recollection. 
While it is in the larger sense above that we use the word 
here, we must notice these two aspects of memory. The 
first has reference to its content, the stock of ideas pres- 
ent, together with the associated feelings and desires ; the 
second looks to the power of the mind to recall these to 
consciousness. Since, however, the second presupposes the 
content of memory, the following discussion will be con- 
fined to the power of recollection. But the reader will 
please bear in mind that the content of the memory in- 
cludes, not merely this or that special kind of mental 
product, but all kinds whatsoever, every mental state, 
whole or partial, that has ever occupied consciousness. 



26 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

With this understanding we could then at once proceed 
to consider the laws of memory according to which ideas 
are recalled to consciousness. But such general state- 
ments as were before made in regard to the content of 
memory and the power of recollection are altogether too 
liable to present to the reader many obscure points, unless 
they have come after the consideration of a large number 
of observed facts. We shall, therefore, first present ex- 
amples of some of the different kinds of recollection. 

First of all, take those instances of which we commonly 
think when we speak of memory, — the reproduction of 
groups and trains of thought which have been intention- 
ally committed to memory by repetition ; e.g., words of a 
foreign language, a melody, a map, a literary selection, etc. 

With these the reader may compare those recollections 
which, while likewise very prominent, are not the result 
of any intentional committing to memory. Thus we can, 
for example, call to mind, as plainly as if present to the 
eyes, the appearance of our father's house outside and in- 
side, with all its rooms and furniture ; likewise our parents, 
other relatives and neighbors, and the whole landscape of 
the home of our childhood, with all its roads and paths, 
mountains, valleys, woods, fields, and groups of houses. 
Similarly we can recall with ease the mental picture of 
other houses and places in which we have lived for any 
considerable time. The mother tongue is also learned in 
this way, so far as it takes place without regular instruc- 
tion. In all of these and similar cases there has been 
a frequent repetition of the perceptions, which fact is the 
cause of the distinctness, fidelity, and certainty of their 
reproduction; but the repetition has not been intentional. 

The exact reverse of these examples would be such re- 



EXAMPLES. 27 

production as takes place after only once receiving the im- 
pression. In such cases there is neither intentional nor 
unintentional repetition to help the memory. Thus, for 
example, if the teacher after relating a story, thereupon 
asks questions in regard to its main features, or calls for 
its repetition at once ; or if he calls on his pupils to repeat 
after him a sentence or a verse ; or if a child after he has 
once been taken to a distant place, then has to find his 
way thither alone. 

In all of the above examples the act of reproduction is 
prominent. But there are also mental processes in which 
the memory plays a part without our usually thinking of 
it. These cases are for our investigation quite as impor- 
tant as those above, and must also be illustrated by some 
examples. 

What is meant when we say that the pupils have satis- 
factorily understood what was told them in the history 
lesson ? What is it that has taken place in their minds ? 
Let us see. First of all, the pupils have heard the spoken 
words ; or, more exactly, they have had auditory sense 
perceptions. In the second place, with each word and sen- 
tence as heard the sense has occurred to their minds ; i.e., 
the mental pictures of the things denoted by these words 
(persons, objects, processes, and relations) have had to ap- 
pear in consciousness. Now, all this presupposes, of course, 
that the meaning of the expressions used was already 
known. In order to understand what was related to them, 
the pupils have therefore had to recall continually to mind 
already known ideas. At the sound of the words these 
ideas arose from the depths of the mind into consciousness, 
and so grouped and arranged themselves that the story 
seemed to take place, as it were, before the very eyes of 



28 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

the pupils. This process of understanding depends accord- 
ingly on the working together of two entirely different men- 
tal processes : — 

(1.) On a new perception (through the ear) ; and 

(2.) On a resulting reproduction of old ideas. 

When we say that such an understanding requires ima- 
gination, we mean, first of all, to say that the persons, ob- 
jects, and events, which the pupils are to think of, do not 
stand before their eyes bodily, and therefore cannot be per- 
ceived by the senses. The expression merely emphasizes 
the second factor of the process, — recollection. 1 

All that is said above in regard to understanding what is 
orally related is of course true of oral instruction of every 
kind, as well as of conversation and of reading, except that 
in the latter case sight takes the place of hearing. In 
short, the immediate understanding of language of any 
kind depends on the two factors named, — the sense percep- 
tion of the verbal forms, and the resulting reproduction of 
the associated ideas. 

We will now examine the process of the formation of 
concepts, to see what part memory plays here. .We saw 
above how the child in an entirely natural and spontaneous 
way proceeds gradually from the percept " mountain," to 
the concept " mountain." When he sees another elevation, 
and says, " That is a mountain too" this shows that the 
former image must have occurred to him again. Even the 
very name used is recalled; and this fact bears witness that 
its meaning also, the idea, has returned more or less dis- 
tinctly. When a third, fourth, or fifth mountain is seen, 

1 No allusion is here made to that free scope which the imagination 
has, or might have, in such a case as the ahove, in picturing the details 
that are not described in words. 



MEMORY IN CONCEPTION AND JUDGMENT. 29 

this reproduction is repeated ; for if it were not, the forma- 
tion of the concept could not proceed. All of this shows 
plainly that even in the spontaneous rise of concepts, 
memory is an essential factor. From step to step the new 
perception forms the first factor, and the reproduction of 
the corresponding earlier idea, the other factor. And it is 
the latter that is essential to the process ; while, on the 
other hand, the sense perception, as we shall see later, may 
in other cases be replaced by a reproduced idea. 

But the spontaneous formation of concepts must be sup- 
plemented by instruction. With this purpose in view the 
teacher may have his pupils observe and compare two or 
more objects present to their senses, or pictures of such 
objects. If, however, the objects in question are already 
known to the pupils, the comparison might take place as a 
purely internal process, relying on reproduction alone. If 
they are incorporeal in their nature, as is mostly the case 
in the field of mental sciences (e.g., if peculiarities of char- 
acter, moral and religious causes, social relations, etc., are 
to be considered), the comparison cannot be otherwise than 
purely internal ; i.e., based on reproduced ideas. The only 
reason why school instruction seeks to present material 
objects to the senses when they are being studied, is, on the 
one hand, to make the comparison easier ; and, on the other 
hand, to be able to correct any mistakes promptly, — in a 
word, in order more certainly to secure a good result. Ac- 
cordingly, it is not essential to the process of conception, 
that the objects be presented to the senses ; this process 
merely presupposes that there are concrete ideas present in 
the mind. They form the raw material, out of which 
something new is to be created ; and it makes no difference 
whether these were gained earlier, or were just received, or 
were again refreshed by perception. 



30 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

It is very similar with the formation of judgments. In 
this process, as we saw before, two ideas — subject and 
predicate — come into consciousness together, as if they 
belonged together in this particular relation. It was 
further to be noticed that this separation into two of what 
was still to be thought of as one, has the purpose and result 
of laying greater stress on one of these ideas ; namely, the 
predicate. The judgment, " The boy is writing," means 
essentially nothing more than the expression, " a boy writ- 
ing." There is, however, this important difference between 
the two mental acts, that in the latter case the character- 
istic " writing " is of the same dignity as the rest, while in 
the first case it receives all the emphasis of a chief charac- 
teristic. One step farther. If this selection of a single 
feature out of a complex idea, as it is outwardly repre- 
sented in a judgment expressed in language, is actually 
an act of the mind, which would take place according to 
natural laws even without the mediation of language, then 
the formation of judgments must be just as spontaneous 
as that of concepts. But if this is so, how does the mind 
come of itself to adopt this judgment form ? In other 
words, what is the natural and spontaneous process of 
making a judgment ? As preliminary to the answer, we 
may say at once, that if, instead of an ordinary complex 
idea (for example, a boy writing), there arises in the mind 
a judgment idea (the boy writes), or, in other words, if out 
of a complex idea a single characteristic rises in conscious- 
ness superior to the rest, there must have been some im- 
pulse present to cause it. We must try to find this impulse. 
If we discover it, all that was obscure in the making of 
judgments will probably become clear. 

There is one incentive to the making of judgments which, 



SPONTANEOUS JUDGMENT. 31 

though artificial in its nature, school practice has known 
from time immemorial ; and wherever it has been rightly 
understood, it has been diligently employed. It is the 
interrogative form. A question is, as already remarked 
above, an incompleted, half-finished judgment ; one portion 
of a complex idea, whether subject or predicate, is named, 
while the other part is to be sought. Both subject and 
predicate may be named, of course, in the question, but 
in such a manner as to require some further qualification 
of the one or the other. The interrogative form accord- 
ingly makes the pupil notice an omission in an already 
known complex idea, and points to it with the finger, as 
it were. That is the external impulse. In the attention 
thereby roused and directed to this omission, lies the in- 
ternal impulse} so that the idea sought is, on being found, 
brought more strongly and separately into consciousness. 
This completes, then, the act of judgment ; for a judgment 
is, as we must keep well in mind, not a mysterious miracle, 
but nothing more than the simple process by which, out of 
a conscious complex idea, a partial idea arises so strong as 
to gain separate attention. The interrogative form is there- 
fore an example of how through language a person may 
intentionally lead another to make use of the judgment 
form ; but we have yet to seek the impulse that -calls forth 
spontaneous judgment. In this case the source must be in 
the object ; i.e., some characteristic of the object itself must 
strike one prominently. All natural circumstances which 
arouse the attention, — provided they direct it to some- 
thing definite, — find their expression spontaneously in the 
form of judgments. Every good language lesson will make 
abundant application of this principle. Teachers have 
every cause to pay special attention to that part of psy- 



32 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

chology which treats of spontaneous attention. The most 
prominent of these incentives to attention is contrast, 
which we will illustrate by a couple of examples. 

Suppose a child has, until now, seen only red roses. 
When he sees a yellow one for the first time, his attention 
will be roused. The present sense idea recalls the earlier 
image of such flowers, so that there are now two ideas in 
consciousness. In so far as they are alike they are taken 
in as a matter of course, and no notice is taken. The 
differing characteristic, "yellow," on the other hand, which 
causes the contrast, attracts attention, and pushes to the 
front in consciousness. Although the new object is per- 
ceived in its totality, still this differing characteristic is 
prominent, and therefore gains special vividness. It is, 
properly speaking, a new piece of information. Now, it is 
just this peculiar state of ideas that we call a judgment. 
It is plain to see, moreover, why the expression, " a yellow 
rose," in which the characteristics are co-ordinated, does 
not satisfy the mind, but only the pointed judgment, 
"This rose is yellow." 1 It makes no difference whether 
this is spoken or not ; for judgment is a purely mental pro- 
cess. Take another example. A team of two black 
horses is passing by. To an observer the sight would prob- 
ably produce an idea such as would find expression in the 

1 The Chinese language is not inflected, and, like other languages origi- 
nally, operates with word roots of only one syllable. The position of the 
qualifying word before or after the substantive distinguishes the attribu- 
tive from the judgment form. Thus the sound ta means, without any 
change of form, great, greatness, and to be great. If ta stands before 
a substantive, it has the meaning of an adjective. Thus ta jin means a 
great man. If ta stands after a substantive, it is a predicate, or, as we 
should say, a verb. Thus jin ta (or jin ta ye) would mean, The man is 
great. See Max Miiller, Lectures on the Science of Language, i. p. 
301-302. 



MEMORY IN JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 33 

words, "two black horses." If, however, one of the horses 
is white, the contrast would attract notice, and lead to the 
more pointed expression, " One horse is black ; the other 
is white." The reason for the double judgment, as one 
sees, is the fact that the two rival objects appear simultane- 
ously to the senses, and therefore have equal claim to be 
regarded or judged. 

We now return to our original point of view, and inquire 
in what measure memory helps in the formation of judg- 
ments. This depends in each case on whether the two 
ideas which lead to the judgment are from immediate 
observation or are reproduced. The former condition, as 
in the last example above, will seldom be fulfilled. In- 
stances such as the first example above, in which one idea 
is a perception, the other a recollection, are much more 
frequent. In the field of the mental sciences, in which 
most ideas are conveyed by language, both terms of the 
judgment must be, for the most part, reproduced ideas. 
We have been considering the unintentional or entirely 
spontaneous judgments. When, however, the process is 
intentional and meditated, we find just the same three 
cases ; only it is to be noticed here, — e.g., in silent medita- 
tion, in conversation, or in the composition of any writing, — 
that the reproduced ideas are still more frequent. Accord- 
ingly, an abundant supply of ideas by the memory is re- 
quisite for the ready exercise of judgment. 

It is hardly worth while to speak separately of the 
process of reasoning, since it has to do with judgments, 
and its conclusion is likewise a judgment ; and therefore 
all the above discussion applies equally well to it. 

What has now been said of the origin of concepts, judg- 
ments, and reasoning, shows that even in these processes 



34 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

of thinking proper, memory plays a much greater part than 
is commonly believed. Nor have we called to mind yet 
all the assistance that memory renders in the process of 
thinking. 

We saw above that the understanding produces new 
ideas, either conceptual or judgmental in form. Either : — 
First, on the basis of two perceptions ; or, 
Second!//, on the basis of a perception and a reproduced 
idea ; or 

Thirdly, on the basis of two reproduced ideas. 1 
We have assumed above that sense perception is ex- 
clusively an activity of the senses, and that it belongs, 
therefore, entirely to the elementary raw production of 
the mind. This is, however, not the fact. Only in con- 
trast to the new ideas which are produced in thought and 
imagination can the perceptions rightly be called raw 
products. It is, of course, true that perceptions of the 
outer world are possible only through the senses ; but that 
is not saying that they are exclusively a product of the 
senses. The senses by themselves never produce anything 
but sensations, even in the case of the practised senses of 
adults. Suppose, for instance, that a certain object has 
once produced a sensation in the mind ; when this takes 
place later, a second time, this new sensation will recall 
the former one. This reproduction does not, however, 
result in a twofold sensation, or double seeing ; but, since 
the two sensations are completely alike in their content, 
they coalesce in consciousness into one act ; in other words, 
they unite in result, so as to be much stronger intensively 
than the first sensation was. With every following new 

1 For the sake of brevity we speak here of two ideas, but of course in 
every case there may be several. 



AFPERCErTION. 35 

sensation coming from the same object, this reproduction 
of previous similar sensations, or of their last total result, 
is repeated, as well as their coalescence in consciousness. 
As this composite act becomes intensively stronger and 
stronger, i.e., plainer, it comes at last to be what we call 
perception. Thus, although an act of sensation must be 
oft repeated if it is to give rise to a perception, still the 
real reason of the superiority of the latter, as one sees, 
does not lie in this repeated production of the new sensa- 
tion, but in the resulting production of the already present 
similar sensations. The fact that we are not conscious of 
the reproduction in these cases is because the newly pro- 
duced sensation and that Avhich is reproduced are com- 
pletely, or at least essentially, alike, and therefore at once 
run together, or fuse into one act of sensation. Later on, 
when these combined acts have perfected themselves into 
an objective perception, we often notice very plainly that 
a reproduction has taken place ; for in these cases we speak 
of " recognition." If now, as we have seen, even the ap- 
parently primitive perception receives its main strength 
from a reproduction of former sensations, it is plain that 
those processes of conception and judgment which are 
prompted by a transient perception (see above, p. 34) also 
receive this sense element chiefly from recollection, rather 
than from the senses direct. 

For the present, let us lay particular emphasis on this 
fact, that knowledge is necessary for the assimilation of 
knowledge. If some would object to the use of the word 
apperception in such an extended meaning, they will at 
least have to content themselves with the fact that in all 
the operations of the mind the memory plays a more or 
less conspicuous part, and is always essential to the con- 



36 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

scions processes of thought. Lange and De Garnio do not 
hesitate to say that " all learning is apperceiving." The 
reproduced ideas are the " apperceptive organs " for grasp- 
ing and assimilating the new. 

We can close our empirical treatment of the memory 
here, and sum up the results as follows : — 

(a.) Memory in the widest sense is the mental capacity 
of retaining and recalling all the sensations and percep- 
tions, as well as all the products of thought and imagina- 
tion, whether ideas, feelings, or volitions, which have 
existed in consciousness, including all the associations 
formed among these mental states. 

(b.) In the memory we must distinguish a, passive and an 
active side, if these expressions may be allowed for the 
time being. As apparently resting or passive, we under- 
stand the memory in so far as the ideas, etc., are uncon- 
scious ; as active, when these are recalled, i.e., brought 
again into consciousness. 

(c.) Whatever of the content of memory cannot be re- 
called, or, as we say, has been entirely forgotten, is for the 
mind, so far as we can see, of no consequence ; i.e., so 
long as it cannot be recalled. It is this power of recollec- 
tion, or the active side of memory, that properly forms a 
subject for study. 

(</.) The memory is not a separate so-called " faculty " 
of the mind, in the sense of a special, independent power. 
The passive or resting side of memory only implies that 
there are already ideas in the mind, living and existing ; 
the active side implies nothing more than that these ideas, 
under certain definite conditions, can be recalled. This 
power of recall, however, may differ much in the different 
ideas ; it may be greater or less with respect to the fidel- 



SUMMARY. 37 

ity or exactness of recollection, or with respect to prompt- 
ness, rapidity, or reliability, after a considerable interval. 
And this depends in each separate case entirely on 
the compactness or looseness of the idea in question, and 
on the extent to which it is advantageously associated with 
others. The power of recollection, or the active memory, is 
therefore an individual peculiarity of the separate ideas, 
and not a general power behind them. If one uses the term 
power at all, it ought to refer to the power of existence of 
the ideas (above mentioned), meaning thereby that they 
strive to become conscious ; and further referring to the 
individual quality of the different ideas, the greater or less 
completeness of their structure, and the greater or smaller 
number of their associations. There are, therefore, to use 
a paradoxical expression, as many different kinds of 

MEMORY IN THE MIND AS THERE ARE IDEAS. 

The memory is for the whole mental life — we have in 
mind particularly the intellectual side — of wide and far- 
reaching importance. Even the most primitive ideas (the 
perceptions) require its indispensable aid ; but still more 
necessary is it in the processes of thought and imagination. 
Without the help of the memory, not even perceptions 
would be possible, to say nothing of concepts, judgments, 
and reasoning. The relation between memory and apper- 
ception is that of means to an end ; but each is a means 
to the other. Apperception is the assimilation of new 
knowledge, whether percept or concept, by means of the 
ideas called up in memory; but this process is, in turn, 
itself the very best, if not the only, means of storing up 
ideas, so that they will not be forgotten. 

It need scarcely be said that this last paragraph, as well 
as the whole preceding section, is not to be understood in 



38 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

the sense of the traditional memory worshipper, who be- 
lieves that the main object of the school is to store the 
memory with facts and words. In the course of our work, 
the miserable defect in this way of teaching will be brought 
to light, as well as some mistakes of those who aim at just 
the opposite. 

On the value and art of questioning, consult Fitch, Art of 
Questioning, and chap. vi. of the Lectures on Teaching. For the de- 
pendence of memory on attention, and the physiological basis of 
attention, read Kibot, The Psychology of Attention. For the most 
generalized conception of memory, see Hering's famous lecture on 
Memory as a general function of organized matter, in No. 6 and 7 
of The Open Court, Chicago. See also Religion of Science Library 
(same publishers). There is another translation of this epoch- 
making address in Butler, Unconscious Memory, chap. vi. Ladd's 
Physiological Psychology expresses the same ideas. " Every organ 
— indeed, every area and every element — of the nervous system has 
its own memory." (p. 553.) 



CHAPTER III. 

THE LAWS OF THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

Truly the fabric of mental fleece 

Resembles a weaver's masterpiece, 

Where a thousand threads one treadle throws, 

"Where fly the shuttles hither and thither, 

Unseen the threads are knit together, 

And an infinite combination grows. 

Goethe's Faust : Bayard Taylor. 

After reviewing the chief processes of thought and 
memory in their many forms, it remains to discover the 
genetic order in this manifold complexity, the active forces 
in these processes and their laws. What we see in the 
world of matter, will also manifest itself in the realm of 
spirit; howsoever wonderfully diversified the phenomena 
may be, even so wonderfully simple are the laws that con- 
trol them. 

The foregoing investigation led from thought to memory ; 
the following will begin with memory, and therefore spin 
its thread in the opposite direction. 

A. Of Memory. 

Even Aristotle had already found out that ideas were not 
reproduced in lawless confusion; i.e., that it was not de- 
pendent on mere chance, whether this or that idea arose in 
consciousness. First of all, he noticed that a previous idea 
does not, of its own accord, return into the mind but by 
invitation ; at the call, as it were, of another idea which is 

39 



40 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

already in consciousness. This was of itself an important 
discovery. It showed what one must look for in order to 
come on the track of the ways and laws of reproduction; 
namely, for the relation existing between the two ideas. 

To proceed with his investigation, he had, accordingly, 
first to collect a fund of examples in which one idea re- 
called another, in order then to try whether the cases could 
be brought into definite order under the given point of 
view. His task was, therefore, that of classification ; and 
the objects were, exactly expressed, the different rela- 
tions that occurred between the two ideas reproducing each 
other in those examples. 

If he had, for instance, a case in view where the thought 
of the old homestead immediately recalls the idea of the 
adjoining trees or the neighboring house, etc., — in like 
manner where the thought of a certain plant brings to 
mind also the image of the place where one first found it, 
and the other objects in its vicinity, — he may have noticed 
how all of these examples agree in that the objects repre- 
sented by the associated ideas are near together in place. 
With the discovery of the common characteristic in these 
cases, some order seemed already to come into the chaos, 
and the investigator could further assume that the dis- 
covery he had made would also shed light on other cases. 
This hypothesis had now to be tested. Accordingly, a 
number of other examples were sought of objects near 
together in place ; and, as before, the ideas in question were 
found to reproduce each other. This seemed, at least, to 
establish a firm standpoint from which to look out over a 
tolerably large part of the field. However, there had been 
found other examples which, though very similar, still did 
not quite exactly fit into the hypothetical class (" near in 



Aristotle's laws of association. 41 

place"). Tims, for instance, that the thought of an absent 
friend recalls the idea of the place where we have last 
spoken with him. Here, to be sure, the two objects, our 
friend and this place, have been together ; this contiguity 
was, however, not constant, but only accidental. This must 
have led the investigator to the further knowledge that in 
this, as well as in the former examples, the decisive point 
is not in the objective being-together, but in the subjective 
bein g-seen-tog ether ; not in the contiguity in sj:>ace, but in the 
contiguity in time, — in a word, in the simultaneousness of 
perception. This new discovery, being approved by further 
trial, showed the first hypothesis to be insufficient. The 
latter had helped the investigation upon the track, but had 
not reached the goal ; it was not entirely false, but the de- 
cisive point was lacking ; it contained only half the truth, 
not the whole. 

Of course it does not make any difference whether the 
Greek psychologist went to work in just this way or not ; 
his investigation resulted in a classification into four kinds 
of relations. And, as a matter of fact, all cases of recol- 
lection, however varied they may at first view appear, may 
be divided into these four categories, as any one can try for 
himself if he will take the trouble. 

These four forms of recollection are as follows : — 

1. Simultaneously formed ideas reproduce one another. 
(Examples above.) 

2. Ideas in continuous series reproduce one another, — 
most easily in the order in which they were formed. Ex- 
amples : The words and sentences in a selection committed 
to memory ; the stations and stages in a journey ; the events 
in a story that has been heard or read ; the occurrences in 
one's own life, etc. 



42 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

3. Similar ideas reproduce one another. Examples : 
Like-sounding expressions, as in rhyme and alliteration; 
similar historical facts (thus David and Jonathan's friend- 
ship recalls that of Damon and Pythias ; the giving of the 
law by Moses, the legislation of Lycurgus and Solon, etc.). 
Here belong also the cases in which a thought calls up 
a comparison ; further, that reproduction which helps to 
form clear perceptions out of sensations, and that also which 
leads to the spontaneous formation of concepts and judg- 
ments, etc. 

4. Contrasted ideas reproduce one another. Examples: 
The sight of great luxury and waste reminds one of poverty 
and misery ; a deed of distinguished courage recalls an ex- 
ample of cowardice; great goodness of heart, an instance 
of hard-heartedness ; the downfall of Prussia in 1806, its 
uprising in 1813 ; Germany's political unity since 1870-1871, 
its previous distracted condition ; the cradle, the grave, etc. 1 

This was an important beginning in the illumination of 
such an obscure field as that of the movement of ideas, and 
redounds to the honor of the great Stagirite. This perform- 
ance is all the more remarkable because in all sciences it is 
the first steps that are the most difficult; but still more 
because of the fact that psychological investigation during 
the succeeding two thousand years did not make any essen- 
tial progress in this regard. 

Those four laws of recollection are, as without doubt their 



i Whoever wishes to get any real good out of these four laws for the 
association of ideas must not omit to observe his own thoughts as they 
occur to him off and on, and see under which rule each separate case 
belongs. In the study of psychology, that which is learned should be ap- 
plied on and on to the phenomena of one's own mind, since nothing can 
take the place of self-observation. For exceedingly interesting sugges- 
tions see Gal ton, Human Faculty, p. 182-207. 



DESCARTES SIMPLIFIED THE LAWS. 43 

discoverer also knew, only symptomatic, not causal. They 
say that the ideas reproduce each other in these four ways, 
but they cannot say why they must do it; wherefore, also, 
it remains unexplained why there are just four ways, no 
more and no less. But aside from this chief omission, of 
which we shall speak later on, the Aristotelian theory of 
memory is also symptomatically incomplete, although not 
absolutely wrong. Since Descartes (died 1650), this incom- 
pleteness has been remedied. And this has been the only 
scientific addition to the doctrine of memory until the 
present century. Herbart (died 1841) gave a new impetus 
to psychology in every department, and has justly been 
called the father of modern psychology. It is this recent 
work, more particularly in the physiological field, that has 
contributed most toward a solution of the cause of the asso- 
ciation of ideas. The addition made by Descartes was this. 
He recognized that, on the one hand, the first and second, 
and on the other hand, the third and fourth, laws (as stated 
above) have so much in common, that probably each pair 
forms a single law. 

In the first pair the deciding characteristic is the time ; 
more exactly, the circumstance that the two ideas in ques- 
tion have been in consciousness together, either at the same 
time or immediately succeeding each other. There is no 
reference to the content of the ideas. They may be derived 
from different senses, or from the same; and in the latter 
case they may be like or unlike, and it makes no difference. 
If, now, both laws require a previous co-existence of the 
ideas in consciousness, while they differ only as to whether 
the ideas are completely simultaneous, or whether one idea 
has already become partly obscured when the other enters 
consciousness, — or, in other words, whether the two ideas 



44 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

have been together in consciousness a longer or a shorter 
time, — it is clear that in both cases the reason of repro- 
duction must be sought in the common characteristic of 
having been together in consciousness. Accordingly, these 
two laws are to be understood only as one, which may be 
called the law of simultaneity. That which had previously 
misled into thinking that there were two laws proves to be 
merely a difference in the effect of one and the same cause, 
— namely, the being in consciousness at the same time, — 
and in the main only a difference of degree, since the com- 
pletely simultaneous ideas are more strongly united than 
the half simultaneous. 

The other pair (3. and 4. laws p. 42) differ from the first 
pair in two ways. First of all, the matter of time does 
not come into consideration here at all, since the ideas 
need never have been together in consciousness. And in 
the second case, that which before was not considered — 
namely, the content of the ideas — is here the distinguish- 
ing characteristic ; for the expressions " similar " and " con- 
trasted " refer to the content of the ideas. Keeping this 
in mind, one cannot help wondering why in the one case 
the similarity, in the other case the dissimilarity, of mean- 
ing should cause reproduction. It was plain that there 
must be some mistake It was soon recognized that in 
the latter case the earlier psychologists had allowed them- 
selves to be deceived by outward appearance. A contrast 
between two objects presupposes their similarity in other 
respects. For between two entirely dissimilar or disparate 
ideas there can be no contrast, because, as we say, they can- 
not be compared. Thus, for example, such ideas as have 
their origin in different senses, as square and sweet, red 
and shrill, etc. ; likewise, round and yellow (form and 



LATER VIEWS OF MEMORY. 45 



color), although they come from the same sense. Since, 
then, in the third law it is plainly only the likeness that 
causes the reproduction, it might easily be guessed that 
also in the case of contrasted ideas it was their like char- 
acteristics that made one reproduce the other, and that 
only after this had so far taken place the contrasted char- 
acteristics attracted attention. This was proved to be true 
by the fact that ideas completely unlike never recall one 
another, unless they have been in consciousness simultane- 
ously, in which case the law of simultaneity alone holds. 
From which it follows that the 3. and 4. laws are likewise 
to be regarded as one, which may be called the law of simi- 
larity. That which had previously misled into supposing 
that there were two laws, — namely, the consciousness of 
contrast, — proves to be merely a difference in the effect 
of one and the same cause, and really only an after-effect of 
the reproduction that has already taken place by reason 
of similarity. 

Thus a deeper examination has shown that the funda- 
mental laws for the manifold forms of reproduction are 
considerably simpler than was formerly believed. There 
are not four laws of memory, but only two ; that of 
simultaneity, and that of similarity. In the first a sub- 
jective factor decides, — namely, the previous presence of 
the ideas together in consciousness ; in the second, an 
objective factor, — namely, their similar content. 

These two laws, then, simple as they seem, are only symp- 
tomatic, and do not yet express the cause of reproduction. 
Modern psychology, physiological and experimental, has 
been fruitful in suggestions of solutions for this question. 
When we recall to mind an act we have done or a sensa- 
tion we have experienced, the similarity between this and 



46 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

the original doing or feeling is so great as to leave but little 
doubt that the same parts of the nervous system are con- 
cerned in the mental reproduction as in the previous physi- 
cal production. We know that every action leaves the 
parts of the body with a disposition to the same action 
again, thus making the second performance more easy. 
This fact lies at the foundation of habit, and it would 
seem the same fact is the basis of memory. 

Thus, then, we may conclude that the senses are not 
only necessary to receive impressions from the outside 
world, but are also necessary for their vivid reproduction 
in memory ; the muscles of the body are not only concerned 
in the movement of parts of our organism, but they also 
play a part in the remembrance of these actions afterward. 
The memory, therefore, has no seat in any particular part 
of the nervous system, but is everywhere. There are as 
many species of memory as there are species of represen- 
tation. Mental work is also nerve and muscle work. 

This being so, we can easily appreciate the fact that the 
nervous discharge, when once started on a previously 
travelled tract, continues till it has roused all those cells 
to action which took part in the first process. Or, to put 
it more plainly, if one portion of a previous mental state 
returns to consciousness, the entire state, with all its ac- 
companiments, will naturally be recalled, provided only 
the nervous energy is sufficient. As Professor Lazarus 
of Berlin expresses it, " Every state of consciousness tends 
to reproduce itself completely." That this law has its 
basis in the anatomical structure of the brain and nervous 
system, we can hardly doubt. 

This is evidently also only another statement of the 
foregoing law of simultaneity. For whatever ideas, feel- 



ASSOCIATION BY SIMILARITY. 47 

ings, or volitions may be in the mind at any one time fuse 
together into one state ; there is strictly only one complex 
idea in the mind at any one time. The very fact that two 
or more ideas, etc., are in the same moment in the same 
consciousness, unites all of these into one state. They are 
not separate ideas, feelings, etc., until they have been 
thought of at separate times ; i.e., in separate conscious- 
nesses. We have, therefore, in this one statement the cause 
both of our mental associations and of our mental abstrac- 
tions. 

We have next to explain the cause of associations by 
similarity. For the sake of clearness, I shall make 
use of a very simple concrete illustration. In the 
margin is a very meagre outline, say of a vase. Ask 
a shoemaker what it represents, and he will prob- 
ably, if pressed to say something, declare it is a shoe- 
sole. If you ask the same question of a biologist, he will 
probably say it represents a cell of a yeast plant, with a 
daughter cell budding off from it. Ask now a little girl, 
and she will say it is the head and body of a doll. A 
boatman will say it is the outline of some island he knows. 
An Indian recognizes it as a representation of a canoe 
paddle ; a chemist sees in it a laboratory flask ; a geo- 
meter sees two ellipses ; a German is reminded of nine- 
pins ; while a gymnast sees a suggestion of an Indian club. 
This might be continued indefinitely, but enough has been 
shown to illustrate the working of the law of similarity. 

That which remained constant in all of these associa- 
tions is the rough outline on the paper ; but in each case 
it called up in mind a different complement of accessory 
ideas, thus completing for each of these observers a differ- 
ent previous mental state. It is evident that in thus 



48 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

redintegrating previous states of consciousness the same 
process was taking place as Avas before described as asso- 
ciation by simultaneity. 

Let us take one step farther. The same person looking 
at the above figure would no doubt be reminded of differ- 
ent objects (successively, just as we have supposed different 
persons to be). In other words, one of these objects would 
suggest the other through the medium of the outline, which 
is common to both. Now, this illustrates very clearly, I 
take it, what occurs in the case of every instance of asso- 
ciation by similarity. Consciousness concentrates on cer- 
tain elements, — namely, on those through which the asso- 
ciation is made, and which are therefore common to both 
ideas ; thereupon by the law of simultaneity the other 
parts of that second previous mental state are recalled. 
It is in this way that the mind passes from one complex 
idea to another by simply retaining those demerits common 
to both, and then (1) dropping out of conscious7iess the other 
elements of the first idea, and (2) redintegrating the second. 

The process may be represented diagrammatically as in 
the figure. The flow of consciousness is represented from 



x X y w 

V 



left to right. The complex idea, containing elements rep- 
resented by x, a, and y, is now in mind. The attention is 
then concentrated on the one or more elements represented 
by a, which therefore simply persist in consciousness after 
x and y have dropped out. The elements a have, however, 
already formed an integral part of a previous state of con- 



RELATION OF THE TWO LAWS. 49 

sciousness in which they were associated with w and z. 
They therefore now reproduce w and z by the law of sim- 
ultaneity and the second complete idea results in conscious- 
ness. 

Thus we see the process of recollection by similarity re- 
duces to redintegration by simultaneity, and the latter is 
therefore stamped as the original law of association. The 
only way in which two ideas can be immediately associated 
is by their forming parts of the same mental state at some 
time. On the other hand, since two similar ideas are 
associated through their common elements, we might call 
such association mediate, in contrast to the immediate 
association of two ideas by simultaneity. This use of 
terms, as well as the entire preceding explanation of asso- 
ciation, is of course very far from being Herbartian. 

Here, then, we have the two laws of memory in their 
very inmost nature and causal connection before us. Not- 
withstanding, however, their identity in origin, the two ways 
are, psychologically, essentially different in their influence 
on the development of the mental life. They are distinct 
ways of reproduction, and without the recognition of this 
fact the higher activities of thought are inexplicable. One 
individual never goes beyond outer connection ; his memory 
for facts appears marvellous ; we wonder " how one small 
head can carry all he knows " ; his stories are filled with 
minutest unimportant details, apparently having no connec- 
tion but that they once happened in that order. Another 
person does not seem to know half so much, but brings 
every fact into its logical connection. When he tells a story, 
only such details as have relation to the main issue are 
brought in ; his memory makes no great show of power, 
but always seems to be readier in an emergency than the 



50 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

other man's. But the greatest difference of all is, the 
latter understands things better than the former. " To 
the peasant the falling apple redintegrates only spatial 
associations of its pleasant taste ; to Sir Isaac Newton its 
resemblance to all falling bodies suggested the law of 
gravitation." 

The difference in mental economy is shown by the rela- 
tive availability of a fact remembered by association with 
another fact in time or space ; and, on the other hand, of 
a fact remembered by its relation of similarity with others. 
For future use the former is frequently as good as worth- 
less. It is bound up with other ideas with which it may 
never again need to be in connection. Except in those 
cases where the same processes or events are repeated over 
and over again, such memory has practically no use. It 
serves us, to be sure, in remembering that the sun rose in 
the east and set in the west, yesterday, day before, and so 
on. It must even be admitted that it forms the basis of 
all memory, as we have shown above 5 and it has truly 
immense importance for automatic action and all the 
mechanism of the mind. But it cannot be too emphatically 
reiterated that this sort of memory alone never can amount 
to anything. All mental power of thought, invention, im- 
agination, and character itself depends on the workings of 
the other law (of similarity). The connection of similarity 
is internal, and involved in the very nature of the ideas. 
With the formation of every new link of similarity the 
capacity of the mind is increased instead of becoming 
taxed. But its greatest point of superiority is in the avail- 
ability for all future use of ideas so associated. Wherever 
needed, there is just where they put in an appearance. 
They spontaneously group themselves in order, and prepare 



DISSOCIATION. » 51 

the way for all the higher activities of thinking. As we 
have before seen, this process of spontaneous grouping 
leads to conception, judgment, and reasoning. The birth 
of all new ideas, plans, inventions, discoveries of nature's 
laws, etc., are alone made possible by the association of 
ideas by similarity. All science, both of investigation and 
of formulation, consists of applications of it. 

It should be noticed that in the process of recollection, 
as just described, the first step consists in dissociation; 
i.e., in separating certain elements from the rest of the 
first complex idea, which then drops out of consciousness. 
The power to do this requires practice, and is of the 
same nature as abstraction. This breaking up of the 
ideas into their elements, however, must take place in 
order to make the ideas mobile, and to dissolve their 
connection in time and place, and introduce them into new 
combinations with other ideas like themselves. Readiness 
of thought depends on this ability ; and both steps, disso- 
ciation and redintegration, need practice. In early child- 
hood the facts of the external world pour in through the 
senses, leaving no time to sort out and classify. The asso- 
ciation fibres that are probably necessary for the latter 
process do not get their medullary sheath and begin to 
function for a considerable time after birth. The founda- 
tion of all future greatness is, however, being laid in this 
great store of concrete material received through the senses 
and retained by sheer force of natural memory. Happy 
the child whose mind has been furnished thus abundantly. 
This is the raw material of school instruction that must be 
supplemented where deficient, and worked over into the 
higher products of thought. The method of school-work 
should therefore form the transition from the one form to 



52 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

the other ; from memory by simultaneity to memory by 
similarity, from childish wonder to maturer thought and 
understanding. 

The question of resolving the two laws of memory into one prin- 
ciple has occupied nearly all the psychologists of note. Dorpfeld, 
differing from the above views, follows Herbart in his metaphysics 
of the statics and dynamics of ideas, and hence sees in the law of 
similarity the ground for the removal of the check from all the 
similar ideas which therefore rise in consciousness of themselves (1). 
Eepetition is the assistance, by which ideas which are not thus freed 
from check can be dragged into consciousness (2). This explana- 
tion of the two laws is concurred in by nearly all the Herbartian 
writers. The recent translation of lifer' s Introduction to the Peda- 
gogy of Herbart contains the shortest unvarnished statement of 
these views in English (particularly pp. 12-14). See Herbart' s Psy- 
chology, pp. 11-16; Lindner's Psychology, p. 81 ff . ; and two articles 
by G. F. Stout in " Mind" on " The Herbartian Psychology' 1 '' (Nos. 
51 and 52). For a good short account with criticism, see the chap- 
ters on Herbartian Psychology in Ribot's German Psychology of 
To-day, pp. 24-67. 

Spencer seeks on another basis to reduce simultaneity to simi- 
larity. To him the essential fact in association is fusion of similars 
in recognition. Coexistent ideas are similar in their time relation 
and hence associate. Principles of Psychology, i. p. 267 ff. 

On the other hand, Lazarus in Germany, and Sir William Hamil- 
ton and others in England, and Dewey, James, Ladd, and Baldwin 
in this country, agree in the explanation given in the text, reducing 
all association to the principle of coexistence in consciousness. 
See Dewey, Psychology, pp. 00-117. James, Psychology, i. p. 578 ff., 
is very clear and readable. He adds that our general retentiveness 
is unchangeable by any amount of training (i. p. 663 ff. ). On i. 
p. 504 he gives an interesting " history of opinion concerning asso- 
ciation." For a similar brief summary of opinions, see Bain, Mental 
Science, Appendix, pp. 01, 02; and Sully, Human Mind, ii., Appen- 
dix, pp. 330-342. Ladd {Psychology, descriptive and explanatory, 
p. 275) says, "the influence of contiguity in consciousness is the 
sole discoverable psychological principle of association." Baldwin 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 53 

(Handbook of Psychology, Senses and Intellect, p. 201) formulates 
the primary law as follows: "Every association of mental states 
is an integration, due to the previous correlation of those states in 
apperception." But one has to read the context to see what all 
of this means. Kay (Memory, What it is and how to improve it, 
p. 278) agrees in recognizing contiguity as the one principle of all 
association, hut fails completely when he comes to explain it. 

John Stuart Mill is of the opinion that the reduction of the two 
ways of association to one principle must be necessarily unsuccess- 
ful (James Mill's Analysis of the Human Mind, p. Ill, note 35 by 
J. S. Mill). Hoffding (Outlines of Psychology, p. 158) recognizes 
this as the fact, but identifies the association between the parts and 
the whole as the typical form of all association, which he calls the 
law of totality. Sully (Outlines of Psychology, p. 2(37 ff.) describes 
the phenomena in very much the same way, although he does not 
undertake to formulate any general law. 

For an admirable historical account of the psychology of memory, 
see Dr. Wm. H. Burnhani's articles in the American Journal of 
Psychology, vol. ii. A very complete bibliography of memory will 
be found at the close of these in vol. ii. pp. 614-622. 

For dissociation of ideas, see Dewey, Psychology, pp. 117-129. 

For the physiological basis of memory, see Spencer, Psychology, i. 
p. 270; and author's preface to Kay's Memory and pp. 29-46 and 92 
ff. ; James, Psychology, i. p. 643 ff. is clear and readable as usual. 
Perhaps the most accessible and clearest explanation of recent 
theory of physical basis for the association of ideas is contained in 
Ziehen's Introduction to Physiological Psychology, chapter ix. 

See also Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 338, for his 
famous doctrine that " the renewed feeling occupies the very same 
parts, and in the very same manner, as the original feeling." 

B. Or Thought. 

The term law is applied to thought in two senses: we 
speak on the one hand of psychological, and on the other 
hand of logical, laws of thought. In the first case the term 
law is used in the same sense as in all the natural sciences, 
namely, to describe the actual, uniform, and invariable pro- 



54 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

cesses of nature. Such laws allow of no exception. On 
the other hand, the laws of logic, like those of grammar, 
sesthetics, ethics, music, poetry, etc., are rules laid down by 
Art to be followed in order to secure a right result. The 
laws of Science must be followed if there is to be any 
result at all. The rules of Art may be and often are dis- 
regarded, and this results only in mistakes. Since our 
investigation is a psychological one, we have to do only 
with the psychological laws. 

In order to simplify our problem, we must try to reduce 
the fourfold activity of thought under one point of view. 
In the second chapter above, the four forms of thought 
were reviewed : comparison, conception, judgment, and 
reason. It is usual to mention only the last three. The 
reason for this we shall see presently. 

I should like to ask such of my readers as have been to 
normal schools or have already privately studied a com- 
pendium of psychology, just to try whether they can them- 
selves reduce those four operations of thought under one 
head. This problem, belonging as it does to the theory 
of knowledge, which is the plainest and best-worked field 
in psychology, would indeed be very well adapted to show 
how much, or rather how little, good can come from com- 
pendiums. I shall attempt, however, first to make the 
problem plainer by a few separate questions. In what 
relation, genetic or logical, do these processes of thought 
stand to one another ? Is one preliminary to another ; that 
is, does one prepare the way for another ? And if some- 
thing like this is found to be true of some, is it further 
true of all ? Do these four processes form a single genetic 
series, one arising out of another ? In a word, when 
rightly understood, are there really four thought pro- 



GENETIC SEQUENCE OF THOUGHT-PKOCESSES. 55 

cesses, or three, or two, or only one ? Even with these 
suggestions the reader aviII probably not be able to answer, 
especially if he has studied his logic diligently. The books 
on psychology, and especially the handbooks, leave their 
readers entirely too much in the lurch in this regard. 
They do not even present this problem, nor so much as 
call attention to the fact that there is such a problem. But 
worse still, they usually treat of three thought-processes in 
the order in which they are treated in logic. Now, logic is 
right in its treatment ; for, since it has to do merely with 
the forms of thought, not, however, with their origin, it pro- 
ceeds very correctly from the simple to the complex, and 
treats accordingly first of the concept, then of the judg- 
ment, and then of the syllogism. If the text-books in 
psychology choose the same order, it should be only as a 
preliminary treatment of each of these thought-processes 
by themselves. But if now they contain no further dis- 
cussion of the genetic connection between the different 
thought functions, so as to correct the false order previ- 
ously used, then not only is the chief topic in the theory of 
knowledge left obscure, but if the reader tries now to work 
this problem out for himself, he will be misled by the pre- 
vious confusion of treatment. My own presentation in 
the second chapter above nevertheless follows the order 
dictated by logic, but the reason for so doing was simply 
for the purpose of showing the reader the contrast between 
that want of order and the genetic sequence which I shall 
now present. 

For the sake of brevity I shall avoid the proper induc- 
tive form of presentation, and state at once the correct 
order of the thought-processes, leaving the proofs to fol- 
low in connection with examples. 



56 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

In the first place, reasoning or inference drops out of the 
list of processes, on logical grounds. Because, as we saw 
before, reasoning is only a peculiar kind of judgment : 
it is the derivation of a new judgment from two or more 
other judgments, and the conclusion is therefore sometimes 
called a derived judgment. Therefore, leaving reasoning 
out of the list, we have still three specifically different pro- 
cesses of thought. 

These three stand in a genetic relation to one another; 
i.e., they arise one out of another, but not in the confused 
sequence in which logic treats them. There is really but 
a single thought-process, which from its purpose may be 
called the formation of concepts ; but it runs through 
several acts, just as in a flower the bud, the blossom, and 
the ripe fruit follow each other. The three acts in the 
thought-process are comparison, judgment, and conception. 

Comparison is, for the present, to be counted as a sep- 
arate act preliminary to judgment, in order to avoid any 
obscurity, or uncertainty as to its place in the thought- 
process. But, in point of fact, comparison and judgment 
really form but one mental act, or, in other words, they are 
only two different expressions for one and the same pro- 
cess, which in each case is regarded and named from a dif- 
ferent standpoint. The word comparison regards the 
beginning of the process ; the word judgment, on the other 
hand, has reference to its end, denoting, as it does, the 
result of the comparison. Or, in other words, comparison 
represents the process from its objective side, pointing to 
the two or more objects in consciousness whose like or un- 
like characteristics are to be sought ; judgment, on the 
contrary, shows the process from its subjective side, refer- 
ring to the peculiar form of idea produced. Now, in order 



THE THOUGHT-PROCESS. 57 

to have a single expression for this one mental process, 
we call it, from its result, by the name of judgment. In 
this psychological sense, to judge is, therefore, nothing 
more than to call up clearly in consciousness a distinct 
mental representation or idea of the object to be judged, 
together with those characteristics, wherein it is like or 
unlike another object. If the act of judgment is com- 
pleted, the formation of the concept follows of itself. But 
this latter is not to be confused with the verbal expression 
for the concept. Nor can the reader be too careful in dis- 
tinguishing the above use of the word " judgment " in the 
psychological sense from the usual definition of judgment 
as given in logic. Accordingly, we may say in conclu- 
sion : — 

There is only a single thought-process, but it takes place 
in two successive acts, namely, judgment and conception. 

In this statement we have the myriad forms of thought 
reduced to their greatest simplicity. Even popular usage 
in speech has long since expressed the fact that there is 
properly only one thought-process, and that it consists of 
the two acts, judgment and conception ; and further, that 
with the completion of judgment the conception was ready 
of itself, and that, conversely, no concept was possible with- 
out previous judgment. Each of the two expressions is 
used promiscuously in popular language for the whole pro- 
cess. For, when one wants to express the fact that another 
does not understand a certain matter, one may say either 
"lie has formed no judgment in regard to it," or "he has 
no conception of the matter," and they both mean the 
same. 

However welcome the foregoing general view of the 
process of thought may have been to the reader, such 



58 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

knowledge must still remain subject to all of those faults 
that are inseparable from instruction by abstract ideas 
which do not rest on a concrete basis of careful observa- 
tion. It affords, at best, very incomplete satisfaction to 
have a broad, open field of view and yet not be able to see 
clearly and distinctly anything in it. There is, besides, 
much more that requires explanation, particularly in the 
relation between the two parts of the thought-process. 
With the help of the concrete examples let us now attempt 
this further work. 

For the correct understanding of the following examples, 
it is necessary that the two directions of thought be first 
properly understood. In comparison or judgment we may, 
of course, look for either similarities or dissimilarities in 
the object compared. Just according as we look for the 
one or the other, will the result be a different kind of con- 
cept. For instance, if the characteristics common to a 
right-angled, an acute-angled, and an obtuse-angled triangle 
are combined, the concept " triangle " is formed, which in 
respect to the three ideas above (so far as these are them- 
selves concepts), is called a superordinate or generic con- 
cept. If, however, this concept were already formed, and 
in a new comparison of those three figures the dissimilar 
characteristics are seized upon (which process we call dis- 
tinguishing them), there result finally the three differing 
ideas : right-angled, acute-angled, and obtuse-angled tri- 
angle. These, in respect to the concept " triangle," are 
called subordinate or species concepts. This shows us that 
thought can move in two different directions ; in one way 
it proceeds to ever wider, more general, and higher con- 
cepts ; in the other way, it reaches ever narrower, more 
special, and lower concepts. In the one case, broad views 



FIRST EXAMPLE. 59 

open up to us ; in the other, we find exercise for our dis- 
crimination. It is well when one head can combine both 
abilities — far-sight and acuteness. 

The following examples are mostly those of involuntary 
or spontaneous conception, because when concepts are in- 
tentionally formed the process is of itself somewhat more 
transparent. The question therefore arises, what is it that 
determines whether the spontaneous process shall take the 
one or the other direction. When the process is voluntary, 
the will determines by choosing the one or the other ; but 
if it is spontaneous, the determination must come from 
some other source. This source is in the objects them- 
selves. For, if the objects to be compared show more 
similar characteristics and seem so much alike that the 
difference appears unimportant, and therefore not worth 
considering, thought will proceed to the superordinate con- 
cept. If, on the contrary, the dissimilar characteristics 
exceed, or if one in particular succeeds in attracting special 
attention, then, although the likeness will be noticed, still 
the process will lead to the subordinate concepts. Thus 
we see that nature has, even in the spontaneous process, 
already provided for both directions of thought. 

First Example (in the direction of superordinate con- 
cepts). The reader has only to call to mind what was said 
above in the second chapter on the origin of the concept 
"mountain'' in early childhood. If the child has already 
once seen such an elevation, and then afterwards sees an- 
other, the concept " mountain " is in its inception forth- 
with present. Although a general idea has thus worked 
itself out of the two concrete ideas, the child has not been 
conscious of this inner process, and yet if, when he saw 
the first elevation, he was told that it was a mountain, he 



60 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

would at the sight of the second undoubtedly exclaim : 
" That is a mountain, too." We may well be surprised at 
the fact that here the judgment already contains the word 
(mountain) expressing the concept. This certainly looks 
as if the judgment did not take place before conception, but 
rather as if judgment and concept were born simultaneously. 
But, if this is so, how could we claim before that judgment 
was a preliminary process to conception ? And if it is not 
so, our concrete example seems to have brought us only 
further into the fog of uncertainty. But the reader will 
probably conclude, and rightly too, that the example was 
nevertheless purposely chosen. The purpose was to call 
attention to an important peculiarity in the spontaneous 
formation of superordinate concepts, a peculiarity which 
is usually not even alluded to in the text-books. This 
example by itself, however, will not give us any full ex- 
planation. We must therefore first take an example from 
the other direction of thought, in which judgment and 
concept appear strictly separate. After we have rightly 
comprehended the relation in the latter case, we shall be 
able to clear up the doubtful points in the first example, 
and find out the important peculiarity which it teaches in 
regard to the formation of superordinate concepts. 

Second Example (in the direction of subordinate con- 
cepts). Suppose a child has repeatedly seen yellow wood- 
sorrel (oxalis stricta). Of course there are different kinds 
of wood-sorrel, but we will suppose that he has not yet 
noticed their differences. Since, however, he has seen 
various specimens of yellow wood-sorrel, his mind has 
formed from these concrete ideas (percepts) likewise the 
abstract idea (concept) " wood-sorrel." If after this he 
comes across a specimen of violet wood-sorrel, he will notice 



SECOND EXAMPLE. 61 

of course that it is similar to the wood-sorrel he has pre- 
viously seen, but at the same time his attention will be 
attracted by the strongly different characteristic of color. 
The comparison and distinction is forthwith completed, 
and at the same time the mental process of judgment is 
ready to give expression to itself in the words, " this wood- 
sorrel is violet." — What do we find here as the result of 
the comparison ? At all events a judgment. But is there 
not also a new concept — the species concept " violet wood- 
sorrel " ? That there is no such concept in the judgment 
is shown by the fact that the new idea appearing in the 
predicate is nothing more than a characteristic (violet). 
But, it may be asked, does not the species concept " violet 
wood-sorrel " come into existence along with this new 
characteristic ? For the present it does not ; for the single 
specimen of this species that the child has seen can only 
give rise to the concrete idea or perception " violet wood- 
sorrel." In order for an abstract idea to be produced (in 
this case, the spontaneous species concept " violet wood- 
sorrel "), it would be necessary that several specimens of 
this species should first be seen. 1 

The relation between the act of judgment and the for- 
mation of the concept will now probably be somewhat 
clearer to the reader. The judgment indicates as the re- 
sult of comparison nothing new more than a new charac- 
teristic, but not yet the species concept, to which this 
characteristic belongs. It prepares the way, to be sure, 
for this concept, since it furnishes the new material (the 

1 Of course it is not necessary that several different specimens should 
be presented to the senses, but only that several different percepts or 
mental presentations, whether obtained from one or from more than one 
object, should have taken part in the formation of the concept 



62 THOUGHT AND MEMOKY. 

characteristic) for it ; but the judgment as such knows 
nothing of the concept itself. It is clear, therefore, that 
here, in the formation of subordinate concepts, the judg- 
ment certainly comes previously to the concept — not 
simultaneously, as seemed to be the case in superordinate 
concepts. 

It is, furthermore, important to notice that, as was just 
pointed out, the judgment prepares the way for the species 
concept ; for, just as soon as the newly noticed difference 
"violet " has been distinctly apprehended, or, in other words, 
as soon as this new characteristic appears in consciousness 
in the form peculiar to the judgment, the concept wood- 
sorrel which was already present becomes unsettled. Why? 
It previously contained the characteristic " yellow," since 
this characteristic had occurred in all the specimens pre- 
viously seen, and was therefore counted in with the common 
characteristics. But now, after a violet wood-sorrel has 
come to view, it is seen that this characteristic " yellow " 
does not belong to the common characteristics of this 
genus. What result has this on the old concept ? First of 
all, that the concept " wood-sorrel " loses the characteristic 
(yellow) that did not belong to it, and becomes in so far 
purified and more complete. And secondly, that beside 
this earlier concept (wood-sorrel) on the one hand, the ready 
formed subordinate concept " yellow wood-sorrel " arises ; 
and, on the other hand, the way is prepared for a second 
subordinate concept " violet wood-sorrel," co-ordinate with 
the other. 1 



1 The way is prepared for the second concept but it is not yet formed. 
This must he distinctly noticed ; for the judgment as such never helps in 
the formation of concepts at all in any other way, since it does nothing 
else than furnish characteristics. This is just as true of the formation of 



KELATION OF JUDGMENT TO CONCEPTION. 63 

The second example has therefore shown us, first that 
'the judgment always comes before the concept, and cannot 
come otherwise ; secondly, that the act of judgment, when 
it relates to a dissimilar characteristic, has the effect of 
clarifying the old concept and splitting it into two sub- 
concepts, thus making it a genus concept. 

We can now return to our first example and clear up the 
doubts that surrounded it. Why was it that in this first 
example judgment and conception appeared simultaneous ? 
If in comparison, as we know, the mind is concerned only 
with like or unlike characteristics, and if the mental act of 



higher as of lower concepts. In the present case, in the judgment, 
" this wood-sorrel is violet," there is another circumstance that will 
serve to show very plainly how strictly separate the act of judgment 
is from the act of conception. For here the characteristic "violet" 
appears as a point of dissimilarity in contrast to " yellow; " hut a con- 
cept, on the other hand, is always concerned with common or like char- 
acteristics only. From this it follows that the judgment alone could 
never give rise to the concept "violet wood-sorrel," hut that, as before 
said, several specimens of violet wood-sorrel must first be seen. Only 
after these have been compared can the characteristic " violet " be recog- 
nized as common. The new judgment, "all these wood-sorrels are vio- 
let," will now lead to the sub-concept " violet wood-sorrel." The earlier 
judgment in which " violet " was an unlike characteristic, has, there- 
fore, strictly speaking, not directly prepared the way for this sub-concept, 
but only indirectly, and therefore not so much prepared the way for it as 
merely served as an incentive to its formation. The other sub-concept 
(yellow wood-sorrel) did not need any new judgment, since it was already 
contained in the old concept " wood-sorrel." This old concept experi- 
enced a change in its content, in losing one of its characteristics; its pre- 
vious content, on the contrary, then became the species concept. This 
illustrates very nicely that mutual influence between new and old ideas, 
which is so characteristic of all apperception. 

One thing more should be noticed here. Since a concept, whether 
higher or lower, is in comparison with the ideas which it embraces in its 
content, in the relation of superiority to these, it follows, therefore, that 
in the act of conception as such the movement of thought is always ?/p- 
xoard. The two movements of thought spoken of in the text are there- 
fore found in judgment (comparison) only. 



64 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

judgment is nothing more than a mental representation of 
the result of comparison, then it follows that the predicate 
of a mental judgment must relate to characteristics only, 
whether like or unlike. If, on the contrary, conception 
consists of seizing together in the grasp of a single idea 
the similar characteristics, then it must be plain that judg- 
ment and conception are two entirely distinct acts. If, then, 
in our first example this distinction did not clearly appear, 
it was owing to one or both of the following causes — 
either to a peculiarity in the spontaneous formation of 
genus concepts, or to the interference of language. 

In order to have a concrete instance in mind, let us re- 
turn to the example (mountain) given above. Here the 
characteristics which the objects compared with one an- 
other had in common, are several in number, as is also the 
case in most instances of such concepts. A child Avill 
never be able at the first sight to notice distinctly all of 
these characteristics separately ; even an adult would not 
succeed in a single rapid glance. Now, just as the child has 
formed only a general perception of each of the two objects, 
so also of the characteristics in which they are alike. He 
perhaps has the general impression that the two objects 
are similar, i.e., have much in common, but he cannot give 
an account of the characteristics which compose this simi- 
larity. Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that a 
child really had apprehended distinctly all the common 
characteristics, or at least some of them ; still, he would 
scarcely have at command the necessary expressions to 
denote each of these characteristics precisely. But even 
supposing he had, the child would have no incentive to 
express these common characteristics in a series of separate 
judgments. What concerns him is simply to make known 



children's use of words. 65 

the general impression that the two objects are similar. 
For this purpose the easiest means that offers is the name 
of the elevation first seen — the word " mountain," which 
when first heard had for the child the meaning of a proper 
name. 

This shows us clearly whence it comes that the expressed 
judgment, "that (thing) is a mountain," already contains 
the concept word. The expression, mountain, which the 
child uses in the predicate is, for him, not a concept word, 
but a mere name, the name of the elevation first seen. 
He means to denote by it the characteristics he has noticed 
(in this case those that were common to both). Since, 
however, only the total impression was noticed, or in case 
any one of the characteristics was distinctly noticed, the 
particular expression for it was wanting, he therefore 
chooses the name of the object previously seen, as much 
as to say : the characteristics which he has now in mind 
here, are just the same as he had before seen there : or, in 
other words, since the two objects have so much in com- 
mon (judgment), they deserve the same name (concept). 
If the meaning of the child's expression is so understood, 
we see plainly the relation between the act of judgment 
and the formation of the concept, although in the actually 
spoken judgment both acts were mingled. The child's 
manner of expression accords with his incomplete appre- 
hension and his poverty of language. For, because the 
mental act of judgment is not correctly completed, and 
because, moreover, the correct expression is wanting, while 
the idea is, nevertheless, struggling for utterance ; the gen- 
uine judgment form which ought to give the separate 
characteristics is, as it were, skipped, and that form is 
chosen which the judgment has when it comes after the 



66 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

concept has been formed, and when it therefore is intended 
to name, not the separate characteristics, but the concept 
itself. This is probably the correct view 'with reference 
to nearly all those charming instances of childish " exten- 
sion of meaning " in common words, which are frequently 
given as proof of the child's power of abstraction and con- 
ception. One little girl, born in the South, saw snow for 
the first time on a visit North, and said it was " raining 
soapsuds." Another called the crackling of the kitchen 
fire, " barking." A little boy, not yet old enough to pro- 
nounce distinctly, called dipping bread into gravy giving 

it a bath ("ba"'). Baby J used the word "bo" to 

mean anything that pleased him. Darwin's little boy, at 
twelve months, invented the word " mum," which he used 
for food of all kinds. There is no proper abstraction in 
any of these cases. A child of one or two years old uses 
words by analogy, as was explained above, but does not 
have general concepts with any definite content. 

Adults, moreover, do not do a particle better than the 
child in the spontaneous formation of genus concepts. 
When they pass a judgment merely on the basis of a hasty 
comparison, without, therefore, distinctly apprehending 
the separate common characteristics, they understand very 
well how to cover up this deficiency. They pass by the 
genuine form of judgment and employ, instead, the expres- 
sion which contains the ready formed concept, and perhaps, 
besides, use a very general expression for this concept. 
And this phrase must pass current for a genuine judgment, 
and the general expression must serve as an adequate con- 
cept. Sometimes such a word serves the purpose for 
which it was uttered — just as light money passes for 
full value until its deficiency is recognized. 



TO THINK IS TO FORM CONCEPTS. 67 

Thus we have shown that likewise, in the case of super- 
orclinate concepts, there results from the comparison first 
of all a judgment, no matter whether expressed or not. 
But the judgment never concerns itself with anything hut 
the separate characteristics ; for the mental act of judg- 
ment is nothing but the focusing of consciousness on a 
single like or unlike characteristic. To sum up : not until 
the judgments are made, that is, until the necessary like 
or unlike characteristics are seized upon, thus bringing to- 
gether the material for the concept in question, — not until 
this is done, can the concept, whether superordinate or sub- 
ordinate, be formed. For conception is nothing but the 
taking together (con, together, capio, I take) of the com- 
mon or essential characteristics in the grasp of one idea. 
In just so far as the preceding judgments have been incom- 
plete, will also the succeeding concept be incomplete. A 
concept deserves to be called scientifically precise, only 
when it is the result of correct and exhaustive judgments. 

The manifold forms of thinking have thus been so far 
simplified that we see they consist entirely of judging and 
forming concepts, — or of the two successive acts : appre- 
hension of the separate characteristics of several objects, 
and comprehension of their like or essential characteristics 
in the grasp of a general idea. There is, moreover, noth- 
ing to prevent carrying this simplification farther and 
denoting only the final act, and saying, accordingly, to 
think is to form concepts. But one must then keep in 
mind that this concluding act is preceded by the prepara- 
tory act of judgment. 

A further hindrance to the clear understanding of the 
genetic relation between judgment and conception lies in 
the use of language. Since the text-books make no men- 



68 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

tion of this difficulty and no attempt to remove it, we shall 
try to supply the omission. 

Language is in this respect by no means a true mirror 
of the mental processes. Thus the concept, being a single 
idea, would require, as a corresponding expression for itself, 
a single word or a word with one or more qualifiers (e.g., 
right-angled triangle, bitter tasting, beautiful and correct 
writing, "the little village of Grand-Pre, distant, secluded, 
still," as subject, " lay in the fruitful valley, in the Acadian 
land, on the shores of the Basin of Minas," as predicate, 
etc.). But in order to express any mental act, language 
never uses a single word or an isolated phrase — unless it 
be an abbreviation, in which the omission is supplied men- 
tally — but always employs a sentence, which is the form 
of expression for a judgment. And since concepts always 
occur as parts of a sentence, any one who does not thor- 
oughly understand the origin of judgments and concepts 
would be led to believe that concepts were developed before 
judgments. The reason why language obscures the correct 
sequence of these acts is not difficult to see. One has only 
to remember that the speaker puts his thoughts in words 
not for his own sake, but in order to communicate them to 
others. Thus, if one is thinking to one's self and wishes to 
denote in words a newly conceived idea, a single ivord will 
suffice, or an isolated phrase ; but, if one wants another 
clearly to understand a newly conceived idea, such an 
isolated expression will not be sufficient, but the preceding 
act of judgment must be indicated. Now, this is done by 
formulating a complete sentence, in which the objects 
judged appear as subject and the resulting concept as 
predicate. For example, suppose the new concept is " par- 
allelogram." If it has been gained from the study of the 



JUDGMENTS AS EXPRESSED IN LANGUAGE. 69 

square and rectangle, it has been preceded by the two judg- 
ments : " in the square the opposite sides are parallel," 
and " in the rectangle the opposite sides are likewise 
parallel." Hereupon the superordinate concept results 
which we briefly call '•'parallelogram." Now if this act of 
conception is to be made known to others, it takes place 
through the sentence, " Squares and rectangles are parallel- 
ograms." The same is true if the concept is not entirely 
new, but, although formed before, is not yet clarified and 
completed. Thus, in the case before us, if, in regular school 
work, the new concept " parallelogram " is to be tested and 
at the same time made complete — by application first to 
the rhombus, we will say — there will result first of all 
again a genuine judgment : " in the rhombus the opposite 
sides are likewise parallel." Hereupon the clarified con- 
cept appears in the sentence : " the rhombus is likewise a 
parallelogram." If, after the test has been further made 
with the rhomboid, the completed concept is now to be 
expressed in its full extent, the sentence would be : " the 
square, the rectangle, the rhombus, and the rhomboid are 
parallelograms." 

In this way language clothes all thoughts in the sentence 
or judgment form ; but, if one looks closer to see what sort 
of a mental act is thereby represented, one will find that 
there are two sorts of judgments as expressed in language. 
One kind expresses an actual mental act of judgment pre- 
paratory to the particular concept ; the other kind pnyperly 
makes known only a newly gained or newty completed con- 
cept, and such are therefore possible only after the concept 
has been formed. In the first case the language is adapted 
like a well-fitting garment expressly made to order ; in the 
latter case, on the contrary, it is only a borrowed suit for 



70 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

an emergency. Thus, although the fact that language uses 
sentences exclusively, may easily mislead the beginner in 
psychology into believing that the judgment forms the 
conclusion of the thought process, a closer examination has 
shown us that the contrary view is confirmed, viz., that 
conception is the end and goal of thinking. For further 
elucidation let the attention be called to a couple of ex- 
amples which show that the act of conception towards 
which the judgment is aiming is very frequently not ex- 
pressed at all, but instead only the preceding judgment. 
This is more particularly the case when the concept is in 
the main already formed and the new judgment only adds 
a further explanation. Thus, for example, the geometrical 
proposition, " the angles of a triangle are together equal to 
two right angles," is a genuine judgment. The act of con- 
ception, to which it tends, consists in the completion of the 
concept triangle by a new and accessory characteristic. 
The Pythagorean proposition is likewise a judgment in 
which the concept " right triangle " receives a new and 
accessory characteristic. In both cases it is the act of 
judgment to which we give expression, not the act of con- 
ception. The preceding discussion, which has, it is hoped, 
tended very much to simplify our conception of thinking, 
has likewise simplified our search for the psychological 
laws of thought. We have only to concern ourselves with 
judgment as the preliminary act, and with conception as the 
final and' chief act. The psychological law is here to be 
understood as meaning the cause or incentive which leads 
the mind spontaneously (involuntarily) on the road to 
judgment and further on to conception. We must there- 
fore watch and observe unintentional or spontaneous think- 
ing, since intentional or scientific thought is] influenced by 



THE LAW OF CONCEPTION. 71 

the will. We will begin with conception, since we can 
from this higher point of view look back better over the 
preliminary act. 

We must, then, briefly recur to the process of conception 
as before described in the second chapter. When a con- 
cept is to be formed, two or more ideas, having something 
in common, must be present side by side in consciousness. 
There are three possible cases : in the first, two objects 
may be immediately present to the senses, e.g., if the 
teacher draws two geometrical figures on the board, or 
distributes two different kinds of plants to the class. 
Secondly, one idea may be a sense perception and the 
other a reproduced idea, e.g., if the mountain one is look- 
ing at recalls the image of one previously seen. Thirdly, 
both may be reproduced ideas, as is mostly the case, for 
instance, in silent meditation. The concepts in these cases 
are so-called class concepts, because they include in their 
extent a number of objects. The individual concept differs 
from these in referring only to a single individual (person, 
thing, etc.). But in its origin it does not differ, since the 
individual must have been seen several times and in differ- 
ent forms, e.g., a person in different clothes, or at different 
ages, in different mood, activity, etc. Here, only the second 
and third cases above mentioned can occur — the last, when, 
for instance, an historian meditates on the essential charac- 
teristics of an historical character, whose biography he has 
read. 

The process of conception always consists simply in 
those characteristics which the two objects have in common 
becoming clearer in consciousness, and the dissimilar char- 
acteristics consequently being crowded back, i.e., becoming 
indistinct. The former make up the content of the con- 



72 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

cept. It is possible that the like characteristics at first 
have not been all distinctly marked, but only in the form 
of a general impression or feeling, as people usually, but 
very improperly, say. Nevertheless, even in such case, the 
concept is already embryonic. The cause of the act of con- 
ception is, accordingly, the fact that the common character- 
istics become clearer in consciousness, since each pair of 
characteristics corresponding to the two ideas compared 
unite into one and are thus strengthened. This is then 
the psychological law of conception which we have been 
seeking. 1 

The next question is whether this is the only law, or 
whether there is another in conjunction with it. There is, 
indeed, as we shall see, a second law in all those cases 
where one or both ideas are reproduced in memory. For 
in these cases the meeting of two ideas in consciousness is 
made possible only when an idea, momentarily in con- 
sciousness, recalls to mind an earlier similar idea. Thus 
we see that here the memory is actively engaged in the 
service of conception, and we may therefore say, that in all 
those cases where the ideas compared are not sense percep- 
tions, the law of reproduction by similarity assists as a pre- 
paratory factor of thought. The first case above, in which 
this assistance is not rendered, since the objects are pre- 
sented to the senses, occurs comparatively seldom, — and 
for the most part only in regular school instruction, in 
which case the process is intentional, whereas we are here 
speaking of spontaneous conception. The other cases em- 

1 Concepts, therefore, bear a striking analogy to composite portraits. 
The term "abstract idea" is frequently not so appropriate as "cumula- 
tive idea." Compare Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 83. 
Ribot prefers the term " generic idea." 



CAUSE OF SPONTANEOUS JUDGMENTS. 73 

brace not only by far the greater part of the processes of 
thought, but are further of special importance, inasmuch 
as through them the store of ideas already collected is con- 
tinually being applied to the production of new thoughts ; 
without them the older supply of ideas would remain as 
dead capital for the mind. 

In order now to discover the natural cause that leads the 
mind to form judgments, we shall have to exclude from 
our consideration all cases of voluntary thought, since here 
the will too much overshadows the other natural cause for 
us to observe. And so far as involuntary or spontaneous 
thinking is concerned, it will again occur to the reader that 
here the act of judgment is skipped, as it were, i.e., does 
not show plainly, thus resulting in concepts which are 
likewise incomplete. Hence it would appear that the very 
process which we wish to observe is so obscured that our 
investigation seems to be brought again to a standstill. 
But we should recollect that those judgments which lead 
immediately to conception, relate exclusively to the like 
characteristics. Even if this half of the field is cut off 
from our view, there still remains for observation all the 
other half, consisting of those judgments which relate 
to unlike characteristics. These were already referred 
to above as giving the downward direction to thought, 
towards subordinate concepts. 

One point is already clear to start with. Keeping in 
mind that a judgment is nothing but a peculiar kind of 
mental presentation, and, further, that the usual mental 
presentation can take place without leading to outward 
expression in language, we notice that there are two parts 
to be distinguished in the act of judgment. In the first 
place the apprehension of the characteristics in question, 



74 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

whereby the ordinary form of mental presentation results ; 
and, secondly, a certain additional factor that changes the 
ordinary mental presentation into the judgmental form. It 
is this second factor, then, that is properly the cause of the 
act of judgment, and is therefore the element that we are 
seeking. The following examples will show us wherein it 
consists. 

First example : A child sees a white sheep, and at the 
same time, alongside of it, a piece of black coal. 

Second example: The child sees a white sheep, and at 
the same time, alongside of it, a black one (supposing he 
has not seen sheep before at all). 

The examples are evidently so chosen that the very same 
two unlike characteristics (white and black) occur in both 
cases. The question is now : What sort of a mental state 
will these unlike characteristics call forth in each case ? 
Will they give rise to a judgment or not ? 

In the first example, what arise first in the mind of a 
child are the total perceptions of the two objects. There 
is certainly no doubt that the color characteristic will not 
be wanting in either one of the perceptions, since color, as 
is well known, belongs to the characteristics that seldom 
escape attention. We will, therefore, assume that the 
color characteristic has been apprehended along with the 
rest in each object, resulting in at least an ordinary idea. 
Will now this ordinary idea produce a judgment ? At first 
view one might think that since these characteristics are in 
contrast, and their difference is so great that it could not 
be greater, they would strike the child as something notice- 
able, and so lead to the formation of a judgment. Never- 
theless, I claim that the act of judgment will not follow, — 
which is as much as to say, that, in spite of the contrast, 



a child's spontaneous judgments. 75 

the attention is not sufficiently aroused, and the apprehen- 
sion has not been sufficiently lively, to make the mind feel 
the need of (j l u in <j vent to itself in a judgment. Of course 
it would not he absolutely impossible in the case of an 
adult, although even here probably no judgment would 
arise ; but in the case of a child in whose mind those two 
ideas meet for the first time, it is practically impossible. 
The two objects, sheep and coal, are so different in kind 
that they have nothing in common in respect to most of 
their characteristics ; they are, therefore, aside from the 
single characteristic of color, incapable of comparison (dis- 
parate). Although there are two objects, they do not make 
a pa ir. The two ideas lie side by side in the mind, but, 
since their main elements have no relation to each other, 
they remain thorough strangers. They do not rouse each 
other, they produce no movement of thought, but remain 
indifferent, as if they did not concern each other at all. 
To be sure, the two unlike color ideas, being capable of 
comparison, could in themselves serve as a stimulus to 
each other, and particularly so since they are in contrast ; 
but, compared with the excess of indifferent elements, this 
single stimulus is too weak to cause any result. If, then, in 
such a case, where the contrast is so great, no judgment re- 
sults, there is still less cause when the difference is smaller. 
Turning now to the second example, we find as before 
first of all the two total perceptions. But the rest of 
the mental process will be essentially different when com- 
pared with the first example. The two objects are so very 
much alike that they have all characteristics in common 
with the single exception of color. Accordingly, the two 
total perceptions do not remain as strangers, indifferent to 
each other, in stolid repose, but engage at once in inter- 



76 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

course as near relatives. Hereupon the law of conception 
begins to operate, and the similar elements coalesce in 
pairs. This movement of the like characteristics communi- 
cates itself to those that are unlike ; they also approach 
each other, as it were, and feel the stimulus of rivalry to 
compare their content. In so far it looks as if the atten- 
tion would be almost forcibly directed to the difference of 
those characteristics, and, therefore, that a judgment would 
now really result, and yet it is highly probable that such 
will not be the case. For the very same favorable circum- 
stance that brought the two unlike characteristics together 
and stimulated comparison, viz., the commencement of con- 
ception, contains likewise a hindrance to comparison and 
therefore to judgment also; for, while according to the 
law of conception the common characteristics are coa- 
lescing, and therefore strengthening, the effect on the 
unlike characteristics is, as we know, to crowd them back 
in the same measure, to make them obscure, and therefore 
withdraw them from the attention. The advantage afforded 
the act of judgment by the process of conception thus 
seems to be lost. This case which at the beginning seemed 
to be so favorable will, therefore, as a rule, not lead to any 
conscious comparison of the unlike characteristics and 
therefore to no formal judgment. If one changes the 
example before us so that instead of two present percep- 
tions only one is of this kind, and the other a past per- 
ception, and therefore now a reproduced idea, it is easy to 
see that, so far as the act of judgment is concerned, the 
change is not essential. We shall, therefore, not consider 
this case any farther, but shall proceed to a new example, 
in which, on the contrary, the act of judgment appears in 
full force. 



DISAPPOINTED EXPECTATION. 77 

Third example: Suppose the child has seen a white 
sheep not only once but repeatedly, so that the spontaneous 
concept " sheep " is already formed — so far as is possible 
from such observations. What will take place now in his 
mind when he one day happens to see a black sheep ? 
Compared with the foregoing example we shall notice 
two points of difference, both of which are owing to the 
fact that the mind possesses an already formed concept, 
which is now recalled in consciousness. Although again an 
act of conception takes place, still it is only the application 
of an already formed concept and therefore proceeds easily 
and quickly, thus not occupying the attention so strongly 
as at first. While, therefore, on the one hand, the incen- 
tive to comparison of the unlike characteristics remains in 
full force, the accompanying hindrance, on the other hand, 
is weakened. This is the first advantageous change. The 
second point of advantage is as follows. Since all the 
sheep yet seen were white, and this characteristic was firmly 
impressed by the repetition, and even received into the con- 
cept as part of its content, the mind expects to find the 
characteristic " white," again, in case such an animal comes 
again to view. If now a black sheep appears, this expec- 
tation is disappointed. This feeling of disappointed ex- 
pectation directs the attention with all its force to the 
unlike characteristic, draws the idea forward again more 
strongly into consciousness, and then gives vent to the 
judgment, " This sheep is black" 

To sum up the results of our discussion thus far, we see 
that in the first example the apprehension of the unlike 
characteristics was not yet of itself sufficient to call forth 
a judgment, even when the difference amounted to contrast. 
What is further necessary is a stimulus to comparison ; for 



78 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

comparison is the characteristic act which begins the 
thought-process, or the decisive point of transition from an 
ordinary idea into a thought. 1 Only similar ideas afford 
material and opportunity for comparison; therefore, in the 
first example, since the objects were too disparate, no com- 
parison was possible. The act of comparison begins uni- 
formly with the like characteristics ; because the impulse 
to comparison has its origin in the law of conception, 
whereby the similar elements coalesce, and this impulse 
begins to operate at once, as soon as the two ideas come 
together. The comparison of the unlike characteristics, on 
the contrary, does not begin until the process of conception 
has been concluded, because the latter process obscures the 



1 A new light is here shed on the important idea of comparison. It 
will be remembered that at the beginning of this section comparison was 
expressly counted as one of the acts of thought. Comparison is really the 
act out of which all the other acts of thought grow, just as the bud 
develops into the flower and fruit. First of all, judgment — on the one 
hand, of like, on the other hand, of unlike characteristics; hereupon fol- 
lows conception — on the one hand (on the basis of the like characteris- 
tics), rising to higher concepts, on the the other hand (on the basis of the 
unlike characteristics), descending to subordinate concepts. In the form 
of a table these chief points in the thought-process may be represented 
as follows : — 

Superordinate Concepts 

Conception rising to 
like characteristics 

— — < 

unlike characteristics 

\ 

Distinction o f Concepts 
descending to\ 

Subordinate Concepts. 



THE PREVIOUS EXPECTATION. 79 

differences and withdraws the attention from them. As 
an offset to this hindrance a new incentive to comparison 
is found in the above mentioned feeling of disappointed 
expectation. But this feeling is not itself the primal cause 
of judgments in case of unlike characteristics ; for this 
feeling is a derived condition and points to a still earlier 
cause. There must evidently have been a, previous expecta- 
tion based on an earlier act of conception. This concept, 
on the one hand, when it appears as a reproduced idea in a 
new application, and the unexpected new perception, on 
the other hand, give rise to the feeling of disappointment. 
The primary cause of judgments in the case of unlike 
characteristics is, accordingly, to be found in the law of 
conception whereby like characteristics coalesce. It must, 
moreover, not be overlooked that the other factor of con- 
ception, the law of reproduction by similarity, is also at 
work here. 

A few pages back (p. 73) we passed by the judgments 
formed in the case of like characteristics, because there 
the act of judgment was not easily recognized. Now it is 
not to be supposed that the act of judgment is really 
skipped, although this form of expression was before used. 
As a matter of fact, a judgment does really take place, but 
surreptitiously ; because a concept can only be present when 
it has some content, and this latter can only consist of 
those characteristics which are recognized as common, even 
though they are not distinguished separately and precisely. 

The primary cause of judgment in the case of unlike as 
well as in the case of like characteristics, is therefore one 
and the same, namely, the law of conception. The only 
difference is, that in the case of like characteristics this 
law serves as the only and immediate stimulus to judg- 



80 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

nient, whereas, in the case of unlike characteristics, it first 
gives rise to that feeling of disappointed expectation, and 
thus operates through this intermediate factor. 



There are three recognized forms of judgments, — affirm- 
ative, negative, and double, i.e., affirmative and negative. 
It will certainly not be uninteresting to the reader, if, in 
conclusion, we speak briefly of the psychological basis of 
this threefold form, even though this does not properly 
belong to our subject. 

Negative judgments relate to characteristics that are 
missed, i.e., to such as are wanting, whereas previous ex- 
perience has taught one to expect them. If, for example, 
at a season of the year when trees are usually covered with 
foliage, one comes across a tree without leaves, this natu- 
rally attracts attention and leads to the judgment, " this 
tree is not covered with foliage." Or, if one meets a man 
who has lost both his arms, one says, " this man has no 
arms." The negative judgment thus points out a vacancy 
or omission. Both of the other forms relate to characteris- 
tics that are not expected. Two cases are possible. The 
new characteristic may either supply an omission in one's 
previous knowledge, and therefore be compatible with it, 
or it may take the place of an expected characteristic, and 
in this case be incompatible with one's expectations. As 
an example of the first case, suppose a person does not 
know how many styles there are in the apple blossom, 
although he is otherwise well acquainted with this blossom. 
If his attention is called to it and he finds that there 
are five, this characteristic simply completes his previous 
knowledge, and does not conflict with any other character- 



RESULTS. 81 

istic. There results, accordingly, the simple affirmative 
judgment, " the apple blossom has five styles." As an 
example of the second case, let us suppose a child as yet 
has seen only white sheep, but now comes across a black 
one. The new mark of color conflicts with the old. But 
to express this resulting state of mind, a simple affirmative 
statement is not enough ; for both the new characteristic 
and likewise its incompatibility with the old must find 
vent. Hence arises the form, "this sheep is not white, 
but black." Thus the affirmative judgment relates to an 
unexpected, but compatible characteristic ; the double judg- 
ment, on the contrary, to an unexpected, but incompatible 
characteristic. 

Our investigation into the laws of thought is finished, 
and we have found that the two principal acts which suc- 
ceed each other in the thought-process, namely, judgment 
and conception, however different from each other they 
may be, still are based on one and the same fundamental 
law : the coalescence of the similar elements contained in 
the two ideas. Only in the case of judgments of unlike 
characteristics, there is a secondary and additional cause : 
the feeling of disappointed expectation. How simple the 
causes appear in this field of thought, where at first the 
processes seemed so varied and complex ! 



The laws of thought, as well as the laws of memory, 
have thus passed in review before us. Let us now briefly 
compare the two results, in order to make definite the rela- 
tion between these two mental activities. 

In the case of thought we have here to do only with its 



82 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

primary or chief factor, and therefore with but a single 
law ; which is as follows : — 

Thought depends on the coalescence of the similar ele- 
ments of ideas ; or, in other words, it is the similarity of 
ideas that determines thought. 

The memory is controlled by two laws, either — 

1. By the similarity of ideas, or 

2. By their simultaneity. 

If now we compare thought and memory with respect to 
these factors that underlie their processes, we see that both 
mental activities have one factor, namely, the similarity of 
ideas, in common. In the one case this common factor 
causes a production of new material through the process of 
abstraction and conception ; in the other case, on the con- 
trary, it results in a reproduction of the old. We may 
formulate this fact briefly as follows : — 

THE LAW OF THOUGHT IS LIKEWISE ONE OF THE TWO 
LAWS OF MEMORY. 

It will, undoubtedly, have occurred to the reader already, 
that this psychological truth must be of most immense im- 
portance in the work of teaching and education. This will 
show itself still more exactly if we examine the relation 
between thought and memory to see in how far these two 
mental activities re-enforce and serve each other. 

In what way does memory act as the servant of thought ? 

This question has already been answered in the second 
chapter. The memory is, together with the activity of 
perception, the furnisher of the material of thought. But 
in this service it makes a very great difference whether 
the material is furnished according to the one or the other 



IMAGINATION. 83 

law of memory. By the first law of memory similar ideas 
are supplied, and therefore a material which immediately, 
without further selection, may be turned to account in 
thought. By the second law, in so far as it alone controls, 
the memory furnishes, on the contrary, only material that 
is not immediately usable in thought. How important this 
difference is in the work of teaching will be more fully dis- 
cussed in the following chapter. 

Eeversing the question, we may now ask, How does 
thought re-enforce memory ? 

The narrow worshippers of memory may well wonder at 
this question, particularly since many of them think that 
the early training of thought is a hindrance to memory. 
We shall have to leave them in their wonderment for the 
present ; but since, as Plato says, wonder is the mother of 
philosophy, this astonishment may have the good result 
of teaching one to think more favorably of thought — even 
from the standpoint of the narrow partisan of memory. 
The foregoing question is answered by the important fact 
above established. If the law of thought is also one of the 
two laws of memory, it follows that the work of thinking 
must at the same time accomplish a considerable part of the 
work of memory. This volunteer service of thought to 
memory may be of twofold character. On the one hand, 
wherever thought takes place, its help to the memory 
is spontaneous and unsolicited; on the other hand, in in- 
struction it may be employed intentionally as a means of 
memory. This point will likewise receive further consid- 
eration in the following chapter. 

At the close of some of the foregoing sections we have 
taken advantage of the opportunity offered to clear up our 



84 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

ideas of certain psychological phenomena, which, though 
not belonging strictly to our theme, stand in close relation 
to it. In this way have been treated the sensations, the 
rise of perceptions out of sensations, and of complex ideas 
out of simple ones. The present seems to be the proper 
place for some remarks on the phantasy, or imagination. 
For, since the imagination has something in common with 
memory on the one hand, and with thought on the other 
hand, opportunity is here afforded to define more sharply 
the meaning of memory and of thought in this respect. 

We first may ask wherein the peculiarity of imagination 
consists. New sense ideas are not furnished by the imagi- 
nation, but only by the senses ; nor does it furnish new 
abstract ideas, for this is the work of the understanding 
alone. The imagination, therefore, operates with the store 
of ideas already at hand, and is, hence, nothing but a pecul- 
iar kind of reproduction of ideas. In ordinary recollection, 
the ideas come back into consciousness in just the form in 
which they were originally apprehended ; in the case of 
imagination, on the contrary, the ideas are rearranged, 
wherefore we may speak of the activity of imagination as 
a modified reproduction. But now, since the simple or 
elementary ideas are in their nature unchangeable, it fol- 
lows that this modification and rearrangement can relate 
only to the composition and sequence of the complex ideas. 
This modification of a complex idea may take place in 
three ways. This is as true of the intentional as of the 
unintentional use of the imagination ; but, as the reader 
knows, we always have uppermost in mind the involuntary 
and spontaneous processes. 

The first modification consists in leaving out single ele- 
ments in the reproduced group of ideas, — as when, for 



IDEALIZATION AND ITS OPPOSITE. 85 

instance, . anyone tries to recall the face of an absent ac- 
quaintance, but finds that he does not succeed completely, 
because single features have dropped out of his memory. 
This is plainly only an instance of inexact, unfaithful rec- 
ollection. Nevertheless, it may happen that a complex 
idea so changed will thus receive a character noticeably 
different from the original, and therefore produce a dif- 
ferent effect. For, if in such a case the lost elements 
happen not to be beautiful, the remainder will appear more 
beautiful, and therefore this modification will be in its 
effect what we call idealization. Take an example from 
every-day experience. If one imagines one's self in a situa- 
tion long since passed, for instance in one's childhood, that 
period, with its events, conditions, and persons, as a rule, 
will appear to him in a more beautiful light than it did at 
the time when he actually lived through it. The ideas of 
the manifold disagreeable inconveniences, which were not 
wanting in that early time, are now partly forgotten ; 
moreover, the feelings connected with those ideas which 
are not forgotten, have weakened more or less ; since a 
pain, after it is overcome, no longer hurts as it did when 
it was actually felt. Now, this must naturally result in 
the remaining features of this picture assuming a more 
friendly character. Thus the recollection has been invol- 
untarily and unwittingly idealized. On the contrary, dis- 
trust, envy, hate, in short, all sorts of ill-nature may so 
work upon the recollection that, in the picture left in mem- 
ory of the events, conditions, and persons in question, the 
gentler and kindlier features disappear, thus resulting in a 
disfigurement of memory, the exact opposite of idealiza- 
tion. What we have been considering in all these cases is, 
as the reader sees, in its genesis and its nature, nothing 



86 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

more than an inexact recollection; but still, in order to indi- 
cate that this change has given a noticeably different char- 
acter to the ideas, such modifying reproduction is said to 
be imaginative. The justification for this particular name 
is more plainly to be seen, when one remembers that this 
modification may also take place purposely. This first 
mode of the modifying reproduction, in which the change 
consists in the omission of certain elements, is called the 
selecting imagination} 

Secondly, the work of imagination may consist in adding 
new elements to the complex idea, thus reversing the fore- 
going mode. It is an instance of intentional imagination 
of this kind, when, for instance, an artist, in order to rep- 
resent an angel, imagines wings on the human form. But, 
even in daily experience, we find it occurs unintentionally 
likewise. Thus, for instance, when anyone hears or reads 
an account of an event and wants to get a very clear pic- 
ture of the occurrence, he will picture it to himself, with 
all details. For, since language uses only general terms, 
the hearer must make these more or less concrete by filling 
out the further characteristics. — thus, for example, he 
must think of the persons mentioned as of a definite 
stature and size, in a particular dress, circumstances, etc. 
Because the reproduced idea is here further filled out and 
thereby more exactly determined, this second kind is called 
the determining imagination. 

1 This process of abstraction in the field of phantasy must not be con- 
fused with that which takes place in the process of thinking. In the 
first case, the abstraction takes place on a single complex idea; in the 
second case, on the contrary, after a comparison of at least two. If, in 
the former, the given complex idea was concrete, the result of abstrac- 
tion remains likewise a concrete idea; in the latter, on the other hand, 
the result is always an abstract idea or concept. 



FKEEDOM OF THE IMAGINATION. 87 

Only seldom will this second kind of modified reproduc- 
tion occur alone ; both modes are usually united, particu- 
larly when the imagination has much play — for example, 
involuntarily in dreams, or voluntarily in art productions. 
This is, then, the third kind, and is called the combining 
imagination. 

The phantasy is usually thought of as completely free 
and unbound by law. If this is not a complete error, one 
must at least define the word freedom and explain in how 
far the phantasy is unbound, that is, in what respect it is 
free, and furthermore in what respects it never can be free. 
The involuntary imagination is free in no respect, but is 
bound just as much by natural laws as are the processes of 
physical nature. First, it is bound by the store of ideas 
already at hand, as a general preliminary condition ; for a 
man blind from birth cannot imagine color, nor a deaf man 
imagine sound. Secondly, being a reproduction, it is bound 
by the two laws of reproduction of ideas (simultaneity and 
similarity) ; for there is no third way in which one idea 
can recall another into consciousness. Thirdly, it depends 
on how the older ideas were gained, on the relation in 
which they stand to one another, and in general on their 
ease of reproduction; for whatever here is well or badly 
done or left undone is sure to show itself in the reproduc- 
tion, either as retentiveness or forgetfulness. These are 
the rules by which the phantasy is bound. The apparent 
lawlessness of its productions is only seemingly so. How- 
ever singular, for example, the images of a dream may look, 
and however singularly they may succeed each other, they 
have, nevertheless, come into consciousness exactly as 
under the circumstances they had to come. 

The voluntary imagination is likewise bound by the 



88 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

above named three kinds of conditions. But, since the will 
comes in as a new factor here, the imagination receives 
thereby a freer scope in two respects. In the first place 
the will, according to its purpose, may direct the mind 
from step to step in a definite direction, or to a particular 
point, — all the time, however, dependent on those three 
conditions as to what ideas come into consciousness. 
Secondly, the will may now select and retain, according 
to its purpose, certain ones of those ideas which were actu- 
ally called up. There is no freedom for the imagination 
in any other sense. An important rule for the cultivation 
of the imagination follows from what has just been said. 
We must above all direct our attention to that on which 
the imagination as a species of reproduction naturally de- 
pends. In other words, the greater the power of reproduc- 
tion of the ideas the better. But the same advice applies 
to the cultivation of the intelligence in general, as we shall 
see in the following chapter. 

In its genesis, therefore, the imagination is to be distin- 
guished from the memory, since each is a species of repro- 
duction. On the other hand, it must not be confounded 
with the understanding, although both produce new ideas. 

The imagination has still many other interesting aspects. 
It is of great importance not only in artistic creation, but 
no less in the discoveries and inventions of science, and, 
besides, in many practical walks in life, for example, for 
the soldier, the judge, the teacher, etc. From all of which 
it follows that in the school its cultivation must not be 
neglected. But to discuss all of this would require a sepa- 
rate monograph. 



CHAPTER IV. 

APPLICATION TO PEDAGOGY. 

It remains to apply in pedagogical practice the entire 
results of our foregoing psychological investigation. 

Since this practical consideration appears in a psycholo- 
gical monograph only as a sort of appendix, it will natu- 
rally have to be restricted in many ways. In the first 
place, it will be restricted to the intellect only ; for if the 
feelings and the character were likewise to be considered, 
this would have had to be preceded by a psychological in- 
vestigation into the activities of feeling and will. Beside 
this limitation of aim, there, is then, a second in respect of 
the two means to be employed, thought and memory ; for 
their conjunction here means, that the one as well as the 
other activity is to be discussed only in so far as is neces- 
sary to make plain how they can and should work together 
in the building up of knowledge. Inside of this narrow 
field we must, moreover, be satisfied with but a few in- 
structive examples from one or another of the subjects of 
study. 

To commit to memory means to make the ideas in ques- 
tion capable of reproduction and, as far as possible, of 
faithful, rapid, and many-sided reproduction. It is to be 
noticed here that the purpose of committing to memory is 
not stated to be the retention of ideas, but rather the power 
of reproducing them ; for whether they are retained or 
not will show itself in whether they can bo reproduced or 
not. Ideas incapable of reproduction have no more mean 

89 



90 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

ing than dead capital or possessions in the moon ; and, as 
long as they remain incapable of reproduction, so long are 
they — together with the pains spent in learning and com- 
mitting to memory — lost to the mind. 1 

If, now, thought results in a production of new ideas, and 
memory embraces the whole of the previously acquired 
ideas, thought and memory in their service to knowledge 
bear the same relation to each other as do earning and 
saving in daily life to the acquirement of a competency. 

In school instruction, therefore, both activities necessa- 
rily belong together, — as necessarily as in domestic life 
industry and economy, or, as in Avalking, one leg and the 
other, or, as in politics, the progressive and conservative 
parties. And if they belong together, they must also hold 
together, as faithfully and inviolably as in the home and 
family man and wife do. 

First of all, we must find the places where the memory 
must render assistance to thought and to the learning of 
new ideas in general. For this purpose we must recall to 
mind the different stages or steps in the acquirement of 
new ideas. 

All knowledge in any subject must begin with the appre- 
hension of concrete material, or, as we usually say, with 
observation (I.). 

With the perceptions so acquired as a basis, the second 
step in learning follows, namely, the production of abstract 
ideas or conception, in short, thought (II.). 

1 If the reader thinks this is too strong language, he may console 
himself with the story of the cabin-boy, who came to the captain one day 
and said piteously : " Sir, is a thing lost when you know where it is ? " 
" You crazy fellow," cried the captain, " why, how can it then be lost?" 
" I am glad to hear you say that," replied the boy; " I have just dropped 
your silver mug into the sea, while rinsing it." 



STEPS IN ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE. 91 

But in school instruction this cannot be regarded as the 
completion of the act of learning. In several different 
ways one is led to conclude that there must be a third part 
to the process. In the first place, the newly produced 
concept is, as a rule, still incomplete — in its extent as well 
as in its content. In its extent, because it has resulted 
from but a few, perhaps only two, observed examples, and 
therefore embraces but very few concrete ideas ; in its con- 
tent, because the characteristics of which it consists are 
seldom so sharply and distinctly apprehended as they 
ought to be. In the second place a concept developed from 
but few examples increases only the ability to know, not 
the ability to do ; that is to say, since this thought-process 
has taken place but once, it has not yet acquired readiness 
and skill in practice. And thirdly, outside of those ideas 
from which the concept was acquired, there may be still 
others in the mind belonging to this concept. If, now, the 
process of conception stops short with those few examples, 
then all the rest of the related perceptions have lost the 
advantage of their association ; they remain as nothing 
more than raw material of intelligence, not yet having been 
changed into higher products of knowledge to become in- 
struments of thought, or organs of apperception, as our 
friends the Herbartians would say. This shows us that 
intelligence resulting only from the above named two 
activities (observation and thought as a single act unre- 
peated), would be faulty in many ways, and therefore 
something must be done to supply this lack. This third 
and concluding part of the process consists in the applica- 
tion of the acquired concept (III.). 

In school instruction this third step will usually consist 
in presenting to the pupil a number of new concrete exam- 



92 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

pies one after the other, for him to see whether they like- 
wise belong under the new concept. What takes place in 
the mind of the pupil in this case is, in the main, evidently 
nothing else than the repeated production of the same con- 
cept. We are, nevertheless, justified in giving this mental 
process a special name. For, in the first place, new material 
is now used in the process. And secondly, the pupil must 
now proceed with the work of thinking independently of 
the teacher ; besides, the task may be still further increased 
by requiring the pupil himself to hunt for new examples. 
Thirdly, thought proceeded the first time from the percepts 
to the concepts ; now the concept is ready to be applied to 
new perceptions. Therefore the difference between the 
first act of conception and this act of application is usually 
denoted by saying that in the former, the movement of 
thought is from the particular to the general ; in the latter, 
on the contrary, from the general to the particular. A 
well-known instance of such application is furnished by 
the examples in arithmetic, which are to be worked by the 
pupil independently. 

All true intelligence — that is, all information, that has 
at the same time become organized knowledge, and there- 
fore able to develop power — requires the united action of 
those three productive activities of learning: observing, 
thinking, and applying. If anything is left undone in one 
of these respects, the loss cannot be made good again. 
What is thus true on the whole and in all branches of knowl- 
edge, is also true of every single topic, every " method- 
unit," i.e., every portion of concrete material from which 
one general notion or concept is to be developed. Every 
such topic must be worked over in this threefold manner 
— by observation, by thought, by application. 



MEMORY IN APPERCEPTION. 93 

These are the three chief acts or formal steps in the pro- 
cess of acquiring knowledge. 1 

We have now to inquire what part the memory should 
play in connection with these three acts. It was already 
shown that the learning of new ideas and their commitment 
to memory should go hand in hand. It follows from this 
that, in a lesson, every productive operation of the mind 
should be followed by committing the result to memory. 
Thus the results of observation (I.) must be at once im- 
pressed on the memory ; the result of the thought-process 
(II.) must be immediately committed to memory. Only in 
the third step in ay special attention to memory be omitted, 
because in the process of application the act of thought is 
repeated on and on, and therefore of itself accomplishes 
the work of memory. The place, therefore, of the omitted 
memory-drill may be taken, if one wishes, by final repro- 
duction of the whole lesson as a test — either orally or in 
writing, and in the latter case perhaps in the form of an 
independent essay. 

The question may now be asked, Why, then, must the 



1 In the second of these steps we may, as before shown, distinguish 
two acts, judgment and conception. Furthermore, the first step requires 
a preliminary act, to connect the new knowledge with the related old, 
thus resulting in two sub-acts here likewise, the introductory preparation 
and the presentation of the new matter. Hence, if we count these four 
sub-acts in place of those two chief ones, we shall have five formal 
steps. Conf. Rein, Outlines of Pedagogics, trans, by Van Liew, p. 1-15. 
It is taken for granted that the reader has the good sense to see the limi- 
tations and countless modifications of these steps in practical school 
work. They are but a resume or generalization of exercises used and 
recommended by all good teachers for centuries, and are in no way 
intended to restrict or fetter the freest activity of the pupil. To discuss 
all of these points would, however, require too much of a digression 
here. It is hoped that a special monograph on this subject will soon be 
published, treating of the psychology of the recitation. 



94 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

operations of learning and committing to memory go 
strictly parallel with each other ? — or, in other words, Why 
may not the intentional commitment to memory be post- 
poned until all three acts of learning are ended ? The an- 
swer is very simple. If the concrete perceptions are not 
impressed on the mind and made easy of recall, the tliought- 
process will take place indifferently, or perhaps not at all ; 
and if the resulting thought product is not likewise stamped 
on the memory, it will be hindered in its application to 
other examples. Another reason still deserves considera- 
tion. Everything should be impressed on the memory as 
soon as possible after it is first learned ; for the longer one 
waits the more one loses of what was learned. 1 Dr. Mager 
used to say, " When the repetition is necessary, it comes too 
late." 

Another point in regard to how far the observation 
material should be committed to memory needs some 
explanation. Since, in any single lesson, in history, for 
instance, this material is not thoroughly worked over in all 
its parts, but only some few ethical thoughts are developed 
from it, perhaps even only a single one, the question arises, 
Why, then, must the memory nevertheless be burdened with 
all this concrete material in its details ? In answer it may 
be said, that whatever of the observation material was not 
used on this occasion may be made use of later in another 
lesson — either as an example for comparison in the case 
of the formation of concepts, or as an example for applica- 
tion. If the work is properly planned, this will undoubt- 
edly actually be done with a considerable part of the 
concrete material remaining over. For, later on, where are 

1 Compare Ebbinghaus's experiments showing curve of forgetting, 
pp. 125-126 of this book. 



WAYS AND MEANS OF COMMITTING TO MEMORY. 95 

the examples for comparison and application to be obtained, 
if not in the main from the concrete material of the pre- 
vious lessons ? These concrete ideas must, therefore, ever 
be ready at hand and as easy of access as possible. What- 
ever is left over after the school } r ears are past may still be 
turned to account in later life. Facts of observation are, to 
be sure, only raw material, but, in case they are retained in 
memory, they may be continually turned to account in ever 
new uses — just like a tree that bears fruit unceasingly, 
needing only somebody to pick it off. To allow the obser- 
vation material to be forgotten would be like cutting down 
a fruit tree after it has borne one crop. 

Having thus determined whereabouts in each lesson the 
memory is specially to be exercised, it still remains to indi- 
cate the sort of exercise. 

This is the point that makes our subject of such great 
practical importance in teaching, because the old psychol- 
ogy has nourished didactical errors in this regard, which are 
not only among the very worst that there are in the whole 
field of teaching, but, besides, they have made themselves 
particularly dangerous by being surrounded with a sort of 
sacred halo. The foregoing psychological investigation 
will put us into a position to recognize the right method 
of committing to memory, and to see the mistakes on the 
right and on the left in the proper light. 

We turn now to the ways and means of committing to 
memory. To avoid going astray, we must keep firmly in 
mind the above definition of memory. To commit to mem- 
ory is, namety, to make the acquired ideas as capable as 
possible of reproduction, and not only that they may be 
faithfully and quickly reproduced, but also that they may 
be reached from many sides, i.e., through many different 



96 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

ideas. In this definition three points are to be noticed. 
First, that which is here assigned as the purpose of com- 
mitting to memory, namely, the power to recall the ideas. 
Hence, everything that has any influence at all in making 
the ideas capable of recall will come under the head of 
ways and means of committing to memory. Secondly, it 
is to be noticed that not only a one-sided, but a many- 
sided power of recall is demanded. Hence it follows, that 
if one means of committing to memory results in a more- 
sided power of recollection, it deserves higher estimation 
than another which secures only one-sided reproduction. 
Thirdly, mention is here made only of the purpose of com- 
mitting to memory, and nothing is said about any particu- 
lar method, or about the kind of ideas remembered. For, 
since there are different ways of committing to memory, 
the definition can contain only what is common to them 
all, and that is merely their purpose. Hence, if any one 
included in his meaning of memory a particular means of 
committing to memory, e.g., by repetition, all the other 
means would remain unused; and if particular kinds of 
ideas were included, all other kinds would be omitted from 
the benefits of memory. The above definition will, there- 
fore, serve as a sure guide, and prove its value even at the 
very beginning of our survey. 

Keeping in mind, then, that the reproduction of an idea 
is the purpose of committing it to memory, we must at 
once recur to the two main forms of memory, to which all 
others are subordinate. Corresponding to the two laws of 
memory (similarity and simultaneity), are the two entirely 
different ways of committing to memory : the one asso- 
ciates the ideas by their content, and the other associates 
the ideas by the accidental factor of contiguity in time. 



FORMS OF MEMORIZING. 97 

As early as Kant, these two fundamental kinds were dis- 
tinguished, the first as the judicious 1 or thinking memory, 
and the second as the mechanical memory. 

The fact that these are the two essential forms, moans 
that every activity of memory, whether intentional or unin- 
tentional, takes one or other of these two ways, and associ- 
ates the ideas in question either thinkingly or mechanically. 
If, therefore, repetition is made use of intentionally, it is 
not limited to either particular method of association, for 
it can take place in one way as well as in the other. 
Hence it follows that repetition is likewise of two kinds, 
either thoughtful or mechanical. If we add, further, that 
the commitment to memory may also take place involun- 
tarily or spontaneously, and that here, likewise, either a 
thoughtful or else a mechanical association is formed, we 
shall have before us in full the fundamental forms as well 
as the secondary forms of the memory. 2 Thus we see the 
distinction between the two methods of association extends 
through the entire field of memory. It will, therefore, be 
advisable to examine this difference somewhat more closely 
before we take up the other differences between intentional 
and unintentional remembering. 

What is the relative value of the two methods of asso- 



1 From judicium, meaning judgment, deliberation, intuition. Hence 
this sort of memory is also called the "deliberative," the "reflective," 
the " rational," or the " logical " memory. 

Fundamental Forms. Secondary Forms. 

' Thoughtful 



2 Commitment 
to memory 
may be either 



{Intentional, 
or Spontaneous. 

or Mechanical f Intentional, 

(by law of simultaneity), j Qr Spontaueous . 



98 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

ciation with respect to the strength of the association, or 
of the power to recall the idea into consciousness ? First 
and foremost, we must inquire this relative value at the 
time of the first association, and without regard to any 
later repetition. The following may serve as concrete ex- 
amples of the two cases. Of mechanical association : An 
object and its name, or a fact in history and its date, or a 
foreign word and one in the mother tongue, or several 
sounds composing a melody, or several words forming a 
sentence, etc. Now, on the contrary, in case the associa- 
tion is through thought, the similarity or relation of the 
ideas must have been recognized before, and hence it must 
have been preceded by an act of thought, although, per- 
haps, only a spontaneous process of conception. Suppose, 
for example, associated in this way, the square and the 
rectangle through the concept parallelogram, or the pine 
and the spruce through the concept conifer, or the ascent 
of a balloon and the fall of any other body through the con- 
cept gravity, or two historical events through the fact that 
one is recognized as the necessary consequence of the 
other, etc. 

Let us now compare the results in the two cases. The 
value of the association may be measured in three respects : 
by the intensity of its strength, by the extent of its influence, 
and whether the power of recall is one-sided or many-sided. 
How much strength there is, or rather let us say, how little 
strength there is in mechanical association, when the ideas 
meet in consciousness but once, the reader may attempt to 
estimate approximately for himself. On the other hand, in 
the case of association by thought, when two similar ideas 
are present in the mind, if one comes into consciousness, it 
may reproduce the other without any previous act of con- 



SUPERIORITY OF MEMORY BY SIMILARITY. 99 

ception having taken place (see page 44). Hence it fol- 
lows that these ideas, even before the particular act of 
thought which unites them, are by their very existence as 
closely bound together as the mechanically associated ideas. 
Whatever strength the act of thought adds is, therefore, 
entirely in excess. This superiority in strength is owing 
to the recognition of the likeness in the two ideas, which is 
then expressed in the resulting concept. The concept is a 
band, as it were, or clamp to hold the ideas firmly together. 
I say a band " as it were," for that which here binds to- 
gether is not something external, something outside of the 
ideas, as was the case in mechanical association, but objec- 
tively it is nothing but the similar content of the ideas, 
and therefore belongs to their very nature ; subjectively, 
it is nothing but the recognition, the becoming conscious 
of this content. Hence it follows that this association by 
thought lasts just so long as the concept lasts, and the con- 
cept lasts so long as the ideas as such exist at all, that is, 
so long as their content is not lost. In a word, in case the 
concrete ideas are clearly apprehended and their similarity 
distinctly recognized, the association is so strong that it 
cannot be any stronger, and hence no repetition would be 
necessary to strengthen it; for, if one did undertake to 
repeat, this would only be for the purpose of making the 
contents of the concrete ideas wherein the concept is in- 
cluded, plainer and thereby stronger. The strengthening 
of the association results then of itself. Association by 
thought, therefore, possesses already in its very nature as 
much strength intensively as the mechanical association 
can reach even after many repetitions. But still further. 
In the act of thought the concrete ideas together with the 
concept have been simultaneously in consciousness. Hence 



100 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

it follows that they have likewise been associated mechan- 
ically, and therefore in this point are once more as strong 
as ideas associated by simultaneity alone. In comparison 
with the exceeding strength which the thoughtful associa- 
tion already possesses in itself, this small addition of a sin- 
gle mechanical association need hardly be counted ; we 
have mentioned it only in order to show clearly and with 
completeness the great difference between the two associa- 
tions. The excess, as one sees, on the side of thoughtful 
association is truly enormous. 

Turning our attention now to the extent of the associa- 
tion with respect to other ideas, we see that in mechanical 
association without repetition the power of reproduction, as 
a rule, does not extend beyond a sequence of three or four 
ideas ; to gain command of a greater number requires sev- 
eral repetitions. On the other hand, the thought association 
embraces, to begin with, as many concrete ideas together 
with their concept, as have been compared in thought ; it 
may have been two, three, four, or more. But the repro- 
ductive power extends still further. For, after the concept 
has once arisen, its light and power extend to all the other 
related ideas present in the mind ; they also become, ac- 
cording to the degree of their relationship, more ready of 
reproduction, and belong accordingly to the sphere of 
recollection in the centre of which the concept lies. It is 
easy to see that this is the case from the fact, for example, 
that the pupils, after the concept has been formed, are able 
to hunt new examples for themselves. The power of the 
concept will affect even those related ideas which do not 
come into the mind till later; as soon as these are born, 
they likewise belong at once to this sphere of reproduction, 
and therefore share its strength. In this case thought has 



MANY-SIDEDNESS OF REPRODUCTION. 101 

performed the work of memory in advance, as it were. It 
is plain to see that the thinking memory has a far greater 
extent of influence than the mechanical. 

Lastly we inquire into the direction in which the power 
of recollection is exerted, whether it is, namely, one-sided 
or many-sided. In the mechanical association there are 
always only two members in each case so strongly united, 
that they can mutually reproduce each other, and even 
with these few the reproduction backward is not as easy as 
forward. If the series extends beyond two or three mem- 
bers, then only a one-sided reproduction is possible, namely, 
forward. In the sphere of ideas associated by thought, 
however extended it may be, the connections of memory 
are, on the contrary, many-sided, or rather all-sided. For, 
in the first place, the whole of the concrete ideas belonging- 
together can reproduce one another mutually ; and, secondly, 
these ideas and their concept are likewise mutually asso- 
ciated. 1 In a word, in this region the roads for the com- 
merce of ideas are laid out from the centre to all points in 
the boundary, and again, all the points in the boundary are 
connected with each other, — in brief, every idea can reach 
any other idea. Suppose we represent these connections 
between the ideas by connecting lines in a diagram. In 
the first figure on the following page, a, b, c, d, e, f, symbo- 
lize six ideas associated mechanically in a series. In the 
second figure are six ideas similarly symbolized, but asso- 
ciated by the many-sidedness of thought. They are held in 
the grip of the concept x, and by the similarity of their 
content any one is capable of reproducing any other one. 
The relative number of connecting paths in the two figures 

1 A concrete idea can, moreover, call up its concept more easily than 
vice versa ; the reason for this the reader may hunt for himself. 



102 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

will serve as a basis of comparing the availability of ideas 
associated by the two methods. 





The result of the foregoing comparison may be briefly 
summed up as follows : the power of the thinking mem- 
ory is — 

1. Intensively much stronger than the mechanical 
memory, 

2. Extensively greater, and 

3. In direction all-sided, whereas the mechanical memory 
reproduces in series only, and is, in case there are more than 
two or three members in the series, only one-sided. 1 

We return now to the distinction between intentional 
and involuntary, or spontaneous memorizing (p. 97). 

In the very process of learning new ideas they are spon- 
taneously impressed on the memory. This takes place, as 
we shall see, in all the three steps in learning new ideas. 

1 Further on we shall note still other weak points in the mechanical 
memory, such, namely, as show themselves when the memory seeks help 
by repetition. The influence of the emotions may, to he sure, upset any 
such calculations as that in the text ; and yet I think the feelings too will 
xisually be found strongest in association with thought rather than with 
mechanical reproduction. The present monograph, however, concerns 
itself with the intellect only, and therefore may make the facts appear 
simpler than they really are. 



OBSERVATION OF THE CONCRETE. 103 

(I.) Observation has for its purpose the apprehension of 
concrete ideas. Now, in so far as these ideas succeed each 
other in series, each two, and therefore also the whole 
series, become united by mechanical association. But also 
so far as there are ideas in the series that are related with 
one another, or with earlier ideas, in so far do we find also 
the precondition for the association by thought. The 
working of mechanical memory is here plain to see; the 
other kind is, on the contrary, hidden, because it appears 
only in the form of the precondition. Thus the activity 
of observation performs in and with its own proper task of 
acquiring new perceptions, likewise a portion of the work 
of memory in both its forms. Now, one might think that, 
although this was right in theory, yet this first beginning 
could probably have but little importance, since the me- 
chanical association takes place only once, and therefore is 
very weak, and the association by thought occurs only in 
the form of the precondition. But that would be a great 
mistake — just as great as if one thought that education 
could not and should not begin until the pupil is already 
quite grown up. What is true of education in general, is 
also true of memory : it is just this first committing to 
memory in and with the work of observation that is of 
predominant importance. To understand this, it is only 
necessary for one to consider why observation is of so great 
consequence for the succeeding work of (II.) thought and 
(III.) application. For the success of these two processes 
of thought-elaboration depends essentially on the way in 
which the concrete ideas were originally formed : whether 
they were vivid, strong, and distinct, or, on the contrary, 
faint, weak, and obscure. And this again depends on 
whether they were apprehended with interest, and hence 



104 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

also with attention, or, on the other hand, indifferently, 
and therefore inattentively. To enumerate all that goes 
to arouse a lively interest in the work of observation, and, 
with its help, to secure further a vivid, strong, and distinct 
apprehension, would exceed the limits of this book. One 
point only will I call attention to, and that is the great 
difference it makes, whether, for example, in history, the 
matter is presented in general outlines, as in a compendium, 
and hence not concretely, or, on the contrary, is given with 
full and complete detail, and hence concretely and vividly. 
Just in proportion as the concrete ideas are originally 
strongly and distinctly apprehended, so are they also 
strongly and distinctly retained and firmly associated. 
Hence it follows, that whatever value the work of observa- 
tion has for the succeeding processes of thought, exactly 
the same value attaches to the spontaneous memorizing of 
it for its reproduction in these later processes. A discus- 
sion of memory which underestimated the importance of 
this unintentional memorizing in the work of observation, 
would therefore betray as gross ignorance as a discussion 
of the process of learning in which the importance of the 
work of observation for the succeeding elaboration in 
thought failed to be recognized. The success of the work 
of observation depends, however, as we have seen, on the 
choice of the right method of teaching. 

To this right method in the work of observation belongs, 
however, one other point which was only incidentally men- 
tioned above in speaking of the formal steps. In the work 
of observation, namely, the presentation of new matter 
must be preceded by a preliminary act, the so-called prep- 
aration (or introduction, or " analysis " as Herbart says), in 
order that the new may be associated with the old. I want 



SECOND AND THIRD STAGES. 105 

to point out the connection between this preliminary act 
and the memorizing of the new ideas. In two respects it 
helps to strengthen the association. First, by awakening 
a more lively interest for the new matter. The prepara- 
tory step seeks, namely, to recall to mind related ideas 
from the child's personal experience in and about his home. 
Now, since the child has more interest in what he has him- 
self experienced than in what he otherwise learns at school, 
the new ideas associated with these experiences gain like- 
wise a more lively interest. How this increase of interest 
helps the memory was already shown before. The second 
way in which the memory is strengthened is as follows. 
The scenes of one's childhood and early experience, on 
account of their frequent repetition and their close connec- 
tion with the feelings, are the best remembered. Ideas 
connected with these are therefore the most lasting that 
the mind can have. Just think, for example, of homesick- 
ness, or call to mind how, in advanced age, when the mem- 
ory begins to weaken, youthful reminiscences still remain 
vivid as ever. If the new ideas are associated with such 
strong old ideas, the former will thereby gain a powerful 
support, — just as when a weak young sapling is tied to a 
stout pole firmly planted. It is, moreover, not to be over- 
looked that this association, being with related ideas, takes 
place through thought, and is on this account also already 
very strong. 

In how far the (II.) thought-process in and with every 
conception at the same time performs the work of memory 
has already been fully explained in connection with the 
comparison of the thinking and the mechanical associa- 
tions. Hence, the more thoroughly the concrete matter is 
elaborated in thought, the more abundant and many-sided 



106 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

will be the assistance it will gain in reproduction. Since 
the association by thought is so strong, the act of concep- 
tion has but slight need of repetition. The need occurs 
in greater degree only when the result of thought is ex- 
pressed in a rule, maxim, sentence, proverb, or verse, which 
is therefore to be learned word for word and hence must 
be memorized mechanically. 

In the work of (III.) application, the process of memoriz- 
ing is apparent, for with every new example for application 
the process of conception is repeated. What would other- 
wise have to take place by intentional repetition in order 
to make the concept distinct and ready of use, takes place 
of itself now in and with the application to the new cases. 
Hence, we find here spontaneous memorizing in the form 
of repetition, but not of the mechanical kind. 

Thus we see that the process of learning serves of itself 
to impress its acquisitions on the mind. This is true of 
all its three main steps, in the first of which the service is 
partly by the law of similarity, and partly by the law of 
simultaneity, but in the last two stages it is exclusively by 
the law of similarity of ideas. Such a memorizing, not 
undertaken for its own sake nor purposely, but being 
carried out along with the process of learning, is called 
immanent, because inherent in the latter process. Since 
it, therefore, costs neither time nor pains, it is plain that it 
has a much higher worth than voluntary memorizing. 
Hence we may say : the more the course of study and 
the method of teaching are so planned as to allow of the 
greatest possible amount of immanent memorizing, the 
more complete will they be. For, the more an uninten- 
tional memorizing finds place, the less time will be re- 
quired for an intentional one, thus leaving more time free 



IMMANENT MEMORIZING. 107 

to learn new things. Thus the amount of immanent mem- 
orizing furnishes an excellent means of testing whether the 
correct method of teaching is followed. 

Two subjects in the course of study are particularly 
adapted to furnish such opportunities in the form of ex- 
amples for practice. These two are, namely, arithmetic 
and language, particularly foreign languages ; but drawing 
may well be counted with them if it is rightly taught. 
Thus, for example, in the instruction in foreign languages 
the double translation is a continual repetition by applica- 
tion of what was thus far learned from grammar and lexi- 
con. The same is true of the exercises for application in 
arithmetic and drawing. Why it is that in these subjects 
this kind of immanent memorizing has so much room, is 
not difficult to find. Leaving out of account whatever is 
peculiarly favorable in each of these subjects, and also 
aside from the fact that the practical purpose of all of 
these subjects is a ready ability to do or, more exactty, to 
apply what is learned, the remaining reason is that here 
the exercises for application can easily be arranged as 
silent or busy work, namely, so that the teacher does not 
have to be continually at hand to help. We may infer 
from this what would have to be done in order for the 
other subjects of instruction likewise to gain as far as 
possible the advantages of immanent memorizing. The 
exercises for application would have to be as extended as 
practicable and as far as possible in the form of silent 
busy-work. Moreover, immanent memorizing may be fa- 
vored by a correct arrangement of the course of study, 
namely, by the correlative association of the various sub- 
jects in the curriculum. 1 

i A good example of this is furnished in Wilbur S. Jacknian's Num- 
ber Work in Nature Study. 



108 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

Intentional or voluntary memorizing makes help of 
repetition. What is the nature of this means, and how 
does it help in making the ideas easy to recall ? Has it 
only to do with the mechanical memory ? And what is its 
effect ? In no text-book of pedagogy will the reader prob- 
ably be able to find an exact discussion of these questions, 
and particularly of the first in regard to the exact meaning 
of repetition, nor will the psychologies probably contain 
any reference to them either. Everywhere such a discus- 
sion seems to be regarded as superfluous. Ah, if there 
were only innate ideas ! But it is often just the sim- 
plest, most elementary relations that are the latest to 
be completely apprehended, because every one mistakenly 
thinks he has already mastered them. As a matter of 
fact, the usual ideas in regard to these questions are in 
many respects obscure and faulty, and Voltaire's expres- 
sion: Le superflu — chose si necessaire is nowheres more 
applicable than here. We shall, therefore, at once take up 
this apparently superfluous and yet so necessary task, and 
seek first of all to define repetition; the rest will then 
follow of itself. 1 

Of course every one knows what the word " repeat " in 
general means, namely, to do anything over again. But 

i How very lacking many of the text-books in pedagogy, even those 
officially recognized as such, are in many matters needing most necessary 
explanation, is all the more apparent, when we remember in contrast 
how much they contain that is superfluous. It is usual, for example, to 
enumerate a long list of so-called methods of teaching, of course under 
some strange tongue-twisting name (" acroamatic," etc.), all of which is 
but vain and useless waste of words and pedantic cling-clang, whereas 
the indispensably necessary chief divisions of the teaching process, the 
three resp. five formal steps, are not even mentioned. And then, as a re- 
sult, pedagogy must submit to official scorn on account of its "■ Elusinian 
mysteries"! 



TWO FORMS OF REPETITION. 109 

what is its special meaning here, in the field of psychologi- 
cal pedagogy ? Here we have to limit the meaning by tell- 
ing what it is that is done over again. Perhaps, then, some 
one will say : To repeat means to call back once more into 
consciousness acquired ideas. This definition is, however, 
too narrow ; for there are not only ideas to be repeated, but 
also feelings, acts of will, etc. But even in the field of in- 
tellect, that definition would be insufficient, because it is 
obscure in one point. A couple of examples will show 
what I mean. When a concept is to be repeated, the 
teacher may, perhaps, give its definition again, or, it may 
be, only the name of the concept. This will evidently 
call the ideas in question back into consciousness ; but is 
the effect the same as if the original process of conception 
were once more performed ? And if ideas of sense are to 
be repeated, is it the same, whether they are simply re- 
called into consciousness from memory, or whether they 
are again produced by observation ? l There are, as one 
sees, two forms of repetition, the one stricter and more 
complete, the other less effective ; one carries out again 
the original act of production of the ideas in question and 
their association, the other, on the contrary, brings up only 
the more or less faded result of this act. Of course it is 
neither necessary nor, as a matter of time, practicable to 
undertake repetition exclusively, or even mostly, in that 
stricter form ; but it is necessary that the teacher should 
know that there are two forms, so that he will not be 
applying the incomplete form where of right the better 

1 This difference shows still more plainly in an example taken from 
the feelings. Suppose an emotion is to be repeated; does it amount 
to the same thing whether the acual emotion is again called forth, or 
only its name, and hence only the mental idea of this emotion? 



110 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

one should be used. When repeating for the first time, 
particularly in the lower and middle grades, he will cer- 
tainly have to recur, as a rule, to the original process. 
Thus, for example, a history lesson will not be reviewed 
the first time from memory only, but will be presented 
again in class, or read in the text-book. Repetition in the 
stricter form is, consequently, nothing else than once more 
going through the given operation of learning (the work of 
observation, or that of thinking). To sum up in one defi- 
nition, we may say : To repeat means (in the field of intel- 
lect) to call again into consciousness the ideas in question 
— either productively or reproductively. 

The relation of repetition to the two natural forms of 
memorizing, the thinking and the mechanical, may be eas- 
ily stated. It is a means of help, offering its assistance 
wherever needed, to the thinking association as well as to 
the mechanical. Wherever its service is accepted, it as- 
sumes the same character as the particular form of memo- 
rizing, just as a servant wears the livery of his master. 
In the one case the repetition is called thoughtful, in the 
other mechanical, although in itself it is entirely neutral in 
this respect. Hence when, as often happens, the word 
repetition is limited in meaning to mechanical memorizing, 
this is simply an error, showing that the relation between 
repetition and memorizing has not been made clear in such 
case. Repetition is a means, memorizing is its purpose, 
and the final purpose of memorizing is the reproduction of 
the ideas. 

So far as the effect of repetition on the memory is con- 
cerned, the following is to be noticed. That which is 
strengthened is, in the first place, each of the ideas in 
themselves ; and, secondly, their connection, no matter 



TREATMENT OF REVIEWS. Ill 

whether this connection is in thought or only mechanical. 
In the case of mechanical repetition it is, however, not to 
be overlooked that the resulting strengthening of the ideas 
makes them more capable, likewise, for reproduction in 
thought, in case opportunity offers later. The amount of 
help afforded by repetition may also be pretty accurately 
expressed, at least in the case of the completer form of 
repetition. If the mental process of repetition is not dif- 
ferent from the original act of learning, the aid to memory 
is essentially just as great in the one case as in the other, 
no matter whether it is a thinking or a mechanical associa- 
tion. I say " essentially " just as great ; for there is, to be 
sure, a slight weakening, owing to the absence of the stim- 
ulus of novelty. Of course, too, this weakening w r ill increase 
with every successive repetition. How much is to be de- 
ducted in case the repetition takes place in the shorter 
form of simply recalling the result of the previous act, the 
reader may estimate for himself. This question deserves 
particular attention in the case of historical subjects. If 
the stricter form of review has already accomplished its 
purpose, or if, from any cause, it may be assumed that the 
ideas are, for the present, sufficiently secure, then the re- 
productive form possesses certain advantages over the 
other. For, in the first place, the self-activity of the pupils 
will be called into play more strongly now ; secondly, the 
change of form affords a new stimulus ; and finally, in case 
the review takes place by questions, there may be even a 
third advantage, of which we shall speak later on, but 
which the reader will have no difficulty in already guess- 
ing. It all depends, as one sees, on using the two forms 
of repetition each in its right place ; and in deciding 
which is the right form, one must consider also the nature 
of the subject-matter to be reviewed. 



112 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

In regard to the practical treatment of reviews, one 
point deserves special mention on account of its weight 
and general importance. Nothing prevents making an 
easy, quick, and lasting impression on the memory more 
than to offer it too much at once. Professor Ebbinghaus 
found he could remember seven nonsense syllables after a 
single reading. It took, however, sixteen readings to re- 
member twelve syllables, thirty readings to remember six- 
teen, forty-four readings to remember twenty-four, and 
fifty-five readings to remember thirty-six syllables. The 
psychological reason for this is closely connected with the 
so-called limit of consciousness. This fact leads to the 
familiar rule, if a series of ideas to be committed to mem- 
ory is too long, to divide them into smaller portions or 
groups and then memorize the groups, thus building up the 
whole series gradually. This is what Eatich expressed 
three hundred years ago, when he said everything must be 
learned "piecely." This rule of practice applies to both 
kinds of memorizing, but in particular, of course, to the 
mechanical. The reason for this is easy to see. For, the 
mechanical association is of itself very weak extensively; 
and besides, its full force extends to only two successive 
ideas at a time, so that the connection beyond the third or 
fourth member of the series can only be very small. Ac- 
cordingly we divide a story, for example, into smaller sec- 
tions j a list of names to be learned in order, into small 
groups (e.g., the kings of England we divide by their fami- 
lies into Normans, Plantagenets, Yorkists, Lancastrians, 
Tudors, etc.) ; a stanza in a song or melody is memorized 
line by line, etc. 

In our previous comparison of the strength of association 
by similarity, with that of association by simultaneity, we 



THOUGHTFUL AND MECHANICAL MEMORY. 113 

found that the former possesses important advantages over 
the latter : its strength is intensively much stronger, ex- 
tensively greater, and besides, many-sided. The compari- 
son, however, took no account of the help to be gained by 
repetition. Now that we have discussed this means of 
help as to its nature, its forms, and its usefulness, we shall 
have to ask, how it stands with the relative strength of 
those two methods of association, after repetition has taken 
place. 

So far as the three advantages possessed by the think- 
ing association are concerned, it is evident that they re- 
main as before, — of course, provided, that repetition takes 
place in equal measure in both cases. How would it be 
possible for the mechanical association to gain anything in 
its favor beyond the other, since the additional factor on 
both sides is one and the same ? If the two terms of a 
ratio be multiplied by the same number, the products will, 
of course, be in the same ratio. The relative situation is, 
therefore, as clear and definite as an example in arithmetic. 

One of the three advantages possessed by the thinking 
memory, namely, its intensive strength, receives, moreover, 
new light in this connection that deserves mention. In the 
previous comparison the fact was already alluded to, that, 
in every case of association in thought, there was likewise 
an inherent or immanent mechanical association. Before, 
we did not care to take account of this comparatively small 
additional factor. But this addition is multiplied by repe- 
tition until it now deserves to be counted ; for, by equal 
repetition in both cases, it already alone amounts to 
exactly as much as the entire strength in the case of mere 
mechanical association. The association by thought equals 
its rival already, therefore, merely by its immanent mechan- 



114 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

ical strength, so that all its own peculiar power and natural 
strength are altogether in excess. This comparison, how- 
ever, the reader must remember, relates to only one of the 
three advantages, the intensive strength of the association. 
Both the other advantages — greater extent and many- 
sidedness — remain forever denied to the mechanical mem- 
ory, even after the most diligent repetition. 1 

From this comparison several practical inferences may 
be drawn in regard to the use of reviews. The first is, 
that, in the case of thoughtful memorizing, but little repeti- 
tion is needed to secure the result desired, namely, cer- 
tainty and facility in reproduction. The second is, that, in 
mechanical memorizing very much repetition is necessary, 
to reach the same result. 

This diligent repetition, which in the case of mechanical 
association is necessary in order to gain any result at all, 
has furthermore connected with it several noticeable effects, 
— such as, though not intended, follow of themselves. One 
is of an advantageous kind ; the rest are unwelcome disad- 
vantages, but which, willingly or unwillingly, must be taken 
in the bargain. 

The advantageous result consists in the acquirement of a 
high degree of facility in reproduction — a facility which 
may even exceed the proverbial monkey-like or parrot-like 



i This fact will also explain the origin of the mistaken notion above 
referred to, of supposing that repetition must necessarily mean mechanical 
memorizing. Since in mechanical memorizing, as a matter of fact, repeti- 
tion is the more necessary, and it therefore occurs more frequently in the 
mechanical form, many persons have allowed this appearance to deceive 
them into forgetting that repetition must and does take place in the 
thoughtful association likewise. This has also led them to overlook 
the fact that the mechanical factor does not lie in the repetition as such, 
but in the mechanical association. 



MECHANICAL REPETITION. 115 

rapidity, and which is, therefore, rightly or wrongly, called 
machine-like. One need only recall, for instance, the 
quickness with which, in speaking a piece, the word-ideas 
succeed one another, or in singing a melody the sound- 
ideas, etc., in which cases, however, the trains of ideas 
could pass much faster still, if the bodily organs concerned 
in their production could keep up with them. It would, 
however, be wrong to think that this facility is favored 
by the nature of this particular manner of association, so 
as to merit the name mechanical. 1 Because, the reason 
of the facility lies rather in the act of repetition alone, 
or more exactly in diligent repetition. Even the thinking 
association may reach a machine-like facility, if desired, 
by sufficient repetition. This result may here be reached 
even more easily, because the association by thought 
possesses in itself a far greater intensive power than the 
mechanical, and hence needs a much smaller measure of 
repetition to produce the same effect. Ordinarily, however, 
one limits the association by thought to only so much repe- 
tition as is necessary to gain complete certainty in repro- 
duction. Whether this is well, whether one should not 
rather aim at complete dexterity in both cases, the reader 
must decide for himself. Hence we see, machine-like facil- 
ity of reproduction is not a peculiarity of the mechanical 
memory, but is only accidentally more prominent there, 
since in the other case repetition is somewhat neglected, 
whereas in the former we dare not omit it, if the needful 
certainty of reproduction is to be reached. 

Now let us consider the disadvantageous effects which 



1 The expression "mechanical " here means only that the association 
is determined by an external, accidental, subjective factor (simultaneity), 
and not by the internal meaning of the ideas. 



116 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

the mechanical repetition, A\ r hen it is diligently practised, 
brings with it. 

1. The first disadvantage consists of a considerable 
amount of tediousness, resulting from two sources. The 
first lies in the act of repetition as such, as soon as the 
stimulus of novelty is lost. That which in its origin 
seemed to begin only as a lack of enlivening stimulus, soon 
makes itself felt as a positive depression, or actual tedium, 
on account of the continued repetition demanded by the 
mechanical association. In so far as tedium results from 
this first source, it must affect likewise the repetition of 
logical associations as well. The other source lies in the 
nature of the mechanical association, determined as it is 
by an external and accidental quality which is, therefore, 
devoid of interest. With this second source of tedium, 
logical associations have fortunately nothing to do. Now, 
counting the effects of both sources together, and remem- 
bering that the result is not merely the sum but approxi- 
mately the product of these factors, it will be clear that 
mechanical repetition must suffer strongly from tediousness, 
and all the more so, the more diligently it is practised. 

2. The second evil is not of a general nature, but occurs 
only in the repetition of language work, and here only in 
case the passage is to be memorized word for word, and is 
of considerable length. As soon, namely, as a machine- 
like facility is reached in the reproduction of the words the 
separate thoughts in this complex become thereby less 
mobile for further use in thinking. This is entirely as we 
should expect. For, since the words are confined to a defi- 
nite sequence, and the thoughts are bound to the language 
forms, the latter likewise share in the confinement of the 
former. Thus, then, the whole is, in the end, securely 



THOUGHTLESS MECHANICAL REPETITION. 117 

memorized, and can also be reproduced easily in the given 
sequence, but just as the separate sentences stand wedged 
in in this series, so are likewise the separate thoughts. If 
one of the middle members of the series is wanted, all the 
preceding members have to pass in review first. Thus, a 
certain friend of mine, although able to repeat a speech or 
sermon on hearing it once, is nevertheless unable to pick out 
a thought in the middle of the sermon, without beginning 
at the start and repeating down to the part wanted. The 
same is true of most of us, when we have committed a 
poem to memory and wish to quote a particular verse. In 
the case of a short sentence expressing only a single 
thought, literal memorizing may not in any way injure the 
further utilization of that thought in any other connection ; 
on the contrary, its definite expression in language and the 
facility in the use of such expression render the thought 
all the more handy and serviceable. The fact that, in 
learning long selections by heart, the thought becomes stiff 
and dull, particularly when the selection is of an abstract 
nature, every one will recognize in his own experience. 
But the teacher meets it only too often in the class-room, 
and especially in the still worse form, where already such 
a selection has been previously learned by heart merely as 
so many words, leaving the thoughtful understanding of it 
to follow later. 

3. The third evil occurs likewise in the case of verbal 
memorizing, and, although not a necessary evil, is, however 
frequent enough in childhood. For, when a child repeats 
such pieces by heart, he thinks only of the words, but not 
at all, or very superficially, of their meaning — indeed he 
may not give his attention to the words even. Thus the 
most ridiculous blunders may occur, for example, the 



118 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

craziest (nonsensical or perverted) words may be mixed in, 
or the speaker, without noticing it, may switch off into 
another piece of similar sound. A mother reports she 
overheard the other day, her little girl solemnly and ear- 
nestly conning over the following prayer, which she was 
learning to recite in Sunday-school : "I hardly think I 
have any father, I hardly think I have any father." After 
considerable inquiry she found that the dear little soul had 
mistaken the words for "I heartily thank thee, heavenly 
Father." In the worst cases of this kind the process has 
then become almost as mechanical as when any one at his 
work, or in meditation, hums a tune to himself, without 
thinking of the separate sounds, or even perhaps being 
conscious of the act. It is easy to see how this evil result 
comes about. In the case of language two kinds of ideas 
must be apperceived, the word-ideas and the ideas of 
the things. That which is memorized is first of all only 
the words. Whether their meaning is every time thought 
of with them is questionable. When the learner spends 
time and pains on a word or a single sentence, it may be 
that, as a rule, the meaning is also thought of. But in the 
way in which children are accustomed to commit to mem- 
ory, the words usually follow quickly on one another ; con- 
sciousness is carried along by main force with the train of 
words. It is, therefore, only too easy each time to think 
of the contained meaning only fleetingly and superficially. 
But whenever this takes place it cannot but result in the 
formation of a habit of irrational and thoughtless repeti- 
tion. Is it any wonder, then, that this habit later shows 
its power when the child attempts to speak the piece ? 
Hence, even when the teacher is present, unless he knows 
of some means to force the pupil to think of the meaning 



PROPER USE OF MECHANICAL MEMORY. 119 

of words, this evil of thoughtlessness will continue to 
exist. 

So much for the present about mechanical repetition. 
Further on we shall speak of the means to overcome these 
evils (see illustrations, pp. 128ff.). 

Mechanical association is, as we saw before, far inferior 
in reproductive power to the thinking or logical associa- 
tion ; and mechanical repetition, as we have just seen, re- 
sults in many evils just in proportion as it is sedulously 
practised. But are we, on this account, to despise the aid 
thus afforded to memory ? In social science we learn that 
every workman is worthy of his hire, and that every work 
that is indispensable in its place, has a really inestimable 
value, however mechanical and subaltern it may be. Cer- 
tainly the common soldier cannot perform the work of a 
field marshal ; but woe to the field marshal that has no 
soldiers behind him ! These reflections may likewise be 
applied to the estimation of the mechanical compared with 
the rational memory. For the common purpose, the devel- 
opment of the mind, the mechanical memory may in its 
place indeed render indispensable service, and hence de- 
serves corresponding estimation. When, therefore, fault 
is found with the mechanical memory, this must be because 
it has not been put in the right place, or has not been cor- 
rectly employed. Thus it cannot be regarded as a fault if 
mechanical repetition produces a machine-like facility in 
reproduction; on the contrary, this facility is a virtue 
to be highly prized ; for the more surely and easily the 
lower mental activities perform their work, the freer will 
the higher ones be, and the more can they accomplish in 
their higher tasks. If, however, this facility has been pur- 
chased at the cost of too much pains and distress, and if 



120 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

the further use of these ideas in thought has been hindered 
thereby, and thoughtlessness has been cultivated, these are 
sure signs that Pedagogy has not learned her lesson of 
Psychology properly. Hence, if mechanical memorizing is 
to find its proper use, we must first know where its proper 
place is, i.e., where its service is indispensable ; and sec- 
ondly, how it must be used in order to avoid the evils, and 
render the best possible service to the higher activities. 

We may distinguish three cases in which its service is 
indispensable. The first consists of instances where, in 
the interest of mental development, ideas must be associ- 
ated that are not capable of any other than the mechanical, 
or external, association. This is plainly the chief field of 
operation for the mechanical memory. Here belong, for 
example, the association of thing-idea and word-idea, like- 
wise of foreign words with those of one's mother tongue ; 
whence it follows that the learning of a language, impor- 
tant as it is for the mental development, has its foundation 
in mechanical memorizing. Here belong further the asso- 
ciation of thing-idea and number-idea (e.g., in history, in 
geography, etc.) ; furthermore, the association of sound- 
ideas in music, likewise of the sound-ideas with word-ideas 
in singing ; and finally, although it is usually not thought 
of, the association of the simple ideas (the parts and char- 
acteristics of an object) into a complex or composite idea. 
Thus we see that not even the simple perception of an 
object can take place without the aid of the mechanical 
memory. 1 Instances of the second kind are to be found 

1 As before mentioned, both laws of association work together in the 
production of perception, since the repeated observation of an object 
strengthens, on the one hand, each simple or partial idea in itself (law of 
similarity), and on the other hand their association into a complex picture 
(law of simultaneity). 



RECAPITULATION. 121 

wherever ideas to be committed to memory in a definite 
order are capable but partially of association in thought, 
and in part must be associated mechanically. Here be- 
longs, for example, the word-for-word memorizing of liter- 
ary selections. The mechanical memory must in such 
case, at all events, assist. The whole piece, to be sure, if 
one wanted, could be committed to memory in an exclu- 
sively mechanical manner ; but the proper way is to com- 
bine both methods in practice. Examples of the third 
kind are longer lists of logically associated ideas ; for ex- 
ample, the eight branches of the animal kingdom, or the 
classes under each of these, etc. Here we might devote 
our efforts entirely to rational memorizing. But, in so far 
as a certain facility in reproduction is desirable, it will be 
better, on account of the length of the list, to call in the 
help of the mechanical repetition in conclusion. 

So far as the right way of handling mechanical repeti- 
tion is concerned, it must suffice to emphasize a few of the 
most important measures. And first of all we must recur 
to the advice above referred to, which, although given by 
Ratich nearly three hundred years ago, still continues 
to deserve reiteration, particularly as it applies equally to 
the understanding of the new as well as to the memorizing 
of it. The rule is to learn everything "piecely," i.e., in 
conveniently-sized portions. The second and most impor- 
tant rule is, wherever the method of rational memory can 
be combined with the mechanical, always to use it, and in 
such case, in accordance with its higher worth, always to 
give it the precedence. As a third rule for the cultivation 
of the judgment, and the prevention of thoughtlessness, 
it is recommended to have the entire lesson reproduced in 
conclusion, and, particularly in the case of memorized se- 



122 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

lections, always to insist on a logical analysis by topics. 
The practical carrying out of these rules will be shown in 
the next chapter by some examples taken from the differ- 
ent subjects of the curriculum. 

As this ends the general discussion ot the subject of 
memorizing, we will recapitulate briefly its various forms. 

Unintentional or immanent memorizing takes place of 
itself in every lesson in and with the act of acquisition and 
in every one of the three formal steps in learning, but most 
extensively in the applications to practice. By the proper 
arrangement of the course to favor the correlation of 
studies, this sort of memorizing may be considerably in- 
creased. It has three great advantages over voluntary 
memorizing ; first, it takes no extra time ; secondly, it is 
favored by the stimulus of novelty ; and, thirdly, it de- 
pends, for the most part, although not exclusively, on 
rational association by thought. How much it therefore 
deserves to be increased by the proper interrelation of 
studies, is obvious. 

Intentional memorizing, taking place by the help of repe- 
tition, divides, according to the two natural laws of associa- 
tion, into rational and mechanical. The mechanical method 
should never be employed alone on such matters or on such 
occasions as allow of thoughtful repetition. 

When the ideas are not in themselves capable of rational 
association, it is customary in certain cases to help the 
mechanical memory by inventing an art if rial rational asso- 
ciation. This means was already known and practised by 
the ancient Greeks. An example will show how such 
crutches for the memory are manufactured. Suppose, in 
history, it is to be remembered that the Roman emperor 
Theodosius, divided the empire between his two sons, Ho- 



MNEMONICS. 123 

norius and Arcadius, giving to the former the western, and 
to the latter the eastern portion. Here it is evident that 
the pupils can easily become confused when trying to recol- 
lect which was emperor in the east and which in the west. 
To avoid this an artificial association is attempted in one 
case between the personal and geographical name. In case 
the pupils already know the ancient Greek province of 
Arcadia, this association may take place between the sound 
of the name Arcadius and that of the province Arcadia ; 
this lay in the eastern portion of the empire, and it was 
this portion that fell to Arcadius. If the pupils have not 
heard of that Greek province, the artificial association could 
be made as follows : the name Arcadius begins with the 
first letter of the alphabet ; in the east the sun rises first ; 
thus the one l first ' recalls the other ' first.' This method 
of association, as distinguished from the genuinely rational 
association, is called mnemonic (from the Greek word /xvyj/xy, 
recollection). It was named by Kant the ingenious memory, 
i.e., cunningly devised. We call it also artificial memory. 
Mnemonics is, in certain cases, particularly for the reten- 
tion of dates and other numbers, as little to be despised as 
crutches and artificial limbs are when the natural limbs are 
wanting. In its application to numbers this art has in 
later times been reduced to definite rules, which are easily 
learned, and in such vocations as require many numbers to 
be learned it will no doubt pay to drill one's self in the use 
of these rules. But it is quite another question whether 
educative instruction should make use of a system of 
mnemonics in drilling on historical dates and geographical 
numbers. It might be asked in reply whether one should 
systematically accustom sound limbs to the use of crutches ? 
That which no gymnastics for the body would permit, may 



124 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

not be allowed for the mind either. This fact, however, 
should not prevent the mechanical memory from receiving 
artificial aid in certain individual cases ; for example, to 
prevent confounding similar ideas — if for no other reason, 
to call the pupils' attention to the fact that such aid is 
possible. In our opinion the school should not require any 
more numbers to be learned than can be mastered by the 
natural means of memory. If, therefore, a prescribed 
course of study requires the learning of so many numbers 
that the natural means of memory are insufficient, this is 
a sign, not that a system of mnemonics is necessary, but 
that the list of numbers must be shortened. The method 
of mnemonics has often been counted as a third kind of 
memorizing, co-ordinate with the rational and the me- 
chanical methods. With reference, however, to the matter 
in the association, the mnemonic method is a subspecies 
of the mechanical memory ; with reference to the kind of 
association, it is a subspecies of the rational. 

That sometimes our most prominent educators fall into a dispar- 
agement of memory, by reason of restricting it to the mechanical 
form, is shown by the following sentence from Dr. Harris's preface 
to Kay's Memory in the International Education Series : " When we 
can see each immediate fact in the perspective of its genesis or his- 
tory, we have no use for memory, which preserves for us facts and 
events isolated from their producing and deducing causes." This 
whole book is a protest against such a restriction in the meaning of 
memory. To see " each fact in the perspective of its genesis or 
history" is the best way of memorizing it. Nearly all the special 
books on Memory restrict themselves to the cultivation of the me- 
chanical memory, or else advocate some artificial system of mne- 
monics. This is true of Kay's book above mentioned, and even of 
Dr. Pick's Memory and the Rational Means of Improving It. 

For an account of different systems of mnemonics, see article 
"Mnemonics," Encyclopaedia Britannica, and article "Memory" 



LEARNING AND FORGETTING. 



125 



in Chambers's Encyclopaedia. A very interesting book, calculated 
to cure any one of unbounded faith in any system of mnemonics, 
is "Loisette" Exposed, by G. S. Fellows, New York. It contains a 
full bibliography. 

Dr. Ebbinghaus of Berlin investigated on himself some of the 
laws of mechanical memory, and has published his results in a book, 
Ueber das Geddchtnis, Leipzig, 1885. As this work has never been 
translated, 1 I take the liberty of presenting three of his results 
which seem to have most direct bearing on school work. 



CURVE OF LEARNING. 




iiHiiijiniiniinmmiljIllllllllllIl l, 

7 12 16 24 36 

in order to learn x syllables. 

To learn 7 nonsense syllables, Dr. Ebbinghaus found that for him 
it required but once going over; when this number was increased to 
12 syllables it took 17 repetitions to learn the list, 16 syllables required 



i See, however, a very good summary of the book by Dr. Burnham in 
the American Journal of Psychology, vol. ii., pp. 587-603. The curve 
given on p. 126 of this book is not taken from Ebbinghaus, but is con- 
structed from his tables. 



126 



THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 



30 repetitions, and so on. The curve is extremely steep, and shows 
in a very graphic way the difficulty the memory has of mastering 
long lists. It should be added that when lists were chosen in which 
the syllables had a meaning, and could be thus associated, it was 
found the work of learning was reduced to one-tenth. 

By committing lists of nonsense syllables so that they could just 
be reproduced, it was found that after the lapse of only 20 minutes 
58% as much work was required to recommit as to commit an en- 
tirely new list ; or, in other words, 42 % of the original work was 
lost by forgetting. After one hour this loss amounted to 56% of 
the whole. But it was also found that the loss after this was very 
gradual, so that after 6 days there still remained 25%, and after 

31 days there w r as still a saving of 21 % in the work of relearning. 



CURVE OF FOKGETTING, 




10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 

after lapse of i£ hours 



With six 16-syllable lists, Dr. Ebbinghaus found the time saved in 
relearning, after an interval of 24 hours, was directly proportional 
to the number of repetitions (up to 64 repetitions) on the preceding 
day. But this saving amounted to only one-third as much time as 
the original learning required. Hence we see the bad economy of 
attempting to learn things before they can be used, under the plea 
that they will be of use later. One great waste of memory in school- 
work comes from learning things before they are needed, inasmuch 
as they have to be relearned each time that they are really employed. 

James P. Downs of New York has published a series of six 



HERBAUTIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY. 127 

manuals on The Memory. They are, 1, The Mastery of Memorizing ; 
2, Quickness of Perception; 3, Eye and Ear Memory; I, The Study 
of Languages ; 5, Memory and Thought; 6, The Memory-Training 
of the Young. The titles, however, lead one to expect a great deal 
more of helpful suggestiveness from these books than they actually 
contain. They have some good points, but are not worth their 
cost ($5). 

For the English literature of the Herbartian School the reader is 
referred particularly to Rein's Outlines of Pedagogics, translated by 
C. C. and Ida J. Van Liew, Syracuse, N.Y. ; C. W. Bardeen, 1893. 
This is a book of nearly 200 pages, but as thorough as anything on the 
subject yet published in English. It contains a full bibliography to 
date of works in English on Herbartian Pedagogy. Of these I should 
name as chief: De Garmo, Essentials of Method, and Uerbart and the 
Ilerbartians ; Ufer's Introduction to the Pedagogy of Uerbart, trans- 
lated by J. C. Zinser; Ilerbart's Science of Education, translated by 
Henry M. and Emmie Felkin; Lange's Apperception, edited by De 
Garmo; Charles A. McMurry's General Method. The First Year- 
Book of the Uerbart Society for the Scientific Study of Teaching 
contains valuable papers on Correlation, Concentration, and Culture 
Epochs. In these works the reader will find a fuller accoimt of 
"Method-units," or " Method-wholes," " Formal Steps," etc. All 
of these presuppose on the teacher's part a sympathetic acquaint- 
ance with the facts of child development and a good stock of sound 
common-sense in the correct application of these ideas. 



CHAPTER V. 

ILLUSTRATIONS TAKEN FROM THE SUBJECTS OF THE 
CURRICULUM. 

We are now going to illustrate, by some examples taken 
from the different subjects of instruction, how in inten- 
tional memorizing rational repetition may be made to help 
the mechanical, or even in certain cases entirely take its 
place. The work of memory is here alone to be considered, 
and furthermore only that portion that takes place in 
school. All the 'preliminary processes of acquisition will be 
presupposed. In those subjects usually classed as thought- 
studies in contrast to expression-studies, it is, of course, the 
concrete material, and hence the first formal step, which 
requires the most drill. Of the following examples, there- 
fore, all those taken from thought-studies refer exclusively 
to the material of observation. 

First Example — taken from history. 

The story may be any one the reader chooses, provided 
it is a method-whole. We will suppose that the oral pre- 
sentation of the matter by the teacher, including the inter- 
woven explanatory discussion, has been finished, and the 
teacher has now the duty of seeing that the same is ade- 
quately impressed on the memory. 

What will be the method pursued by a teacher who 
makes use of the mechanical memory exclusively ? 

We must, however, first come to an understanding of 
what is exactly meant by the expression mechanical mem- 

128 



METHOD OF MECHANICAL DRILL. 129 

ory, or, in other words, how much place there is here for 
mechanical association. In history and literature the very 
words used have, to be sure, a certain value ; but we will, 
nevertheless, assume that the teacher has no intention of 
requiring a literal commitment to memory, but agrees with 
us in thinking that the pupils should use their own words 
in rehearsing the facts of history. 1 Thus, then, the me- 
chanical memory of the words used is excluded. Hence 
we have to do only with the material facts of history. 
These form objectively a definite sequence in the story as 
related, and yet not an accidental sequence, but one that is- 
determined by the causal connection of the events. Now 
in so far as the pupils have understood this connection at 
the first hearing, the ideas have already become associated 
once rationally ; but in so far as this connection has not 
been conceived, the ideas have been associated only me- 
chanically. The fact, as a rule, will be that a portion of 
the ideas have found a rational, and the other portion only 
a mechanical, association. But suppose the most favorable 
case, namely, that in this first immanent impression on the 
memory the number of merely mechanical associations has 
been very small. How will it be now in case of repetition ? 
In so far as the pupils have not the logical connection in 
mind, this connection will likewise fail of repetition. And 
hence, if the teacher does nothing to freshen up the 
rational association, it will indeed happen that only a 
portion of these rational associations are repeated, thus 

1 " I shall force my daughter to marry according to her inclination" 
said Madame DeStael, taught probably by her own sad experience. This 
maxim may be applied to recitations in the thought-studies. The pupils 
should not only be allowed, but even strongly encovraged, to use their 
own words in recitation. Of course this encouraging must not degene- 
rate into command, for then freedom would be lost again. 



130 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

increasing the number of mechanical associations in the 
same degree. This will be especially true with the weaker 
pupils. With this preliminary explanation, it will now be 
possible to say how the expression "mechanical repeti- 
tion " is to be understood. It means that in such case the 
teacher does nothing to renew and deepen the conception of 
the connection of the ideas, but restricts himself to a mere 
drill of the concrete ideas in the given sequence. 

Returning now to the above question, we shall follow 
the method of mechanical memory in detail. 

To begin with, the teacher, of course, will mentally 
divide the story into smaller divisions. But this is done 
only in the mechanical sense, and therefore not for the sake 
of disposing the subject-matter logically, but for the sole 
purpose of giving the pupils conveniently small portions. 
Accordingly, then, these divisions will not be provided with 
special headings. For this method does not require the 
pupils to think of these divisions as members, but only as 
pieces, and, of course, broken bits need no names. Hence 
in the division of the subject-matter these pupils take no 
part. 

And now the memorizing begins, namely, with the first 
paragraph. The teacher presents the matter once more, 
either orally or by having the pupils read ; in case it 
seems necessary, this may also be repeated a second time 
perhaps. 

Then he calls upon one of the abler pupils to repeat 
independently, and corrects, or allows the other pupils to 
correct, whatever is in need of improvement ; thereupon he 
calls on one of the mediocre pupils to repeat, and finally 
on one of the weakest. Thus reproduction and correction 
are continued so long as is necessary to enable most of the 



LOGICAL DISPOSITION BY TOPICS. 131 

pupils, and, if possible, even the weaker ones, to accom- 
plish what is desired. 

After this the second paragraph is taken in its turn, in 
the self-same way. But this time, in reciting, the pupil is 
required to say both paragraphs together. The same takes 
place with every succeeding paragraph, until finally the 
majority of the pupils are able to reproduce the entire story 
with certainty, and even a certain amount of facility. 1 

That would be just about the method pursued in the 
mechanical memorizing of history. It is characterized, as 
one sees, by the fact that rational association in thought 
is nowhere made use of. Compare with this the other 
method, which, in contrast, depends directly on the rational 
association. 

The first place in which thought here comes to the as- 
sistance of memory is in dividing the story into smaller 
sections. This division of the subject takes place at the 
first presentation for greater ease in the acquisition ; also, 
with the same purpose in view, the separate sections are 

1 Rector Dorpfeld records, in a footnote, how he felt, when at the time 
of the Kegulatives (1872) he first came upon the practice of the last- 
named regulation in regard to repetition. He found the students in a 
Normal School trained to teach in this way. He had supposed it was 
impossible after the introduction of Normal Schools, to find such per- 
verted ideas of teaching. He wrote at that time in the Evangelical 
School Journal : — 

" Does it not seem as if one had already seen this sort of smart work 
elsewhere, and in other connection before ? Is not this manner of com- 
mitting to memory precisely like that old way of learning the spelling 
lesson, in which with every successive syllable of a word the preceding 
syllables had to be again pronounced, after the manner of the ' house that 
Jack built'? Thus it would go: te — e=te; de— i = di, tedi ; 
o — u — es = oiis, te'diotis ; en — e — double es, ness, te'diousness. What 
is here done with the syllables is just as regularly done there with the 
sentences and paragraphs of history." 



132 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

provided with a general heading, or topic. Thus we see 
the difference of the two methods even in the very first 
step; for the topical headings prevent the matter from 
being cut up into arbitrary pieces, and substitute instead 
the logical disposition of the subject. Thus the sections 
become actual members of an organic whole, instead of 
merely loose pieces. Every heading is to be, as much as 
possible, in the form of a catchword. For a very good 
instance of such logical disposition compare the topical 
analysis by Dr. Hill in Fiske's School History of the 
United States. Here, for example, the period of the Rev- 
olution is divided into three chapters: I. Causes and Be- 
ginnings, 1763-1776 ; II. The Winning of Independence, 
1776-1783 ; III. The Critical Period, 1783-1789. Under 
I. are the topics and sub-topics as follows : — 

a. Causes of III Feeling between England and her Colonies. 

1. What was the European idea of a colony, and its object? 

2. What erroneous notions about trade existed ? 

3. What was the main object of the laws regulating trade ? 

etc. 

b. The Need of a Federal Union. 

1. One great difficulty in carrying on the French wars. 

2. An account of Franklin. 

3. Franklin's plan of union. 

etc. 

c. The Stamp Act Passed and Repealed. 

1. The kind of government needed by the colonies. 

2. How Parliament sought to establish such a government. 

3. The nature of a stamp tax. 

etc. 

First Stage in Memorizing. If the first step in acquisi- 
tion (the concrete presentation) has thus prepared the way, 



THE LIST OF HEADINGS. 133 

the work of memorizing will now begin as follows. The 
first stage consists in committing well the logical disposi- 
tion, that is to say, the list of headings. This is done by 
repetition, not, however, mechanically, but thoughtfully. 
The teacher, accordingly, in the simplest possible manner, 
calls attention to the fact that the members of this series 
are not accidental but causal in their connection. He 
shows that the Causes (I.) of the Revolution led to the 
Winning of Independence (II.), and this was then followed 
by the Critical Period (III.), lasting until a stable govern- 
ment could be established again (IV.). After in this way 
the list has been gone through, once forward and once 
backward, it may be thoroughly stamped on the memory 
by the following exercise, in which the teacher questions 
and cross-questions thus, — e.g., What was the cause of the 
Critical Period ? What led up to Independence ? What 
followed on the Winning of Independence ? etc. But in 
all of this the pupils must be allowed opportunity for quiet 
deliberation ; for the aim is not to get the answer as 
quickly as possible, but to get it by tit inking. If this 
exercise is continued awhile, all the pupils will soon be 
able to say the list both forwards and backwards, perhaps 
with facility already, and, at all events, with certaint} r . 

This shows, in the first stage of the process, how thought 
may re-enforce memory through a logical arrangement of 
topics. The help that the memory receives is easy to see, 
on the one hand from the arrangement, and on the other 
hand from the repetition. The contents of each section is 
held together by its separate heading, and the story is con- 
nected, as a whole, by the entire list of headings ; this is 
in both cases a thought-connection. The repetition then 
strengthens both of these bands, but always retains its 



134 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

logical character, and hence this thinking seems to the 
pupils like new acquisition. 

Second Stage of Memorizing. Now, then, can follow the 
repetition of the separate sections. As the reader will 
remember, we described above (p. 109) two forms of repe- 
tition, — the one a strict repetition of the original act of 
learning, and the other a reproduction in memory of its re- 
sults only. In this case the first or productive repetition 
must take place, inasmuch as the matter is to be re-pre- 
sented exactly, and without weakening in its effect. In the 
lower grades, therefore, the teacher has no other way than 
to relate the sections in question once more orally, but now, 
of course, in a somewhat briefer form. In the middle and 
upper grades such a repetition would be tedious to the 
jmpils ; besides, they are justified in wishing to take a 
larger part in the work themselves. Fortunately, there is 
a way of securing all of these advantages, and not losing 
any of those obtained by oral repetition. The teacher has 
only to let his pupils read the story for themselves in their 
books. For, first, the matter is thus presented again just 
as exactly as before ; secondly, opportunity is given the 
pupils for self -activity, and tedium is avoided ; and thirdly, 
their facility in reading is also increased. It would, there- 
fore, be simply folly not to accept these advantages when 
they thus offer. That any one should think it unnecessary 
at all to refresh the memory thus exactly in the one way 
or the other, I shall leave out of consideration entirely. 
In this manner, then, the first section is read. 

This is the place to call attention to an important point. 
The advantages to be gained by this reading, and in partic- 
ular its memorizing effect, may be very noticeably increased 
by the introduction into it of a thought element. This 



THE USE OF QUESTIONS. 135 

may be done by making use of questions, i.e., by putting 
analytical questions, whose answer can be read from the 
book, thus converting the monotonous reading into a viva- 
cious dialogue, as it were. Of course the teacher must not 
spare himself the pains of preparing such questions before- 
hand, because they cannot be made up on the spur of the 
moment in just the fitting form. As already indicated, the 
main object of this is to introduce a logical element into 
the reading ; for the question that precedes places the con- 
tent of the answer under a, particular point of view. But 
it accomplishes still more. Every question is, as it were, 
a finger-post, pointing to a definite place, and hence causing 
a sharper apprehension. Besides this the preceding ques- 
tion leads the pupil of himself into the correct emphasis. 
Counting all of these results together — thought element, 
sharper apprehension, vivacity, right emphasis — it is 
manifest that the resulting power of memory is by this 
means very considerably strengthened. Whoever has once 
tried the plan of letting his pupils read in answer to 
questions will not want to give up the method, even if 
its only advantage were the increased vivacity. 

Third Stage of Memorizing. — Thus, then, after the first 
section has been reviewed in the stricter form, namely, by 
repeating exactly and completely the original process, this 
may be followed by the reproductive repetition. But this 
must not be done by simply calling for a recitation of the 
whole section, and depending entirely on the monotonous 
repetition of this command and the equally monotonous 
repetition of the same matter until gradually even the 
weaker pupils have gained a certain facility. To do so in 
this final stage of memorizing, where of right quiet delib- 
eration, freedom, and alertness should be the rule as much 



136 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

as in the two preceding stages, would be to cultivate tedious- 
ness systematically ; it would mean the renunciation of the 
increased attention, stimulus, and vivacity resulting from 
the use of questions ; it would mean, in short, to imitate 
the purely mechanical method before described. The cor- 
rect way is for the teacher to proceed again with analytical 
questions, i.e., to have the reproduction come in answer to 
questions, just as before in the case of reading. Accord- 
ingly these questions for reproduction will cover the same 
ground as those questions for reading, or at least they may 
do so. The particular forms of expression may be changed 
as much as practicable, in the upper grades, perhaps, by 
using language that is somewhat more difficult and techni- 
cal. One may see from what has been said that only such 
questions are intended as require a rather long answer; 
they should analyze the section, but not pick the separate 
sentences to pieces. Questions that concern merely one 
portion of a sentence, or a single word, do not belong here 
at all. The reasons for the use of questions in reproduc- 
tion are the same as for their use in reading, and hence we 
need not repeat them. There is, however, in the case 
before us one new reason, namely, that this method is 
easier. This carries with it the further advantage that 
the duller pupils, perhaps even the dullest, can answer 
independently at the very first, thus relieving the teacher 
of the tedious necessity of requiring these slower ones to 
repeat after the brighter ones. If this were its only advan- 
tage, the questioning would, even on this account alone, be 
fully justified ; but with all the other numerous advantages 
added, it becomes completely inconceivable how there can 
be any teachers who will give up this way, and prefer to 
torture themselves and their pupils with their monotonous 



LONG TRAINS OF THOUGHT. 137 

mechanical memorizing. 1 After the first section has been 
repeated in this way in answer to questions, topically, it 
will of course be recited once more connectedly, — but again 
not at a mere word of command, but in answer to the topi- 
cal question contained in the heading. The brighter pupils 
need not be required to give this final repetition, but only 
the duller ones, as we may take for granted that the others 
are able to do it after the preceding exercise. 

In this way the first section is gone through. The suc- 
ceeding sections are then repeated in the same way, first by 
reading and then by reproduction from memory. There 
is, moreover, in my opinion, nothing to prevent the pu- 
pils from reading the entire lesson at once, and proceed- 
ing by sections only when they come to reproduce from 
memory. This is, perhaps, on some accounts, the more 
desirable method, seeing that the whole selection has been 
presented in its entirety, and the logical disposition has 
likewise been memorized. 

The question now remains, whether, in this method of 
repetition by sections, some special means does not have to 
be taken to enable the pupils to recite the whole story con- 
nectedly. There is no doubt at all that school instruction 
should include this in its object, and should aim to enable 
the pupils to command long trains of thought and to recite 
independently. If this demand is understood, as it is here 
meant it should be, to apply to only a single recitation and 



1 It may be mentioned, in passing, that this form of questioning en- 
ables the teacher to make use sometimes of the method of " repeating 
after" in quite a different and really stimulating manner. The teacher 
may, namely, now and then, when it seems desirable, have one of the 
duller pupils repeat the question as put to him, or to one of the brighter 
ones. 



138 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

for the time being, and not for all future time, the task is 
certainly not too difficult. But much time will be need- 
lessly lost and the teacher will be sorely tempted to recur 
to the mechanical routine, if he knows that the final exam- 
ination will likewise demand such ability of reproduction. 
The mechanical method accomplishes this end, as we have 
before seen, in its own peculiar way, by repeating the first 
section along with the second, and in this manner with 
every succeeding section reciting all the preceding over 
again. That this means secures the end, particularly when 
the mediocre and duller pupils are required to repeat after, 
admits of no doubt. But there is likewise no doubt at all 
that this procedure is most exceedingly tiresome for all 
concerned, but especially for the brighter pupils. There is 
a second evil which must not be overlooked. By the con- 
tinued precedence of the brighter pupils, all the others in 
the class are forced into their particular mode of expres- 
sion, and thus the repeating after can no longer be called 
an independent recitation. If the former used their own 
words freely, the others imitate their mistakes as well. 
The three evils are, therefore, much tediousness, restric- 
tion of free reproduction for the majority of the pupils, 
and the copying of a model unfit to be imitated. There is, 
however, fortunately another way, which, though safe and 
faultless, seems to suffer only from not being known to the 
advocates of memory-cram. In the main, it consists in 
what neither costs time nor makes the least trouble, be- 
cause all the while this work has already been done in the 
foregoing exercises of rational memory, as they have been 
described. In a word, it consists chiefly in the fact that 
these exercises from beginning to end have made use of the 
th. inking memory. The considerably greater intensive power 



HOME WORK. 139 

of memory by rational association, together with the vari- 
ous other advantages (avoidance of tediousness, increase of 
interest, vivacity, etc.), bring it about that at this stage in 
the process that command of the whole thought is in the 
main already obtained. The small residue that must yet 
be done will consist in the pupils' reading the lesson over 
at home, preferably aloud, — of course, by questions again 
and with regard for the logical disposition. This final 
review of the lesson is, in respect to the ground covered, 
exact and complete ; in respect to its character, since it 
takes place by questions, it is thoughtful ; and it takes up 
none of the time in school. This one review at the close of 
the lesson is the only work of memorizing that should be 
left for the pupils to do at home, so far as the concrete ma- 
terial is concerned. The practice thereby gained in read- 
ing is sufficient reason for requiring this work to be done. 

Assuming that the foregoing exercises of the thinking 
memory have done their full duty — that is to say : that, 
first of all, the immanent memorizing has not been want- 
ing which comes from the thorough, concrete, oral presen- 
tation ; that, secondly, each separate section has been read 
over as well as recited from memory, and that both have 
been done in the thoughtful way ; that, thirdly, these 
sections are firmly connected in mind by the logical dispo- 
sition ; and, lastly, that the pupils have read them over 
thoughtfully once more at home — if this has been done, 
I say, there can be no doubt that pupils of all grades of 
ability will have at least as much command in the con- 
nected recital of the story as the mechanical memorizing 
can accomplish in the same time, in spite of its special 
exercises for this express purpose. Those in authority, 
unfortunately, have too often been willing to overlook the 



140 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

deficiency in power to think and the resulting lack of in- 
terest in the subject, if only the required per cent was 
obtained in examination. 

If, after all that has been said, any one still has doubts 
whether this particular object, viz., the ability to recite 
connectedly the whole story, can be reached in the way 
described, it nevertheless certainly does not follow that 
we are forced at last to return to the tedious mechanical 
method. For what is there to prevent, if need be, the repe- 
tition of any of these exercises, whether of the reading 
or of the recitation from memory ? There is, however, to 
be sure, a still better means, which on the one hand is new 
in form, and on the other hand affords a desirable help to 
the weaker pupils. It consists in assigning to the brighter 
and mediocre pupils the presentation of the story in writ- 
ing, while the teacher in the mean time reviews one of the 
preceding oral exercises with the duller pupils. In brief, 
my theory of memorizing does not prescribe how frequent 
the repetition should be made, but it does demand that 
the repetition shall not be mechanical and, above all, shall 
not be tedious or tiresome, but should always make use of 
thought by means of logical disposition, and well-directed 
questions. 

This is now the place for a brief summary of the char- 
acter and advantages of this mode of memorizing in the 
case of historical subjects. 

So far as their character is concerned, the repetition ex- 
ercises above described are by no means a combination of 
the rational and mechanical modes — as my introductory 
remark might have led one to believe — but on the con- 
trary they are, from beginning to end, exclusively thought- 
ful in their nature. For the mechanical association is 



NATURAL SCIENCE. 141 

never intentionally used, and the connected recitation of 
the matter without questions occurs not as an exercise 
in repetition, but only as a final reproduction in the form 
of a test. 

The advantages are as follows : — 

1. The association in thought makes the power of mem- 
ory in these repetition exercises intensively stronger, thus 
saving time, — to say nothing of the fact that this power 
is extended to a much greater number of associated ideas, 
thus becoming many-sided in the reproduction. 

2. Whatever strength the mechanical association has in 
each repetition belongs each time, as a matter of course, 
to these thought exercises — as a free gift. 

3. The pupils must be constantly deliberating, and are 
therefore forced to keep their thoughts on the subject, and 
pay attention to content and expression. 

4. The tediousness of mechanical memorizing is not 
present. 

5. The language work receives a considerable advance- 
ment in facility of reading, which, moreover, returns to 
re-enforce the further learning of history. The brighter 
pupils have besides an exercise in written composition. 

6. Inasmuch as fewer repetition exercises are necessary, 
and since those that are used are considerably more stimu- 
lating and lively, and therefore more interesting, the dis- 
gust and dislike for the subject which is so prominent a 
weakness of the mechanical routine is, so far as possible, 
avoided. 



Second Example — taken from the natural sciences. 
The subject matter in the natural sciences is essentially 



142 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

different from that in the historical subjects, in so far as 
in the former the new ideas arise as direct sense-percep- 
tions, while in the latter they must be produced by means 
of language on a basis of imagination. In this immediate 
apprehension through the senses, the natural sciences 
have a great advantage to begin with. But this advan- 
tage extends also to the memorizing in several ways. In 
the first place, the ideas of sense are stronger than those 
produced by the imagination. Secondly, a natural object, 
in case it is a body or a physical process that is being 
studied, is continuously before the eyes for observation, so 
that in this way the separate characteristics, so far as they 
are apprehended at all, have already experienced frequent 
repetition. Both circumstances combined must have the 
result of taking less time and trouble for the voluntary 
commitment to memory than are required for lessons in 
history. But there is still a further advantage. As we 
saw in the first example, the different errors and mistakes 
in memorizing historical matter are connected with the 
fact that here the ideas must be conveyed by language. 
The agency of language easily misleads into mechanical 
repetition, and, moreover, to make use of book-learning in 
the wrong place. In the case of natural science subjects 
the teacher is not so liable to be led into these mistakes. 
For the logical disposition (1st stage) almost forces itself 
on him ; to refresh the ideas (2d stage), he is warned by 
the very nature of the subject to have recourse to observa- 
tion again ; and in the succeeding recitation from memory 
(3d stage) the preceding logical disposition suggests to 
him the desirability of judicious topical questions. It will, 
therefore, not be necessary to describe any particular les- 
son in natural science, especially since there are so many 



NATURAL SCIENCE. 143 

branches, chemistry, physics, botany, zoology, meteorology, 
geology, physical geography, and astronomy, that the differ- 
ences in the subject matter lead to many differences also in 
the method of teaching and in the appliances used. An 
example taken from only one of these branches would, 
therefore, not quite fit any other, and hence could easily 
lead to misunderstandings. I shall therefore mention only 
such measures as either apply to all the branches, or at least 
show plainly to what particular ones they do belong. The 
remarks will naturally be connected with the three stages 
of memorizing above noted. In the first stage, as we 
know, the logical disposition, which the pupils have already 
sketched in the work of observation, is to be committed to 
memory. In describing a plant or animal the logical dis- 
position, to be exact, must be branched into main divisions 
and subordinate sections, instead of being a uniform se- 
quence. But such a branched sequence may be just as 
easily retained as one that is uniform, provided it is well 
understood, — indeed it may even be easier, since, in the 
form of the plant or animal, everything is present to the 
eyes at the same time. 1 

In the second stage, where the memorizing of the sep- 
arate sections begins, the repetition, in order completely to 
refresh the ideas, must fall back on immediate observation. 
When the most important points have been reviewed in this 
manner, the section may then be read for completeness, 



1 Of course it is to be understood that such descriptions in the lower 
and middle grades must be thoroughly simple in their nature. Even in 
the upper grades they should not lose themselves in minute details, but 
ought constantly to have reference to such characteristics as are of espe- 
cial importance either for the life of the living thing, or for its aesthetical 
bearings, or as a means of recognition. 



144 THOUGHT AND MEMORY 

provided the matter is appropriate to such an exercise. 
In this case the reading forms the transition to the recita- 
tion. The reading is, however, not necessary so far as its 
object is merely to impress the matter on the mind ; for 
natural science has an immense advantage in the fact that 
its ideas are obtained by direct observation. But the read- 
ing is, nevertheless, useful ; first, because of the repetition 
in a new and different form ; but secondly, and mainly, 
because the pupils are thereby better prepared for later 
self-instruction, since a written description is always more 
difficult to understand than a free oral explanation. The 
final decision, however, whether in the natural sciences the 
lessons should be read so far as the subject matter admits, 
does not belong here in a work on the memory, but rather 
to the subject of the correlation of studies. It may, in 
certain cases, be much better to assign such reading to the 
language lesson than to that in natural science. 

In the second stage of memorizing the drawing of natu- 
ral objects has special value, being indeed indispensable as 
a means of exact apprehension and retention. It may per- 
form good service even in the history lesson. This work, 
however, must not be confounded with the proper and 
regular instruction in drawing. 

The third stage of memorizing is the recitation from 
memory. This will, of course, be oral usually, but a writ- 
ten exercise at this stage is recommended, whenever the 
teacher has to give his attention separately to the weaker 
pupils, and also now and then as a home exercise for the 
entire class. It need hardly be remarked that such repe- 
tition must be thoughtful and not mechanical. Hence, 
wherever the logical disposition is insufficient, the teacher 
will find it serviceable to make use of judicious sub-ques- 



MEMORIZING CHOICE SELECTIONS. 145 

feions. If, for example, a plant leaf was to be described, 
there could be distinguished first the petiole and the blade, 
and in respect to the latter whether simple or compound, 
etc. Practise in connected recitation is not excluded by 
this exercise. 

For the written reproduction, whether a connected de- 
scription is intended or not, as well as for the review at 
home, printed questions for review are desirable. This 
is particularly necessary in order to render the home re- 
view an exercise in thought, and prevent it from degener- 
ating into book-learning, that is always half mechanical, 
and, in the case of a dry outline, is in addition as tedious 
as it is unfruitful. In physical science these review ques- 
tions can be and must be, for the most part, genuine 
exercises for application. 

From both of the above examples the reader will be able 
to conclude that, in our opinion, the work of memorizing 
should be done in the school, exclusively so in the first and 
second stages, and for much the greater part in the third 
stage of the process also. This applies equally to all the 
subjects of instruction. Only a small and easily accom- 
plished residuum of work should be left to the private in- 
dustry of the pupil at home. In this way not only is 
every over-burdening prevented, but the proper means 
will thus be taken to insure zest in the work of memo- 
rizing. 



Third Example. 

Such studies are here included as, in comparison with 
the foregoing examples, contain a new element, in that, 
besides the thoughts expressed, also the form of expression 
is to be learned, — such selections, therefore, as are to be 



146 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

committed to memory word for word. Of course occasion 
for such selections may occur in almost any of the subjects 
of study : in literature, in history, in singing, etc. 

In such a case, before the pupils begin to memorize the 
work, the thought content of the selection should first be 
worked out by the regular method, i.e., according to the 
formal steps of apperception, viz., observation, thought, 
application. This will insure not only the understanding 
of the general thought, but also include the proper expla- 
nation of unfamiliar words and phrases. Short pieces to 
be committed to memory, as, for example, a proverb or 
a stanza of poetry, which occur as accompaniments of a 
history lesson, of course receive the explanation in that 
connection. 

The memorizing of words, apart from any help derived 
from their meaning, must depend, of course, on the law of 
simultaneity. Memorizing is, therefore, in such case me- 
chanical. Since the purpose of such memorizing, just as 
in learning a song, consists in reaching the greatest pos- 
sible certainty and ease in reproduction, and since in this 
case the facility, and in part also the certainty of memory 
depends chiefly on the mechanical association of ideas, the 
drill in repetition, of course, must not be given up until 
this result is reached. Taking thus much for granted, we 
may now enquire whether, in this case also, rational asso- 
ciation may not be called in to the assistance of mechanical 
memorizing. This can most certainly be done, and its ad- 
vantages are most plainly manifest just where the mechan- 
ical method gives the most trouble, namely, in selections 
of greater length. What the teacher can do in this direc- 
tion may be told in a few words, after what has been said 
in the previous examples. 



MEMORIZING CHOICE SELECTIONS. 147 

First Stage. Even the mechanical method requires the 
selection to be divided up into smaller sections. For the 
sake of rational association this requirement is so far mod- 
ified that the sections must be not mere fragments, but 
actual members ; in short that this division of the subject 
into parts must be a logical disposition by topics. The 
work of memorizing begins, then, by committing this logi- 
cal disposition with considerable thoroughness. 

Second and Third Stages. In the middle and lower grades, 
each separate section will now be read and re-read. This is 
essential, if for no other reason, to gain the correct intona- 
tion and whatever else is necessary to a good delivery. 
The other exercises that go along with this — such as trial 
recitations from memory by the brighter pupils, home re- 
hearsals, etc., — need no detailed description here. The 
one feature of the work which, from our point of view, is 
the most important, is that in all of this reading and reci- 
tation the logical analysis must ever be present in mind ; 
for without this the help to be gained by rational associa- 
tion is lost. Whenever a section is read or recited, the 
topical heading should be given every time, — whether by 
the teacher, or by the pupil reciting, or by one of the other 
pupils, depends upon circumstances. The same, of course, 
is to be observed when several sections or the entire piece 
are read or recited. In a word, reading and recitation 
should come constantly in answer to questions, — which 
implies that in the case of longer sections sub-topics should 
be inserted also. In this way the association in thought 
keeps pace, hand in hand, with the mechanical process. 

The advantages of this manner of treatment have already 
been spoken of. But since the help of rational association 
is doubly necessary in such cases as that just mentioned, 



148 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

whereas in practice it is but seldom employed here, it may 
be well to recount at least some of those advantages. In 
the first place, the mechanical repetition in this way gains 
in vivacity and interest, and so becomes less tedious. 
Secondly, it becomes easier, and the retention is likewise 
strengthened, since two bands hold stronger than one alone. 
In the third place, the ideas are made more capable of 
reproduction for a further elaboration in thought at some 
future time ; which fact is here all the more important, 
because the continued drill of mechanical repetition con- 
fines them so firmly in its one-sided association that they 
are on this account all the stiffer and less fruitful for other 
combinations of thought. Fourthly, the pupils are neces- 
sitated to. keep their thoughts constantly on the subject, 
both as to meaning and form of expression. 



Fourth Example — taken from arithmetic. 

This study is fortunate in allowing of diligent memoriz- 
ing without the need of mechanical repetition. But there 
used to be one place in arithmetic that was heartily de- 
tested by the pupils on account of its tiresome mechanical 
memorizing ; and there are probably many schools still 
where, in this matter, the acquisition is more irksome than 
is necessary. This part of arithmetic to which I have ref- 
erence is the multiplication table. We will conclude by a 
consideration of this subject, in order to call to mind how 
these two antipodean methods of memorizing appear in 
the field of number. 

1. What is the mechanical mode of drill, for example, 
on the number 2 in the multiplication table ? 

As a sensible person, the teacher of course would not let 



ARITHMETIC. 149 

anything be committed to memory that was not under- 
stood. Accordingly, the numbers from 1 to 20 have been 
learned previously, we will suppose, on a basis of concrete 
observation. Besides this, exercises in addition and sub- 
traction have already been practised within this range. 
Now, a new chapter in the difficult science of number is to 
be learned, namely, multiplication. Therefore the teacher 
will, of course, provide for the necessary concrete under- 
standing of the process. For this purpose he draws two 
chalk marks on the board, and then again two more, thus 
II + II; the pupils count them up correctly, = 4 marks ; 
then he draws three times 2, then four times 2 marks; 
the pupils add again of themselves, = 6, = 8 marks. When 
this has been continued to ten times 2, and this addition 
has been repeated several times, it might be supposed that 
the subject was clear to the pupils. The next step is to 
introduce the new expression "times," and so translate 
the exercises in addition into multiplication. Thus much 
being accomplished, and therefore all the requirements of 
concrete instruction having been fulfilled, the work of com- 
mitting the columns of the multiplication table could now 
begin. The mechanical way in which the children perform 
this part of the work is only too well known. 

2. Now contrast with this the mode of procedure that 
makes use of the rational memory. 

The purpose of what follows is not so much to show how 
to teach the multiplication table, for most teachers think 
they know that already, but rather to call attention to a 
certain peculiarity in the rational association of numbers, 
and to the pedagogical results of this in practice. The 
purpose is, therefore, more psychological than pedagogical. 
That which everyone thinks he knows is not usually 



150 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

taught, and even the text-books on psychology are wont 
to pass over the subject in silence. 

The concept of number is. as was incidently remarked 
before, a concept of relation. That is to say, in the case 
of a number we are concerned with a characteristic of rela- 
tion, and that not only in its concept Ion but also in its 
perception^ viz., with the relation between unity and plural- 
ity ; for example, the perception that the number 5 is five 
times as great as 1. Now, since the characteristic denoted 
by the name of the number is one of relation, its concrete 
apprehension presupposes always a previous comparison — 
just as the pitch cannot be distinguished in a single sound 
by itself, but only when two sounds of different pitch are 
compared together. This presupposed comparison is one 
reason why the concrete apprehension of a number is not 
so easy as is generally thought. But there is a second diffi- 
culty. As a characteristic of relation, enumeration is not 
a material quality of a number, but something entirely for- 
mal ; in order to grasp this formal characteristic there must 
be, therefore, first an abstraction of the material character- 
istics. Thus the concrete apprehension contains impliedly 
both the mental processes of comparison and abstraction, 
which otherwise only occur in conception. As a matter of 
fact, in arithmetic the formation of the concept, i.e., the 
transition from denominate to indenominate numbers does 
not give children the most trouble, but just this process of 
perception. 

This explains why it is that, among savages, adults fre- 
quently cannot count beyond ten, sometimes not beyond 
five. The concept of pure number is, however, always 
present even with these people, at least in its spontan- 
eous form, as soon as they can count to two ; that is, as 



HOW CHIILDREN COUNT. 151 

soon as they are in possession of two perceptions of number. 
So, too, with our own children ; nearly every parent is at 
first probably so astonished at the arithmetical stupidity 
of his first-born as to have serious doubts whether the child 
will ever grow up to count to a hundred. Preyer's child at 
twenty-nine months, although he could talk well enough, 
and say over the numbers up to ten, could not apply even 
" two " and " three " correctly. At this period, however, 
he was taking his own method of learning, — a very sug- 
gestive method, by the way, — and was counting every- 
thing by ones. He would put up a ninepin, and say 
"one," then another, and say "one more," then a third, 
"one more," and a fourth, and so on, each time counting 
" one more," although not naming the sums. A little girl 
of two and one-half years that I know uses similarly the 
expression " more ball " for each additional ball in counting 
by ones. I tried in vain, by the use of objects, to teach a 
little niece of mine, when she was two and one-fourth years 
old, to distinguish "one" and "two." She was bright 
and eager enough, but she could not get it right half the 
time. Another little girl of three and one-fourth years, 
who can entertain you with stories and talk by the hour, 
can say the numbers up to twelve in order without trouble, 
but cannot yet discriminate in the use of " three " and 
"four." In the case of weak-minded children this is more 
apparent still. Ireland reports a boy ten years old, at 
the Larbert Institution, who knew all the colors, and 
was learning the alphabet. He formed an estimate of 
the character of those around him, and had some notion 
of moral relations. He talked volubly on childish sub- 
jects, but was so deficient in arithmetical power that 
he seemed "at nine years of age to have no conception 



152 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

even of a unit. He would say that he had three heads, 
touching his head several times with his fingers." The 
following year he mastered the idea of two, and could 
count cautiously up to three. Verily, there is a great deal 
more than mere memory involved in learning the multipli- 
cation table. 

The perception of a plurality, for example, of the num- 
ber 6, is not completed by a comparison with unity alone ; 
in order to be entirely clear and perspicuous, the comparison 
must be made with all the intervening numbers also. Full 
perspicuity is, however, not secured even by this. Side by 
side with the building up or synthesis of a number, its 
analysis must likewise be perceived; and, in the former 
case, its composition by multiplication as well as by addi- 
tion, in the latter case its decomposition by division as well 
as by subtraction. The division must appear likewise in 
both the form of finding the number of equal parts, and 
that of finding the size of the equal parts into which a 
quantity may be divided. Now, to be sure, what the pupil 
actually perceives in the synthesis, of a number by addition, 
and in the analysis into the same parts of the same number 
by subtraction, is exactly the same in the two cases ; but 
each operation has a different result and, moreover, a dif- 
ferent way of expression in language. It is, however, just 
this difference in the way of expressing the process that 
makes the second operation seem like a new one to the 
pupils, and hence causes the difficulty in understanding. 
The same is true of the other corresponding operations. 

Now what conclusions can we draw from all this regard- 
ing the proper method in arithmetic, so far as concerns 
numerical relations only ? 

First, of course, this, that every number must be com- 



CONCLUSIONS AS TO PEOPER METHOD. 153 

pared not only with unity, but with all preceding numbers, 
and that this comparison must be by all four resp. five 
fundamental operations. 

Secondly, this, — and here we return to the question of 
the right mode of memorizing, — that if the pupils are to 
learn arithmetic in the easiest, quickest, and most fruitful 
way, then they must everywhere memorize by thought, and 
never mechanically. This, of course, is just as true of 
addition and subtraction as it is of multiplication. That is 
to say: we should never attempt, by means of mechanical 
association, to have the pupils impress on their minds the 
result of a problem; for the full value of arithmetical exer- 
cises does not lie in the quick retention of their answers, 
but in always solving the problems by thinking, i.e., by 
clear, self-confident perception. For the perspicuity thus 
gained in the perception of numbers involves everything 
else, knowledge of them as well as skill and facility in their 
use. The retention of results in any other way than by 
thought is force- work, resulting in precocity of facility at 
the cost of genuine knowledge, and in the end the learning 
of arithmetic will be made difficult and slow. 

Still a third monition follows from the discussion above. 
If the pupil has perceived the synthesis of a number by 
the addition of all the various combinations of its constitu- 
ent numbers, there is properly nothing more left for him 
to understand about this number. For he will be able at 
once to solve all problems in the other fundamental opera- 
tions with this number, provided they are presented to him 
in known terms, that is, objectively. What he has to learn 
new is, in reality, only the new expressions for these dif- 
ferent operations. Of course this includes the practice 
also which is necessary for facility in operating with these 



154 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

expressions. This being so, it follows in teaching that 
every succeeding comparison of this number with its com- 
ponent numbers in subtraction, multiplication, etc., at first 
must be expressed in terms already familiar to the pupils, 
to insure facility of perception when the new expression 
shall be given. They should not be allowed to get the 
idea that decomposition of a number by subtraction, etc., 
is anything new to be learned. If this mistaken idea is 
once allowed to form, they become confused by the new 
expressions, and in this way the subject is unnecessarily 
made twofold more difficult. 

As a fourth inference, this is to be mentioned. The ap- 
prehension of numbers by perception is so important and 
critical alike for their understanding and for facility in 
their use, that so soon as the numbers in the short range 
-from 1 to 20 are altogether really clear through and 
through in all their relations, the chief work for the entire 
range of numbers is already accomplished, both as to abil- 
ity to understand as well as for facility in their use. Let 
the teacher stop and just think for a moment what that 
implies. 

We proceed now to describe the method of teaching the 
multiplication table by the use of the rational memory. 
For the sake of comparison with the mechanical method 
we will suppose that, as before, addition and subtraction 
have been carried through the whole range of numbers to 
twenty before multiplication and division are taken up. 
By rights, of course, as before remarked, each number 
should be carried through all four operations from the 
beginning. 

The difference between the two methods shows itself at 
the first step, in the objectivation of multiplication by the 



COMPARISON OF THE TWO WAYS. 155 

addition of like quantities. This difference appears in two 
ways. The objectivation occurs, of course, in both cases; 
but, whereas the mechanical teacher goes over at once to 
new expressions for multiplication, and leaves the drill of 
repetition till later to be carried out in this new form, the 
more thoughtful teacher would begin this drill immediately 
in the form of addition. And also, whereas the former 
in his succeeding exercises aims at impressing on the 
mind only the answers (products), the latter gives his at- 
tention constantly to the repetition of the act of thought 
(perception), knowing as he does that the results will come 
of themselves. Accordingly he asks, always in the forms 
of addition, how much is 2 + 2 + 2+2 + 2? 2+2 + 2? 
etc., at random, and not in the order of the table. He is 
not so much concerned to have the pupils answer as quickly 
as possible, as he is to have them keep pace with him and 
give the sum correctly, while he slowly gives out the quan- 
tities to be added. For the activity on the part of the 
pupil should be nothing but a repeated act of thought ; and 
in order to secure this, and prevent the so-called " learning 
by heart," the teacher departs from the regular order in 
his questions, and by speaking slowly allows the pupils 
time for deliberation. This thoughtful repetition is con- 
tinued, orally and in writing, until a certain amount of fa- 
cility is acquired. It is not necessary to increase this 
facility to dexterity, because these exercises will occur 
again in many different forms ; besides, to continue too 
long in one and the same form would also become tedious. 
The next modification is with the use of expressions for 
subtraction. The teacher asks, How many are left, if one 
takes away 2 marks from 4 marks ? if one takes away from 
6 marks 2 marks, and then 2 marks more ? etc. After 



156 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

this subtraction has been continued in the sequence indi- 
cated as well as at random for awhile, the third form is 
introduced with expressions indicating multiplication. I 
say "indicating multiplication" because the children ought 
not to regard multiplication as a new mode of reckoning, 
but only as another form of expression for an already 
known thing, viz., the addition of equal quantities. Much 
depends on this, because one should seek to make a new 
work easier for them, rather than more difficult. The 
only thing new at present is the expression " times," and 
this gives no trouble. The teacher asks: II -f- II + II are 
how many times 2 marks ? and so on with other similar 
examples. Thereupon, the already familiar exercise may 
be taken up, using the new expression : How much is 3 
times 2 ? 4 times 2 ? etc. 

After this form also has been practised awhile in ascend- 
ing and descending order, and at random, always being 
careful to give time for thought, the transition to division 
may be made by using the expression " times " first for 
the already familiar decomposition by subtraction ; for ex- 
ample, how much is left if you take away from 8 once 2, 
two times 2, three times 2 ? etc. 

Finally, the same exercise appears in the fourth form, 
with expressions for division (but only in the sense of be- 
ing contained, not in the sense of dividing into parts). 
Ask : 6 is how many times 2 ? 8 is how many times 2 ? 
etc. Further, in order to introduce the new expression 
"is contained/' use this form of question: If you have 6 
apples in your pocket, how many times are 2 apples con- 
tained therein (i.e.. in your pocket)? Again: how many 
two-cent pieces must one take in order to have ten cents ? 
etc. This should be carried out with still other forms of 
expression. 



ALL FOUR OPERATIONS. 157 

Now, if the processes of arithmetic, involved in learning 
the multiplication table have been repeated thoughtfully in 

this fourfold form, there can be no doubt at all that the 
products will be better committed to memory than would 
be possible through learning them by heart mechanically. 

And not only is this purpose fulfilled, but all tediousness 
is avoided, since the pupils are constantly kept thinking 
and therefore interested. Besides, this work Las given 
the pupils but little trouble; and finally, what is more im- 
portant than all the rest, the numbers from 1 to 1'0 — so 
far as concerns their composition and decomposition by 
the number 2 — have become thoroughly clear to them 
in thought, including therefore facility in practice. 

One more point requires attention. For the sake of com- 
parison we have presupposed that addition and subtraction 
were learned throughout the whole range of numbers be- 
fore multiplication and division began. This, however, 
brought us to the difficulty of not being able to complete 
the subject fully. For while Ave could take up the case of 
one number containing another, the division of a quantity 
into equal parts could not be treated until the pupils could 
use "times" 3, 4, etc., up to 10. This difficulty, therefore, 
shows us that this presupposed restriction to addition and 
subtraction would be a mistake. A second mistake is also 
shown in the fact that multiplication and division were 
treated of even numbers only, which restriction, however, 
was not at all necessary. As already indicated, the theo- 
retically right way would be to treat all four fundamental 
operations at every step ; or, more exactly expressed, to 
compare every number with the lower numbers in all lour 
resp. five fundamental ways. By leaving multiplication 
and division until addition and subtraction have been 



158 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

finished throughout the table, the difficulty of thought is 
increased both in understanding and in memorizing the 
new processes. The restriction to addition and subtraction 
may, nevertheless, have a certain amount, of justification 
in so far as it is made to apply to the very first numbers 
— say from 1 to 6. But in the case of 6 or 8 the two neg- 
lected operations must certainly be made up immediately, 
and with every succeeding number all four operations 
should be treated together. 



CHAPTER VI. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION". 

After the foregoing psychological and pedagogical in- 
vestigations, we may now stop and look back over the field 
and see clearly how thought and memory are related to 
each other in the work of instruction — as well in regard 
to the peculiar significance of each for the development of 
the mind, as in regard to their interrelation and mutual 
re-enforcement. 

Thought is necessary, along with observation and imagi- 
nation, in the acquisition of knowledge ; and its particu- 
lar office here, in distinction from that of observation and 
imagination, is the production of higher forms of knowl- 
edge. 

The office of memory is to retain the ideas thus acquired, 
or, more exactly, to make them easj 7- of reproduction, i.e., 
to furnish thought the material from which, along with 
new perceptions, it can create new and higher products of 
knowledge — including the carrying out of these ideas in 
practice. 

The two activities, accordingly, bear the same relation 
to each other in their importance as do earning and saving, 
or gaining and preserving. But since this preservation is 
not a purpose in itself, but is only for the sake of mak- 
ing possible the enrichment and practical utilization of 
one's possessions, we may also say : thought and memory 
bear the same relation to each other as do end and means, 

159 



160 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

or as do master and servant. This comparison will also 
define their relative rank in the work of culture and 
education. 

The same consideration will likewise serve to determine, 
as regards their mutual service one to the other, what 
assistance the memory should render to thought. The 
memory has, indeed, nothing else at all in the ivide world to 
do but to be of service to thought. But, on the other hand, 
thought cannot make any progress unless the servant mem- 
ory is continually at hand. Memory must, therefore, follow 
constantly at the heels of the master, and not lag behind, 
leaving the master to proceed alone. 

It has frequently happened, in the history of education, 
that this relative rank of thought over memory has misled 
into a serious error with regard to their relation in service 
to each other. Thus, when many teachers esteem thought 
higher than memory, they are, of course, entirely right, in 
case this is meant merely as the relative rank of the two 
processes ; but if in practice they neglect the memory, they 
are terribly foolish, — just as foolish as one who thinks he 
will gain his purpose without attending to the means of 
accomplishing it, or as a master who lets his servant starve, 
and still believes he will, nevertheless, receive good ser- 
vice. This error was long ago recognized, as indicated in 
the Jesuit maxim, " repetitio mater studiorum est." This 
statement expresses a truth, but is very far from express- 
ing the whole truth. Hence it does not seldom happen 
that those who like so much to quote this maxim fall into 
more numerous and worse errors in regard to thought and 
memory than the others do to whom these are so willing 
to give advice. These mistakes made by the partisans of 
memory will be plainly recognized if we now reverse the 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 161 

relation, and consider the help afforded to memory by 
thought. 

First in importance comes immanent memorizing (p. 106) 
— as distinguished from the intentional. Its superiority 
is owing on the one hand to the fact that this form makes 
use almost entirely of rational association, and on the other 
hand that it costs no time. The work of immanent memo- 
rizing is, indeed, accomplished by the industrious master 
" thought " — even in those cases in which it depends on 
an appropriate arrangement of the course of study. Tlie 
servant, memory, does not need to move a linger, and yet 
afterward enjoys the fame with ignorant people of having 
done this fine piece of work itself. 

Intentional memorizing is accomplished by repetition. 
Thought may here also, in case it is called upon, render 
important assistance by bringing under one conceptional 
view the ideas which otherwise would be associated only 
mechanically by repetition. This breathes into repetition 
the breath of life in the form of rational association. In 
what measure this is possible depends, of course, on the 
nature of the subject. Wherever the subject does not ne- 
cessarily require a mechanical association, as for example 
in lessons for thought getting as opposed to lessons for 
thought expression, repetition may be made entirely ra- 
tional. But even in the many instances where verbal com- 
mitment to memory is necessary, and where, therefore, 
mechanical association is unavoidable, the rational means 
of memorizing through logical disposition and questions 
may afford very desirable assistance. Nothing much re- 
mains, therefore, exclusively for the mechanical memory 
but the instruction in singing, if we except the occasional 
learning of names and numbers in the other subjects. 



162 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

If we reckon together all the assistance rendered to 
memory by thought : — 

1. the immanent memorizing — in the operations of 

thinking, 

2. the exclusively rational repetition — in the study of 

facts, in arithmetic, etc., 

3. the assistance of rational association — in the case of 

verbal commitment to memory, 
we find the surprising result that by far the greatest part 
of the work of memorizing is accomplished by thought, 
when the right method of instruction is followed. That 
implies, therefore, that memorizing, which in the mechani- 
cal form would be a subordinate piece of service, is thus 
changed into a noble and inspiring work, and thus brings 
with it all the other advantages before mentioned. 

The mistakes in method, resulting from a perverted con- 
ception of memory and of its relation to thought, may be 
now clearly summarized. 

1. The first mistake is in not being acquainted with im- 
manent memorizing, or in not making sufficient use of it. 
This mistake occurs wherever the three res]), five formal 
steps in the acquisition of knowledge are not consciously 
or unconsciously followed, and wherever the principle of 
the correlation of studies is not recognized. 

2. The second error, generally associated with the first, 
consists in ignoring the help afforded by thought in the 
case of intentional memorizing, or in not sufficiently making 
use of the former, — whether by neglecting the logical dis- 
position, or the secondary questions, or the appropriate use 
of reading, or finally by committing all three mistakes at 
once, — in a word, by restricting one's self more or less to 
mechanical repetition. 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 163 

3. A third mistake is one that those in authority have 
contributed to spread. It is the view that restricts the 
idea of memorizing to mean the commitment to memory 
of words only. In such case it seems not to be known, or 
else to be totally ignored, that first and foremost the ideas 
themselves, concrete and abstract, for which the words 
stand, must be memorized. It is furthermore not known, 
or else ignored, that not only ideas, but also feelings and 
acts of the will, yes, even actions, must be memorized 
chiefly through repetition. In the case of actions this 
memorizing is generally called habit. Neglect in this mat- 
ter has especially serious consequences for the formation 
of character, but for the present we will restrict ourselves 
to the intellect only. The falsity of the view referred to 
appears not only in the material memorized, but as well 
in regard to the method of memorizing. For the confine- 
ment of the attention to the form of expression, to the ex- 
clusion of the material ideas, prevents of itself the ]ftoper 
appreciation of immanent memorizing. Nor is there much 
likelihood that such a one-sided view will make appropriate 
use of the means for rational association in repetition, but 
it will rather, on the contrary, prefer the mechanical way. 

Both the first-named errors above alluded to characterize 
the work of memory-cram, wherever found. It neglects 
the use of immanent repetition, and ignores the means of 
rational association; or, in one word, it makes exclusive 
use of the mechanical memory. The third and last-named 
error, of restricting the idea of memorizing to mean the 
commitment to memory of a particular form of language, 
is not necessarily involved in cramming; but when the two 
are associated together, the resulting method is doubly 
bad. 



164 THOUGHT AND MEMORY. 

A mistake of another kind is still to be mentioned here, 
which, however, is fortunately fast dying out. May we 
hasten the day of its burial ! Wherever it is still alive it 
makes its presence known by special " exercises for mem- 
ory," separate " memory lessons," and similarly separate 
"thought exercises," and thirdly, what is still very com- 
mon, separate " object lessons." Indeed, all of these exer- 
cises, in many instances, have been incorporated into the 
course of study as if they were so many separate subjects 
of study. The origin of this mistaken notion is undoubt- 
edly the false idea taught so industriously by the old 
psychology, according to which each class of mental phe- 
nomena or activities was ascribed to a separate faculty or 
power of the mind. Of course this is as smart as it would 
be in botany, for instance, to talk about a root-force, a tuber- 
forming force, a branching force, a tendril-forming force, a 
thorn-forming force, a leaf -forming force, a flower-forming 
force, etc., etc. It is, in fact, just what the old heathen 
mythology did, when it ascribed every different kind of 
phenomena in nature to a special and independent divinity. 
The psychological mistake of supposing there were inde- 
pendent mental faculties led naturally to the pedagogical 
one of supposing that, by exercising any of these faculties 
on one particular subject matter, they would be trained 
for use on every occasion, just as a knife may be sharpened 
by rubbing on one particular body, and yet may be used to 
cut any other substance as well. That this theory is a 
pure superstition might be seen without help of the new 
psychology, because it was well known and could not be 
doubted that an understanding of mineralogy did not pro- 
duce an understanding of botany nor an understanding of 
zoology ; that a mathematical understanding was far from 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 165 

being a musical understanding as well ; that the understand- 
ing of theology did not bring with it an understanding of 
pedagogy, etc. But false opinions grown old are difficult 
to eradicate, and the presence of the " object lesson " in 
many courses of study and works on pedagogy is a speak- 
ing proof of this fact. 



In conclusion, the doctrine of this book may be thus 
summarized : — 

I. In school instruction the memory is fundamental in 
its importance ; but, 

II. Thought is the sole purpose, and at the same time 
the very best means, of doing the tvork of memory. 



REFERENCE LIST 

Giving full titles, publishers, and dates of all books referred to in the 
foregoing pages. 

Bain, Alexander: Mental and Moral Science. Part First: Psychology 
and History of Philosophy, pp. 428 + Appendix pp. 101. London: 
Longmans, Green, & Co., 1884. 

The Senses and the Intellect. 3d edition. London: Longmans, 

Green, & Co. 

Baldwin, James Mark: Handbook of Psychology. Senses and Intel- 
lect. 2d edition, revised, pp. 343. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 
1890. 

Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and 

Processes, pp. 496. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. 

Brown, H. W. : Some Records of the Thoughts and Reasonings of Chil- 
dren. From the Collection of Observations at the State Normal 
School at Worcester, Mass. In Pedagogical Seminary, Vol. II., 
pp. 358-396. 

Burnham, William H. : Memory, Historically and Experimentally Con- 
sidered. In American Journal of Psychology, Vol. II. The follow- 
ing are the topics : 
I. Historical Sketch of the Old Conceptions of Memory, pp. 
39-90. 
II. Modern Conceptions of Memory, pp. 225-270. 

III. Paramnesia, pp. 431-464. 

IV. Recent Theories and Experimental Studies, pp. 568-622. 
Appendix and Bibliography. 

De Garmo, Charles: Herbart and the Herbartians. pp. 268. In the 

Great Educators Series. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895. 
The Essentials of Method. A Discussion of the Essential Form of 

Bight Methods in Teaching. Revised Edition, pp. 133. Boston : 

D. C. Heath & Co., 1893. 
Dewey, John: Psychology, pp.427. New York: Harper & Bros., 1890. 
Downs, James P. : The Memory. A series of six Manuals, containing 

about 100 pages each. (1) The Mastery of Memorizing ; (2) Quick- 
166 



REFERENCE LIST. 167 

ness of Perception; (3) Eye and Ear Memory; (4) The Study of 
Languages ; (5) Memory and Thought ; (G) The Memory Training 
of the Young. New York: James P. Downs, 1891. 

Fellows, G. S.: " Loisette" Exposed, together with Loisette's com- 
plete system of Physiological Memory. Bibliography of Memonics, 
1325-1888. pp.224. New York: G. S. Fellows & Co., 1888. 

Fiske, John: A History of the United States for Schools, pp. 474. 
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, & Co., 1894. 

Fitch, J. G. : Art of Questioning. In Vol. 9, " The Teacher's Mentor," 
of The Standard Teachers' Library. Syracuse, N. Y.: C. W. Bar- 
deen, 1894. Also, as separate pamphet (15c.) by E. L. Kellogg & Co., 
New York City. 

Lectures on Teaching, delivered in the University of Cambridge, 

1880. pp. 393. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1889. 

Fullerton, George S. : On Sameness and Identity. In Publications 
of the University of Pennsylvania. Philosophical Series, No. 1, 
April, 1890. Philadelphia : University Press, 1890. 

Galton, Francis: Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development. 
pp. 387. London: Macmillan & Co., 1883. 

Harris, Wm. T. : Introduction to the Study of Philosophy. Selected 
and arranged by Marietta Kies. pp. 287. New York: D. Appleton 
& Co., 1889. 

Herbart, Johann Friedrich: A Text-Book in Psychology. An at- 
tempt to found the Science of Ps3 r chology on Experience, Meta- 
physics, and Mathematics. Translated by M. K. Smith, pp. 200. 
Vol. 18 of International Education Series. New York: D. Appleton 
& Co., 1891. 

The Science of Education; its general principles deduced from 

its aim, and The ^Esthetic Revelation of the World. Translated by 
Henry M. and Emmie Felkin. pp. 268. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co. , 
1893. 

Hering, Ewald : On Memory as a General Function of Organized Mat- 
ter. Nos. 6 and 7 of The Open Court, Chicago, and in Butler's 
Unconscious Memory, chapter vi. Also separately in Religion of 
Science Library, published by The Open Court, Chicago, 1895. 

Hoffding, Harold : Outlines of Psychology. Translated by Mary E. 
Lowndes, pp. 365. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1891. 

Jackman, Wilbur S. : Number Work in Nature Study. Part I. pp. 
198. Published by the Author, Cook Co. Normal School, Chicago, 
1893. 






168 REFERENCE LIST. 

James, William: The Principles of Psychology. Vol. I., pp. 689. 
Vol. II., pp. 704. American Science Series. New York: Henry- 
Holt & Co., 1890. 

Kay, David: Memory, what it is and how to improve it. Vol. 8 of In- 
ternational Education Series, pp.334. New York: D. Appleton & 
Co., 1888. 

Ladd, George T. : Elements of Physiological Psychology. A Treatise 
of the Activities and Nature of the Mind from the physical and 
experimental point of view. pp. G96. New York: Charles Scrib- 
ner's Sons, 1892. 

Psychology, descriptive and explanatory. A Treatise of the 

Phenomena, Laws, and Development of Human Mental Life. pp. 
676. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1894. 

Lange, Karl: Apperception. A Monograph on Psychology and Peda- 
gogy. Translated by the Herbart Club and edited by Charles 
DeGarmo. pp.279. Boston : D. C. Heath & Co., 1894. 

Lindner, Gustav Adolf: Manual of Empirical Psychology. Trans, 
by Charles De Garmo. pp. 274. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1890. 

McMurry, Charles A. : The Elements of General Method. Based on the 
principles of Herbart. 2d edition, pp. 201. Bloomington, 111. : Pub- 
lic-School Publishing Co., 1893. 

The First Year-Book of the Herbart Society for Scientific Study of 

Teaching. Prepared for discussion at the Denver Meeting (1895) of 
the National Educational Association. Edited by Charles A. Mc- 
Murry, Secretary of the Society, pp. 139. Bloomington, 111. : Public- 
School Publishing Co., 1895. [It contains four papers: (1) Most 
Pressing Problems concerning the Elementary Course of Study, by 
President Charles De Garmo; (2) Concentration, by Dr. Frank M. 
McMurry; (3) The Educational Theory of the Culture Epochs, 
viewed historically and critically, by Dr. C. C. Van Liew; (4) Plan 
of Concentration for the first four years, by Mrs. Lida B. McMurry.] 

Mill, James : Analysis of the Phenomena of the Hitman Mind. Edition 
by John Stuart Mill. Vol. I., pp. 453. Vol. II., pp. 403. 2d edition. 
London : Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1878. 

Mnemonics: in Encyclopaedia Britannica, and Memory in Chambers's 
Encyclopaedia. 

Muller, Max: Lectures on the Science of Language delivered at the 
Royal Institution of Great Britain in 1861-3. Fifth edition. Vol. I., 
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Pick, Edward : On Memory and the Rational Means of Improving it. 
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BEFEBENCE LIST. 169 

Preyer, W. : Mental Development in the Child. Trans, by H. W. 
Brown, pp. 170. Vol. 24 of International Education Series. New- 
York: D. Appleton & Co., 1894. 

The Mind of the Child. Part II. The Development of the Intel- 
lect. Observations concerning the mental development of the human 
being in the first years of life. Trans, by H. W. Brown. Vol. 9 of 
International Education Series, pp.317. New York: D. Appleton 
& Co., 1893. 

Radestock, Paul : Habit and Its Importance in Education. An Essay 
in Pedagogical Psychology. Translated from the German of Dr. 
Paul Badestock by F. A. Caspari ; with an Introduction by G. Stanley 
Hall. pp. 117. Boston; D. C. Heath & Co., 1889. 

Bein, W. : Outlines of Pedagogics. Trans, with additional notes by 
C. C. and Ida J. Van Liew. pp. 199. London: Swan Sonnenschein 
& Co. ; Syracuse, N. Y. : C. W. Bardeen, 1893. 

Bibot, Th. : German Psychology of To-day. Trans, by James Mark 
Baldwin, with a preface by James McCosh. pp. 307. New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886. 

Diseases of Memory : an essay in the positive psychology. Trans. 

by W. H. Smith, pp. 209. Vol. 41 of International Scientific Series. 
New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1893. 

The Diseases of the Will. Trans, by M. M. Snell. pp. 134. 

Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1894. 

The Psychology of Attention, pp. 121. Chicago: The Open 



Court Publishing Co., 1890. 
Spencer, Herbert: The Principles of Psychology. Vol. I., pp. G40. 

Vol. II., pp. 648. London: Williams and Norgate, 1881. 
Stout, G. F. : The Herbartian Psychology. In " Mind," Nos. 51 and 52, 

Vol. XIII. London: Williams and Norgate, 1888. 
Sully, James: Outlines of Psychology, with special reference to the 

Theory of Education, pp. 711. New York : D. Appleton & Co., 1892. 
The Human Mind. A Text-book of Psychology. 2 vols., pp. 501 

and 393. New York : D. Appleton & Co., 1892. 
Ufer, Chr. : Introduction to the Pedagogy of Herb art. Authorized 

translation from the fifth German Edition, under the auspices of the 

Herbart Club, by J. C. Zinser. Edited by Charles De Garmo. pp. 

123. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1894. 
Ziehen, Theodor: Introduction to Physiological Psychology. Trans. 

by C. C. Van Liew and Otto Beyer, pp. 284. London: Swan 

Sonnenschein & Co., 1892. 



Education. 



For descriptions of forthcoming books on Education, see announcements at end of 
this catalogue. 



pOR American Schools and American Scholarship there is no 
more healthful sign than the newly-awakened interest of teach- 
ers in all that pertains to successful work and personal culture. At 
the outset of this great and wide-spread movement in favor of better 
methods and worthier results, it was but natural that the practical side 
of education should be treated out of all proportion, while its theoreti- 
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education is to become a science and teaching to be practised as an 
art, one means to this end is to gather and examine what has been 
done by those who have been engaged therein, and whose position and 
success have given them a right to be heard. Another and not less 
potent means is, to gain a clear comprehension of the psychological 
basis of the teacher's work, and a familiar acquaintance with the 
methods which rest upon correct psychological principles. As con- 
tributions of inestimable value to the history, the philosophy, and the 
practice of education, we take pleasure in calling the attention of 
teachers to our books on Education, mentioned in the following pages. 
It is our purpose to add from time to time such books as have con- 
tributed or may contribute so much toward the solution of educational 
problems as to make them indispensable to every true teacher's library. 

The following good words, and also the opinions quoted 
under the several volumes, are an earnest of the appre- 
ciation in which the enterprise is held : — 



Dr. "Wm. T. Harris, Concord, Mass. : 
I do not think that you have ever printed 
a book on education that is not worthy 
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J. W. Stearns, Prof, of the Science 
and Art of Teaching, Univ. of Wis.: 
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"3 



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City Coll. for Training of Teachers : I 
am greatly interested in your series of 
pedagogical publications. 



EDUCATION. 117 



Apperception. 



A Monograph on Psychology and Pedagogy. By Dr. Karl Lange. Trans. 
lated by the following named members of the Herbart Club: Elmer E. Brown, 
Charles De Garmo, Mrs. Eudora Hailmann, Florence Hall, George F. James, 
L. R. Klemm, Ossian H. Lang, Herman T. Lukens, Charles A. McMurry, 
Frank McMurry, Theo. B. Noss, Levi L. Seeley, Margaret K. Smith, and edited 
by Charles De Garmo, President of Svvarthmore College. Cloth. 279 pages. 
Retail price, $1.00. 

THIS is perhaps the most popular scientific monograph on education 
that has appeared in Germany in recent times. It has the rare 
merit of being at once thoroughly scientific and intensely interesting 
and concrete. Not a little of its value arises from the fact that it 
approaches the problems of education along the highway that teachers 
must actually pass in order to solve them. Its standpoint is, in brief, 
the living, developing mind of the child itself. Apperception is a 
single word comprehending the whole complex of processes known as 
mental assimilation. It is here considered in its original nature, and 
in its application to instruction and moral training, both as regards the 
developing child, its interests, powers, and mental stores, on the one 
hand, and the selection, arrangement, and methodical treatment of 
the subject-matter of instruction, on the other. The scientific value 
of the volume is enhanced by a somewhat extended chapter on the 
history of the term Apperception, found at the close of the book. 
The prediction is not unwarranted that this unpretentious monograph 
will awaken more universal interest and stimulate more educational 
thoughts than any other single work that has been issued in the 
United States during the last quarter of a century, for it ushers in a 
new epoch in the popular study of education in this country, that of 
scientific treatment enriched by a vast wealth of concrete, interesting 
material. In it science has become popular treatment, and popular 
treatment scientific exposition. 



Edward T. Pierce- Prin. of Nor- 
mal School, Los Angeles, Cal.: I am 
more than pleased with the book. It is a 
fascinating book to a teacher who is 
searching after truth. I shall not only 
recommend it to teachers, but urge them 
to get the book. (Nov. 25, 1893.) 

Li. R. Klemm, of the Bureau of Edu- 



cation, Washington, D. C: There are few 
educational books on the American mar- 
ket that come up to this in usefulness. 
It has qualities which will make it a 
favorite text-book in Normal Schools and 
other pedagogical institutions. The little 
book will be hailed with delight, and justly 
so, by the great number of teachers. 

(Aug. 23, 1893.) 



u8 EDUCATION. 



Manual of Empirical Psychology. 

An authorized translation from the German of Dr. G. A. Lindner, by Charles 
De Garmo, Ph.D., Professor of Modern Languages in State Normal Univer- 
sity, 111. Cloth. 274 pages. Price by mail, $1. 10. Introduction price, £1.00. 

THIS is the best Manual of Psychology ever prepared from the 
Herbartian standpoint, which, briefly characterized, is the 
standpoint of pedagogics. No other school of psychologists has 
thrown so much light upon the solution of the problems arising in the 
instruction and training of youth ; and no other author of this school 
has been so successful as Lindner in compact yet comprehensive and 
intelligible statement of psychological facts and principles. The book 
is what its name indicates, a psychology arising from the given data 
of experience; yet there is no psychology in English which does so 
much toward arousing an intelligent interest in the advanced depart- 
ments of rational psychology and philosophy in general. 

That an effective educational psychology must be based upon a 
concrete experience, rather than upon the a priori forms of mind is 
reasonably evident, but Lindner is more than a mere recorder of ex 
perience. He unfolds his subject as a true inductive science, never 
losing sight of the organic development of mental life. This gives 
him a great pedagogical significance. Again, he is always interesting. 
His explanations are lucid, pointed, and self-consistent, while every 
department of science and of experience has yielded its choicest facts 
to enrich the contents of the book. 

The work is especially recommended for normal schools, reading 
circles, and higher institutions of learning. 



G, Stanley Hall, Pres. of Clark 
Univ., Worcester, Mass. : The practical 
applicability of this stand-point and book 
makes its merits. 

G. Williamson Smith, Pres. of 
Trinity Coll., Hartford, Conn. : It is an 
original work, on well conceived principles 
and carried on by methods of induction 
approved by all. 

F. Louis Soldan, Prin. St. Louis 
Normal and High School: Lindner's 
Psychology is one of the best works, if not 
the best, of the vigorous school to which 
he belongs. The translation is an im- 



provement on the original. can editor was a clear-minded psychologist 



W. H. Councill, Prin. State Nor- 
mal and Industrial School, Ala.: The 
work possesses every merit necessary to 
give it a permanent place among the high- 
est order of text books. 

G. S. Albee, Pres. State Normal 
School, Oshkosh, Wis. : Only the most 
original and realistic teachers have been 
able to obtain results in class work which 
lifted the study of psychology above con- 
tempt. This key-note of the best and 
most definitely true teaching appears upon 
nearly every page of Lindner. The author 
may congratulate himself that his Ameri- 



EDUCATION. 



19 



The Essentials of Method. 



Revised Edition. A discussion of the essential forms of right method in teach- 
ing by Charles De Garmo, Ph. D., President of Swarthmore College. Cloth. 
133 pages, Retail price, 65 cents. Special price for class use. 

THIS little volume is an initial work in the science of methods, no 
attempt of its kind having previously been made in English. It 
assumes, therefore, an importance and significance which are not 
measured by its size or price. 

It comprises three parts: 1. The psychological basis. This con- 
sists mostly of a discussion of the nature of the individual and the 
general notion, and of the true nature of mental assimilation, or ap- 
prehension ; 2. The necessary stages of rational methods as deter- 
mined by the psychological basis. We have here an exposition of the 
functions of observation, of generalization and of the application of 
generalizations in fixing and utilizing knowledge ; 3. Practical illustra- 
tions, showing how the teacher may consciously observe these stages in 
his daily work in the school-room. The Revised Edition gives both a pop- 
ular and a scientific explanation of the modern doctrine of Apperception. 

Experience shows that the book is admirably adapted to training- 
classes in normal schools, and to city or village reading circles, 
while no live teacher can afford to remain partially or wholly uncon- 
cious of what it reveals. 



J. W. Stearns, Ph.D., Prof, of Pe- 
dagogy, in Wisconsin State Univ. : It is 
the first real step toward the development 
of a science of methods in this country. 

B.A. Hinsdale, Prof, of Pedagogy, 
Univ. of Michigan, Attn Arbor : A very 
good book indeed for students of educa- 
tional science. I show my opinion of it 
by putting it on a short list of books that 
I recommend to teachers. 

T. H. Balliet, Supt. of Schools, 
Springfield, Mass.: I think it has as 
much sound thought to the square inch as 
anything I know of in pedagogics. 

Geo. Morris Philips, Ph.D., Prin. 
State Normal School, West Chester, Pa.: 
An unusually excellent little book ; there 
can be no question of its merit. 



J. C. Greenough, Prin. of West- 
field Normal School, Mass. : A small 
book but a great work. One of the best 
pedagogical books ever published in the 
English language. 

M. L. Seymour, Prof, in State Nor- 
mal School, Chico, Cal. : It is a book 
without a peer or rival in the discussion 
of the underlying principles of methods in 
teaching. // should be the daily compan~ 
ion of every teacher until fully assimi* 
lated. 

R. G. Boone, Prof, of Pedagogy^ 
Univ. of Ind.: It seems to me very sug« 
gestive and along right lines as counteract- 
ing the wide-spread tendency to adopt de- 
vice and formula. It promises teachers A 
rich return for the most careful perusal. 



EDUCATION. 



The Science of Education. 



Translated from the German of Herbart by Mr. and Mrs. Felkin. With an 
introduction by Oscar Browning. 26S pages. Cloth. Retail price, $1. 00. 

HERBART began the study of education and of the human mind as 
a private tutor of boys of gentle birth and nurture intended to 
receive the higher education. His experiences, therefore — and with 
him theory and practice always went hand in hand — are of especial 
value to teachers in public schools. 

" Mr. and Mrs. Felkin deserve the thanks of all who are interested 
in education by making these writings of Herbart accessible to English 
readers. They have accomplished their work with the greatest care 
and self-denying zeal. The translation is as readable as is consistent 
with an exact rendering of the original. If it is carefully studied, as it 
ought to be, there will be no difficulty in understanding it. Their in- 
troduction is probably the best account of Herbart which has appeared 
in our tongue.'" — From Mr. Browning 1 s Introduction. 



L. R. Klemm, of the Bureau of 
Education, Washington, D. C: It is with 
pardonable admiration for your " pluck " 
that I lay down Herbart's Science of edu- 
cation after a thorough examination. I 
say " pluck," because it certainly needs a 
good deal of aggressive courage to offer 
the teachers of America such a work for 
professional study. The book is happily 
introduced by the chapter on the life of 
Herbart, his philosophy and principles of 
education, and the two analyses by the 
translators. They offer a very convenient 
key to the treasures of Herbart's book. 
I like the translation ; have compared 
whole pages with the original, and am 
well pleased. It is a very creditable work. 
As a member of the profession of teachers, 
I offer you my gratitude for this publica- 
tion. {Sept. 25, 1S93.) 

S. G. Williams, Professor of Phi- 
losophy, Cornell University, Ithaca, 
N.Y.; I have read the book carefully and 
compared portions with the original, and 
I feel that you deserve the thanks of 
English speaking teachers for placing 



within their reach the work of this leader of 
modern German pedagogic thought. The 
translation is so neat and so true to the 
original that it not infrequently makes 
the concise and somewhat poetic diction 
of the author more readily comprehensible 
than the original. {Oct. 16, 1893.) 

Educational Courant, Louisville, 
Ky.: It is a work that no educator can 
afford not to read and study. The volume 
will influence our theory and practice for 
years to come, and he who remains ig- 
norant of its contents can justly be ac- 
cused of wilful ignorance of what most 
intimately concerns him. 

Science, New York: Following the 
entertaining sketch of Herbart's life the 
translators have given a review of Her- 
bart's philosophy, together with a synop- 
sis of the two works which follow and 
form the principal portion of the book. 
The review has evidently been written from 
a thorough acquaintance with Herbart's 
writings and is an additional aid to our un- 
derstanding of his principles. 



EDUCATION. 123 



The Educational Ideal ; 



An outline of its growth in modern times. By James P. Munroe. Cloth. 268 
pages. Retail price, #1 .00. 

THIS work is prepared to meet the demand for a book which shall, 
in brief compass, present a concise and well proportioned view of 
the historical development of the educational principles which underlie 
the aims and methods of modern teaching. 

The book deals with the successive leaders in thought, beginning 
with the Renaissance, who have most strongly directed the educational 
aim towards its highest modern development. The chapters are 
biographical only as far as is necessary to give to these leaders a 
human interest, the object being to deal with the broad principles 
upon which the development of the educational ideal has rested, rather 
than with specific pedagogic methods. By means of the material 
furnished in the book it will be easy for anyone interested in educa- 
tional questions to pursue an extended study of the whole or of a par- 
ticular part of the historical period which the volume covers. 

CONTENTS. Chap. I, Introduction; II, Rabelais. — The Revolt against Medie- 
valism; III, Francis Bacon. — The Revolt against Classicism ; IV, Comenius. — The 
Revolt against Feudalism; V, Montaigne and Locke. — The Child has Senses to be 
trained ; VI, The Jansenists and Fenelon. — The Child has a Heart to be developed ; 
VII, Rousseau. — The Child has a Soul to be kept pure; VIII, Pestalozzi and 
Froebel. -— Senses, Heart, and Soul must be educated together ; IX, Women in Educa- 
tion — Education leads to and from the Family; the Home is its Unit; X, Sum- 
mary. Bibliography. Index. 

Introduction to the Pedagogy of Herbart. 

By Charles Ufer, authorized translation, under the auspices of the Herbart 
Club, by J. C. Zinser ; edited by Charles DeGarmo, President of Swarthmore 
College. Cloth. 131 pages. Retail price 90 cts. 

THE Herbart Club heartily recommends this little volume as a clear 
and useful introduction to Herbart's system of pedagogy. It 
gives a bird's-eye view of the whole field of pedagogy as based upon 
psychology and ethics. It discusses with considerable fulness such 
topics as the following: The Development of Interest, the Choice of 
Studies, the Culture Epochs and Concentration, Methods of Teaching 
— The Formal Steps, and Moral Training. 

In part IV the author gives us some extended illustrations of the 
manner in which History, Language, Geography, Nature Study, Arith- 
metic, Geometry, and Drawing can be unified by concentration. 



[2 8 EDUCATION. 



The Student 1 s Froebel. 

By William H. Herford, late member of the Universities of Bonn, Berlin, 
and Zurich. Cloth. 128 pages. Retail price, 75 cents. 

THE purpose of this little book, as stated by the editor in his preface, 
is to give young people, who are seriously preparing themselves 
to become teachers, a brief yet full account of FroebePs Theory of 
Education ; his practice or plans of method is reserved for a second 
part. This book is adapted from FroebePs Education of Humanity 
{Die Erziehungder Menschheit), published in 1826. The editor has 
tried to give what is FroebePs own in English as close as possible to 
the very words of his author. The book, in addition to an Introduc- 
tion treating of the subject in general, has chapters on The Nursling, 
The Child, The Boy, and The School, and summaries of the teachings. 

The Psychology of Childhood, 

By Frederick Tracy, Fellow in Clark University, with Introduction by Presi- 
dent G. Stanley Hall. Cloth. 183 pages. Retail price, 90 cents. 

THE author has in this work undertaken to present as concisely, yet 
as completely, as possible, the results of the systematic study of 
children, and has included everything of importance that can be found. 
Some of its special features are thus summarized : — (1) It is the first 
general treatise, covering the whole field of child psychology. (2) It 
aims to contain a complete summary, up to date, of all work done in 
this field. (3) The work contains a large amount of material, the re- 
sults of the author's own observations on children as well as those of 
perhaps a score of very reliable observers. (4) The subject of child- 
language has been gone into with especial thoroughness, from an en- 
tirely new and original standpoint, and with very gratifying results. 
(5) A very exhaustive bibliography, containing, it is believed, every- 
thing of value that has ever been written on this subject, is appended. 

Earl Barnes, Department of Edu- 
cation, Leland Stanford fr. University, 
Cal. : No book has come from the press 



J. Clark Murray, Prof, of Philo- 
sophy, McGill University, Montreal, Ca- 
nada: In English we have certainly no 
original work on the psychology of child 
hood to compare with it, and even among 
translations from German and French there 
is none which shows such a mastery of the 
whole subject. {Nov. 14, 1893.) 



during the past year which I have been 
so glad to see as this one. For all of us 
who are carrying on courses in the psychol- 
ogy of children it will prove an invaluable 
aid. {Nov. 23, 1893.) 



3° 



EDUCATION. 



A Laboratory Course in Physiological Psy- 

chology. By Edmund C. Sanford, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Clark 
University, Worcester, Mass. Part I. 187 pages. Cloth. Introduction price, 
90 cents. By mail, #1.00. 

THE use of the laboratory in teaching psychology is indorsed by 
the experience of the other sciences, by the approval of the best 
teachers, and by the psychological laboratories recently opened in 
leading colleges and universities in this country and in Europe. The 
need of some definite schedule of experiments for such work in the 
practice course in the laboratory of Clark University gave occasion for 
the first collection of the experiments here published in a form which 
it is hoped will make them useful to others. The aim has been to 
introduce the student to the most important facts and chief methods 
of experimental psychology so far as they are adapted to the handling 
of college men and within a moderate expense for apparatus. The 
course includes experiments upon the Dermal Senses, Static and 
Kinesthetic Senses, Taste, Smell, Hearing, Vision, Psycho-physic. 

[Part II in Press. 

The Connection of Thought and Memory. 

A contribution ro pedagogical psychology. By Herman T. Lukens, Honorary 
Fellow in Psychology in Clark University. Based on F. W. Dorpfeld's Mono- 
graph, " Denken und Gedachtnis." Published under the auspices of the Herbart 
Club, with an Introduction by Dr. G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark Univer- 
sity. Cloth. 000 pages. Retail price, ocoo. 

THIS is a Herbartian book, showing how the interdependence of 
thought and memory should be realized in practice, followed by 
illustrations taken from History, Natural Science, Literature, and 
Arithmetic. It is an application of the theory of Apperception, and is 
intended for teachers 1 reading-circles, normal schools, and private 
reading. Being based on the work of Dorpfeld, which grew out of 
round-table conferences with teachers, it may be said to have already 
proved its helpfulness for teachers in Germany ; and the adaptation to 
American ideas and conditions, while modifying the original in many 
respects, keeps true to its ideal. 

Although in the main following Herbartian principles, the book does 
not ignore the suggestions of psychological work that has been done 
in the last fifty years, but it is in touch with the latest approved ideas 
of the present day. \In Press, ready soon. 



HISTORY. 



Sheldon's United States History. For grammar schools. Follows the " seminary " 
or laboratory plan. " By it the child is not robbed of the right to do his own think- 
ing." Half leather. $1.25. 

Teacher's Manual to Sheldon's United States History, a key to the above 

system. 60 cts. 

Sheldon's General History. For high school and college. The only general history 
following the "seminary" or laboratory plan now advocated by leading teachers. 
Half leather. $1.75. 

Sheldon's Greek and Roman History. Contains the first 250 pages of the above 

book. #1.00. 

Teacher's Manual to Sheldon's History. Puts into the instructor's hand the key 
to the above system. 85 cts. 

Sheldon's Aids to. the Teaching of General History. Gives also list of most 

essential books for a reference library. 10 cts. 

Thomas's History Of the United States. For schools, academies, and the general 
reader. A narrative history with copious references to sources and authorities. Fully 
illustrated. 532 pages. Half leather. $1.25. 

Shumway's A Day in Ancient Rome. With 59 illustrations. Should find a place 
as a supplementary reader in every high-school class studying Cicero, Horace, Taci- 
tus, etc. 75 cts. 

Old SOUth Leaflets. Reproductions of important political and historical papers, ac- 
companied by useful notes. Each, 5 cts. and 6 cts. For titles see separate lists. Per 
hundred, $3. 00. 

Allen's History Topics. Covers Ancient, Modern, and American history, and gives an 
excellent list of books of reference. 121 pages. Paper. 30 cts. 

Fisher's Select Bibliography of Ecclesiastical History. An annotated list of 

the most essential books for a theological student's library. 15 cts. 

Hall's Method Of Teaching History. "Its excellence and helpfulness ought to 
secure it many readers." — The Nation. #1.50. 

Phillips' History and Literature in Grammar Grades. A paper read before the 

Department of Superintendence, at Brooklyn, N.Y. Paper. 15 cts. 



See also our list of Old South Leaflets. 



D. C. HEATH & CO., PUBLISHERS, 

BOSTON. NEW YORK. CHICAGO. 



education. 



Compayr6's History Of Pedagogy. " The best and most comprehensive history of 

Education in English." —Dr. G. S. Hall. $1-75. 
Compayre^S Lectures On Teaching. "The best book in existence on the theory and 

practice of education."— Supt. MacAlister, Philadelphia. $1.75. 

Compayre's Psychology Applied to Education. A clear and concise statement 

of doctrine and application on the science and art of teaching. 90 cts. 

De Garmo'S Essentials Of Method. A practical exposition of methods with illustra- 
tive outlines of common school studies. 65 cts. 

De GarmO'S Lindner's Psychology. The best Manual ever prepared from the 
Herbartian standpoint. $1.00. 

Gill's Systems Of Education. " It treats ably of the Lancaster and Bell movement 
in education, — a very important phase." — Dr. W. T. Harris. $1.25. 

Hall's Bibliography of Pedagogical Literature. Covers every department of 

education. Interleaved, *$2. 00. $1-30. 
Herford'S Student's Froebel. The purpose of this little book is to give young people 
preparing to teach a brief yet full account of Froebel's Theory of Education. 75 cts. 

Malleson's Early Training of Children. "The best book for mothers I ever 

read." — Elizabeth P. Peabody. 75 cts. 

Marwedel's Conscious Motherhood. The unfolding of the child's mind in the 

cradle, nursery and Kindergarten. $2.00. 
Newsholme'S School Hygiene. Already in use in the leading training colleges in 
England. 75 cts. 

Peabody's Home, Kindergarten, and Primary School. "The best book out- 
side of the Bible that I ever read." — A Leading Teacher. $1.00. 

PestalOZZi's Leonard and Gertrude. "If we except 'Emile' only, no more im- 
portant educational book has appeared for a century and a half than ' Leonard and Ger- 
trude.' " — The Nation. 90 cts. 

RadestOCk'S Habit in Education. " It will prove a rare ' find' to teachers who are 
seeking to ground themselves in the philosophy of their art." — E. H. Russell, Worces- 
ter Normal School. 75 cts. 

Richter's Levana ; or, The Doctrine of Education. "A spirited and scholarly 

book." — Prof. VV. H. Payne. $1.40. 
Rosmini'S Method in Education. " The most important pedagogical work ever 

written." — Thomas Davidson. $1.50. 
ROUSSeau's Emile. " Perhaps the most influential book ever written on the subject of 

Education." — R. H. Quick. 90 cts. 
Methods Of Teaching Modern Languages. Papers on the value and on methods 

of teaching German and French, by prominent instructors. 90 cts. 

Sanford's Laboratory Course in Physiological Psychology. The course 

includes experiments upon the Dermal Senses, Static and Kinaesthetic Senses, Taste, 
Smell, Hearing, Vision, Psychophysic. In Press. 

Lange's Apperception : A monograph on Psychology and Pedagogy. Trans- 
lated by the members of the Herbart Club, under the direction of President Charles 
DeGarmo, of Swarthmore College. $1.00. 

Herbart'S Science Of Education. Translated by Mr. and Mrs. Felken with a pref- 
ace by Oscar Browning. $1.00. 

Tracy's Psychology Of Childhood. This is the first general treatise covering in a 
scientific manner the whole field of child psychology. Octavo. Paper. 75 cts. 
Sent by mail, postpaid, on receipt of price. 

D. C. HEATH & CO., PUBLISHERS, 

BOSTON. NEW YORK. CHICAGO. 



